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ABSTRACT 
This research works toward the systematic development of a Habermasian perspective on 
moral validity within the context of educational administration. Its central aims are to 
promote Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality as a suitable moral epistemology for 
the field and to provide an initial examination of current attitudes toward adopting 
district-wide educational initiatives in Newfoundland and Labrador from a moral point of 
view. Habermas’s clear specification of conditions necessary for the justifiability of 
morally valid policy- and decision-making offers a promising avenue for empirical 
research. This facet of his moral epistemology is an ideal point for researchers to grasp 
the philosophical framework and apply it to real cases. The current study focuses on how 
senior administrators at one school-board office interpret the four necessary conditions of 
practical discourse in relation to their work in adopting district-wide initiatives. The 
method of investigation is semi-structured, in-depth qualitative interviewing. The 
attitudes and perspectives of the district’s Director of Education and three Assistant 
Directors are explored. These interviews are supplemented with the reflections of a 
former Director of Education and a former Assistant Director of Human Resources from 
two additional school districts in Newfoundland and Labrador. Each participant was 
asked to provide a personal example of the process of adopting educational initiatives and 
to comment on how they saw each of the four conditions of practical discourse operating 
within such processes. Key aspects of their responses are presented and implications of 
their responses for the moral validity of educational initiatives are discussed along with 
prospects for further research and the education of future administrators.
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 Jürgen Habermas argues that moral validity within pluralist societies can be 
established only through engagement in public deliberation or “practical discourse” 
defined by the following four necessary conditions: all who might make a relevant 
contribution must be included; all participants must be granted an equal opportunity to 
contribute; all participants must mean what they say; and all participants must be free 
from coercion (Habermas, 2003; 1998). These idealizing conditions of practical discourse 
orient participants toward cooperative attainment of mutual understanding and joint 
agreement in accord with the discourse principle (D): “Only those norms can claim to be 
valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas, 1990, p.66). As such, the moral validity 
or “rightness” of social norms and policies is grounded in dialogical norms of 
communication. These norms are the unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation 
wherein interlocutors incorporate the insights and perspectives of an ever-widening 
sphere of contributors in a search for mutual understanding and agreement on substantive 
moral issues. This rational reconstruction of communicative interaction forms the basis of 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality, more commonly translated as “Discourse 
Ethics”.  
 Habermas’s (D) and his identification of necessary conditions of practical 
discourse are central to the theoretical and practical aims of the current study. As a 
metaethical principle that is consistent with universal egalitarianism, (D) obligates social 
cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution through sincerity and reciprocal perspective-
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taking. The principle also maintains a purely epistemic ground of moral judgement that, 
nonetheless, reflects collective moral intuitions about right and wrong. The four 
conditions of practical discourse, moreover, frame an impartial moral point of view that 
is supportive of growing concern for equality in educational governance. The conditions, 
as such, offer an exceptional means of guiding and assessing how decisions are made, 
conflicts resolved, and norms validated in public education. On this basis, Habermas’s 
Discourse Theory of Morality appears as a highly promising moral epistemology for the 
contemporary field of educational administration.  
 In light of this promise, the following research undertakes an initial foray into 
understanding and applying Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality within the formal 
education system of Newfoundland and Labrador. It opens with provision of converging 
reasons that support the timeliness of this study. Here, in the introductory chapter, the 
value and relevance of a Discourse Theory of Morality to the field of educational 
administration is initially appraised. The second chapter maps the conceptual framework 
of this study by explaining Habermas’s intersubjectivist interpretation of Kant’s moral 
point of view. Specific attention is given to the place and significance of reciprocity and 
sincerity in Habermas’s conception of moral judgement (2.1). The second chapter 
concludes with an identification and discussion of the four necessary conditions of 
“practical discourse” (the communicative practice at the core of Habermas’s Discourse 
Theory of Morality). Habermas views these conditions, in concert with (D), as providing 
the criteria of a cogent moral epistemology for posttraditional societies (2.2).   
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 In Chapter Three, a review is made of the historical progression of thought that 
has brought growing concern for incorporating a viable moral epistemology in the theory 
and practice of educational administration (3.1). In support of the current interest, Peter 
Senge’s influential work on dialogue and discussion is introduced as a prime example of 
the theorizing of communication practices for the field (3.2). The conditions of practical 
discourse are then compared and contrasted with these well-accepted views of 
organizational communication. This allows a case to be made for the value of 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality as a moral epistemology that would allow 
educational organizations to engage in communicative rationality, thereby stepping 
beyond the instrumental reasoning that characterizes much of the administration literature 
grounded in systems theory (3.3). 
 Attention subsequently turns to specifics of the current study as Chapter Four 
provides a straightforward account of various matter-of-fact aspects of the research. 
These include ethical considerations (4.1), participant recruitment (4.2), limitations of the 
study (4.3), method of data collection (4.4), the suitability of in-depth qualitative 
interviews to the current study (4.5), and a description of how the data were sorted and 
analysed (4.6). In keeping with specifics of the current study, Chapter Five presents a 
short series of sketches detailing the professional profile of each of the six research 
participants. This chapter highlights the wealth of administrative experience represented 
in the interviews that form the empirical backbone of this study.   
 In Chapter Six, each of the four conditions of practical discourse is explored 
within the context of the educational setting. This is where the bulk of the empirical 
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research and analysis is presented. Each condition is afforded its own sub-chapter, and 
each sub-chapter works to characterize the general view and attitude of the respondents 
concerning inclusion (6.1), participation (6.2), truthfulness (6.3), and non-coercion (6.4) 
in their practice of school-district administration. This contextual characterization of the 
conditions offers insight into the similarities and differences of understanding the 
conditions as strategically important to the success of, or epistemically necessary to, the 
moral validity of policy- and decision-making.  
 The interviews also provide direction for further considerations in applying a 
Discourse Theory of Morality to the practice of educational administration and the work 
of addressing these concerns is taken up in Chapter Seven. The first consideration 
pertains to doubt regarding the plausibility of Habermas’s rational reconstruction of the 
necessary conditions of practical discourse as universally valid (7.1). The main aim of 
this sub-chapter is to allay charges that Habermas’s project is an inherently Eurocentric 
view of morality that rests too heavily on a Western understanding of the need for 
impartiality in moral deliberation. The subsequent section of Chapter Seven (7.2) argues 
that Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality can provide sufficient space in its 
application to attend to the context sensitivity of particular cases of moral judgement. 
Here, the challenge is to demonstrate that Habermas has provided sufficient philosophical 
resources to satisfy the clear need for mutual recognition and reflexivity in practical 
discourse, that the symmetry and reciprocity sought in discourse can accommodate a non-
levelling intersubjectivity. That such sensitivity is possible within the provisions of 
Habermas’s project is further supported by the introduction of “application discourses” 
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which are intended to augment the context sensitivity of justificatory discourses in the 
application of norms to concrete situations. The final section of Chapter Seven considers 
the practicality of applying counterfactual conditions of communication to the real-world 
demands of educational organizations (7.3). A conception of “rational trust” is considered 
and developed in an attempt to bridge the gap between the role of the conditions as 
regulative ideals and the pressures and constraints of institutional policy- and decision-
making. This marks an effort to make feasible applications of Habermasian discourse 
theory to formal education. It recognizes inherent organizational limits while maintaining 
the epistemic value of the conditions for securing moral validity.  
 In Chapter Eight, the final chapter, directions are suggested for further research 
extending from the current study and recommendations are made for cultivating the 
moral point of view of educational administrators. Directions for future work are divided 
into empirical investigation aimed at checking the veracity of decision makers and the 
barriers to practical discourse that constituents may face (8.1), and critical analysis of 
purported educational imperatives and supposed understandings as well as the impact 
these assumptions have on education policy (8.2). The chapter ends with 
recommendations to enhance the administrative awareness and orientation to the moral 
point of view through the explicit instruction of moral theory in educational leadership 
programmes, and by fostering, in prospective administrators, the dispositions appropriate 
to practical discourse (8.3).                
In an era marked by calls for deepening equity and democracy in policy 
development worldwide (UNDP, 2002), the case for Habermas’s Discourse Theory of 
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Morality as a theoretical framework for guiding and assessing policy is advancing 
internationally in many areas of administrative studies, including medicine (Greenhalgh, 
Robb, & Scambler, 2006) and business (Meisenbach, 2006; Rasche & Esser, 2006). 
While Habermasian critical social theory has received some attention in the educational 
literature (Ewert, 1991; Murphy & Fleming, 2009; Okshevsky, 2004), there has been 
little systematic study of the contribution his Discourse Theory of Morality can make 
toward securing the moral validity of educational policy- and decision-making (for 
exceptions see: Foster, 1980; 1986; Johnson & Pajares, 1996; and in a Canadian context 
see: Harris, 2002; Martin,  2012; Milley, 2002). As his work on communicative 
rationality forms the core of Habermas’s critical social theory, this research seeks to 
promote and encourage further interest in the potential value of Habermasian discourse 
theory to critical perspectives on education. Through an investigation of its specific 
contributions to the context of educational governance, the potential of Habermas’s 
Discourse Theory of Morality to support critical stances on schooling should appear more 
evident. An intended aim, as such, is to provide a groundwork for making more equitable 
and democratic policy decisions in education.    
Across Canada, the current trend in public schooling is decidedly in favour of 
administration and regulation by fewer and larger districts (Wotherspoon, 2009) and 
recent reforms to the Newfoundland and Labrador school system are consistent with this 
trend. The resulting centralization of educational authority increases the overall range and 
impact of district-wide initiatives, making school districts key sites of investigation for 
any study of decision-making in formal education. This general trend toward 
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consolidation and centralization of decision-making authority in Canadian schooling 
gives the current study not only provincial but national relevance as well. Moreover, 
because consolidation increases the impact of district-level decisions, studies aimed at 
better understanding the opinions and practices of district administrators are essential in 
moving the public school system toward more democratic and equitable decision-making 
practices (Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009). In short, school districts matter and will 
continue to matter with increasing importance as the trend toward consolidation in 
educational governance continues. 
In addition to the widening interest in democratization and the general trend 
toward consolidation in schooling, researchers in educational administration have also 
come to recognise the need for greater representation of diversity in, and more equitable 
procedures governing, normative deliberation and decision-making. Current appreciation 
of this need has motivated a substantial increase in calls for investigation of fair and 
inclusive decision-making frameworks in the field. Yet, there are few empirical studies of 
equitable practices to date and progress in addressing the need for equitable decision 
making both in the provision of theory and in the reform of practices has been slow to 
materialize. What is apparent in this as yet unaddressed surge of moral consciousness is 
that the study of educational administration has reached a tipping point where it can no 
longer justify or recommend practices solely on the bases of their strategic validity. 
While this shift can be characterized in various ways and under various headings as a 
move toward “democracy”, “equity”, and/or “social justice”, it is fundamentally a 
philosophical reorientation of the study of educational administration – a philosophical 
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reorientation of the field towards taking “a moral point of view” in a very specific, 
constructivist sense of the phrase.  
The growing interest in the value of Habermasian discourse theory to 
administrative studies and public governance, the trend across Canada toward 
consolidation of educational decision-making authority into fewer and larger school 
districts, and the general progression of thought in educational administration toward 
consideration of moral decision making offer converging rationales for undertaking the 
current study. Of these converging rationales, the one most relevant to the present study 
is the progression of thought that concerns itself with the moral dimension of 
administrative decisions in education. This is because the field of educational 
administration, which has long sought a knowledge base to support its practices, now 
finds itself in a defining moment as substantively moral values of democratic 
representation and equity in decision making are increasingly driving research into and 
critique of current practices.  
While many in the field are viewing this moral orientation in terms of 
“democracy”, “equity”, and “social justice”, the current research attempts to support and 
promote the shift by providing a more direct link between district administration and 
critical social theory, and specifically by linking the process of creating justifiable district 
policy initiatives to Habermas’s work on a Discourse Theory of Morality. This approach 
is not inconsistent with recent interest in communicative rationality in administrative 
research and the present trend of consolidation in school-district administration. Most 
importantly, however, the current research offers support for and promotion of the 
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progression of thought in educational administration in orientating the field toward a 
well-articulated and philosophically robust moral point of view. That is, this work 
contributes to the articulation and justification of a moral epistemology suitable to 
educational administration and research by examining the opinions and practices of 
school-district administrators in relation to the necessary epistemic conditions of practical 
discourse as delineated by Habermas.     
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Chapter Two 
Framing Habermas’s Moral Point of View 
 
This study attempts to focus some of the critical interest in administrative research 
on social justice, equity, and democracy to an explicitly moral point of view within 
educational administration. The specific moral point of view petitioning to join the 
progression of thought in educational administration, in this case, is that of Jürgen 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality. Notwithstanding his central role in 
developing critical social theory, the study and application of Habermas’s ideas and their 
impact remains minimal within educational administration literature. As noted earlier, 
important but rare exceptions include Foster (1980; 1986) and, through his influence, 
Johnson & Pajares (1996) as well as Harris (2002) and, through her influence, Milley 
(2002). In the main, these works refer to Habermas’s “ideal speech situation” (a term 
dating back to an early formulation of his discourse theory) as presenting a sound 
philosophical foundation for educational administration practices concerned with 
democratic reform and giving voice to people traditionally marginalized in public 
education. In keeping with the promise of such earlier work, the application of 
Habermas’s discourse-theoretical approach to the problem of establishing the moral 
validity of educational initiatives offers important guidance and resources for supporting 
the moral turn presently taking place in educational governance and for revising 
influential ideas in the current literature, such as Senge’s conceptualizations of dialogue 
and decision making.  
Key to the success of this research is, first, the provision and explanation of a 
suitable moral epistemology and, second, the cogent application of that conceptual 
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framework to the setting of educational governance. In general, a Kantian moral 
epistemology gives an account of the nature and criteria of justifiable claims to moral 
rightness. It outlines what it means to take a moral (and ethical) point of view on a 
substantive issue in accordance with a perspective of universal egalitarianism. In doing 
so, it identifies characteristics and competencies claimed as universally necessary and 
culturally appropriate to making practical decisions. Other familiar examples of moral 
epistemology include Aristotle’s virtue based ethics, Rawls’ concept of an overlapping 
consensus, and MacIntyre’s weighing of cultural traditions. Different moral 
epistemologies offer distinct conceptual schemes, frames of reference, and possibilities 
for constructing supporting sets of deliberative abilities and dispositions, but they all seek 
to identify specific criteria for what makes a judgement morally justifiable or right.  
From a Kantian perspective, the moral point of view sets formal conditions on 
practical reasoning with the aim of forming judgements that are impartial and 
universalizable (Wagner & Simpson, 2009). This approach to practical reason and 
judgement seeks a moral point of view that is not grounded in morally substantive values 
but one that can provide the formal resources for assessing the impartial and universal 
rightness of a norm or policy. In this specific sense, the work of the moral philosopher is 
in theorizing and reconstructing a necessary or indispensable procedural principle for 
making moral judgements while recognizing that “The content that is tested by a moral 
principle is generated not by the philosopher but by real life” (Habermas, 1990, p. 204). 
A moral epistemology intending impartiality and universality is inherently formal and 
procedural and this proceduralism is found in the work of all Kantian theorists, including 
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Habermas’s. Kantian proceduralism, moreover, is constructivist in that it delineates a 
procedural practice for moral deliberation but does not supply the deliberative content. 
This means that moral maxims, norms, and principles are rationally produced or 
constructed within the formal epistemic procedure (Habermas, 1994). As the central aims 
of this study are to develop Habermas’s epistemological interpretation of practical reason 
and judgement as a moral framework for educational administration, and to apply his 
conditions of practical discourse to the current attitudes and practices of select school-
district administrators, an explanation of his theoretical position is essential.  
Habermas’s central contribution to moral epistemology is his insightful reframing 
of Kant’s conception of the moral point of view. At its most general, this reframing may 
be viewed as moving from an individualist to an intersubjectivist understanding of moral 
deliberation (i.e., from the philosophy of consciousness to a formal pragmatics of 
communication) and, as further moving, from a grounding of moral validity in 
“monological” acts of thought and imagination to a grounding of moral validity in 
dialogical acts of communicative interaction: “I think that the task of philosophy is to 
clarify the conditions under which moral and ethical questions alike can be decided 
rationally by the participants themselves” (Habermas, 1994, p. 175). Habermas makes 
clear that both these moves are made while attempting to preserve the fundamental 
insight of Kant’s moral theory through a form of communication that “makes possible a 
justification of moral norms convincing to all participants because of its impartiality” 
(Habermas, 1998, p. 41). From this vantage point, all moral norms and policies must pass 
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a test of their impartiality and universalizability by attaining the uncoerced, mutual 
agreement of all participants under conditions of symmetry, reciprocity, and sincerity.  
Habermas credits Kant with “the explication of the moral point of view, that is, a 
point of view that permits the impartial treatment of questions of justice” across 
particular perspectives of any single ethical community (1994, p. 24). Kant frames this 
impartial viewpoint within a single rationally reconstructed principle, the Categorical 
Imperative. In its formulation as Universal Law it reads: “So act that the maxim of your 
will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law” (Kant, 
1993, p. 30). Habermas also argues, differing from Kant, that the competence of an 
individual testing norms and policies under the Categorical Imperative cannot on its own 
satisfy the impartial and universal requirement of the moral point of view. As Habermas 
(1998) insists, “[Kant] tacitly assumes that in making moral judgments each individual 
can project himself sufficiently into the situation of everyone else through his own 
imagination” (p. 33). The main problem Habermas sees in testing maxims against the 
Categorical Imperative in concrete situations is the insufficiency of one’s individual 
powers of reason, imagination, and insight. The origin of this problem, according to 
Habermas (1999a), is Kant’s understanding of moral epistemology as “ahistorical” (i.e., 
failing to recognize the historical situatedness of standards of rationality) and “mentalist” 
(i.e., drawing upon a false division between an inner mind and an outer world). That is, 
Kant’s epistemological assumptions about the universal and generally uniform capacity 
for moral reasoning lead him to argue for the possibility of personal moral objectivity – 
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an objectivity on the part of the individual that is grounded in what Kant took to comprise 
transcendental conditions of human reason.  
Habermas regards these assumptions as problematic. He attributes part of his 
analysis of Kant to the original work of Hegel: “The thrust of Hegel’s arguments [against 
Kant] is that abstract morality demands too taxing a motivational and cognitive effort on 
the part of individuals” (1999a, p. 150). In terms of cognitive capacities, in societies with 
homogeneous traditions and values, attempts at impartial and universal imagining about 
the moral validity of a maxim go largely unchallenged because the day-to-day moral 
reasoning of individuals can sufficiently meet social expectations. In this sense, the very 
ethnocentricity of individuals’ moral reasoning can blind them to a full testing of a 
maxim’s moral validity – as shall be seen below – while simultaneously assuring them 
that they have made a justifiable moral judgement. In pluralistic societies where a 
multiplicity of interests and value-orientations often compete, however, individualistic 
deliberations on right and wrong via self-projection often prove “inadequate” (Habermas, 
1998, p. 57). Such deliberations may provide individuals with a greater sense of acting 
authentically (i.e., staying true to their beliefs) but they cannot assure satisfaction of the 
impartial and universal requirement of the moral point of view.  
To address this inadequacy, Habermas offers an intersubjectively oriented 
reconstruction of Kant’s moral epistemology: “The good that is relevant from the moral 
point of view shows itself in each particular case from the enlarged first person plural 
perspective of a community that does not exclude anybody” (1998, p. 30). Habermas’s 
work on his Discourse Theory of Morality refocuses the problem of validating moral (and 
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more generally, normative) claims through the exercise of cooperative reason that is not 
grounded in a metaphysical or religious foundation, nor in assumptions about 
“transcendental” human reason in Kant’s sense. For Habermas, “practical discourse” 
answers the epistemic question of how the justification of moral judgments is possible. 
“In raising claims to validity, speakers and hearers transcend the provincial standards of a 
merely particular community of interpreters and their spatiotemporally localized 
communicative practice” (1994, p. 52). This trans-cultural orientation displays a 
genealogical link to Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Kant’s Universal Law, however, is 
reformulated by Habermas into a “dialogical” principle that does not assume people’s 
private “monological” moral reasoning will lead them to the right decision or provide 
them with assurance of the rightness (i.e., impartiality and universalizability) of their 
decisions. Habermas, instead, offers an intersubjective framework for moral reasoning 
that considers practical discourse as an epistemic requirement for justifying moral 
decisions. Practical discourse, as such, provides the only available and hence necessary 
means and assurance that a norm has been assessed from the moral point of view and 
deemed to be justifiable. McCarthy (as Habermas notes; 1990, p. 67) renders this 
difference succinctly: 
From this point of view Habermas’s discourse model represents a procedural 
reinterpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative: rather than ascribing as valid to 
all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law [as Kant would have us 
do], I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing its 
claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without 
contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a 
universal norm. (1978, p. 326)  
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 For Habermas, the reinterpreted principle for testing the moral validity of norms 
now reads: “A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its 
general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be 
jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion” (1998, p. 42; 1994, p. 32; 1990, p. 
65). Habermas uses this “principle of universalization” (U) to integrate the underlying 
criteria of a Kantian moral point of view with the practical necessity of discursively 
testing the impartiality and universality of individual moral reasoning. The 
communicative aspect of intersubjective testing of norms requires that interlocutors enter 
into an actual exchange of reasons in support of their moral validity claims. Again, this is 
because the cognitive content of internal monologues employed in individualist 
procedures for testing maxims against the (CI) is no longer considered sufficient for 
determining the universal acceptability of a norm.  
 Habermas further argues that the moral validity of judgments may be excised 
from charges of cultural relativism and ethnocentrism even while maintaining a 
constructivist understanding of how moral norms are constituted. The basis of this 
argument (which is elaborated in Chapter Seven) rests in a philosophical reconstruction 
of the conditions that are necessary to reaching mutual understanding and joint agreement 
through the cooperative use of language. In this way, the unavoidable features of 
practical discourse provide an impartial orientation in the co-construction and assessment 
of moral norms. This further line of argument informs Habermas’s response to what may 
be understood as the posttraditional challenge to morality: moral judgments are valid 
(i.e., justifiable) insofar as they are mutually and jointly understood and accepted by all 
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affected from an intersubjective point of view under conditions of practical discourse. 
Criticisms of his response are considered in Chapter Seven.    
Habermas believes, moreover, that beyond articulating (U) as the epistemic 
criterion for what should be considered a morally valid norm, he also needs to argue for 
criteria identifying how the validation of a moral claim is to be achieved (Edgar, 2005). 
Consideration of the means of validation leads to a serious problem, however. The 
practical validation of (U) requires a far more refined epistemic principle in order to 
ground the clause:  “jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.” That is, insofar 
as (U) might be misinterpreted as appealing implicitly to substantive moral values of 
inclusion and non-coercion (on the grounds of “natural equality” or “self-evident rights”, 
for example), it cannot be presupposed and applied as a justified epistemic principle 
aimed at establishing moral validity in its required universal sense. The problem 
Habermas is compelled to address is that in arguing for a means of validating moral 
norms he cannot presuppose any substantive “self-evident” moral rights without creating 
a circular, implicitly moral argument. Instead, Habermas must provide a means of 
validating moral claims that is itself free of moral assumptions or values if his theory is to 
make good on its claim to universality. That is, to the degree that (U) could be 
misinterpreted as a moral (i.e., not exclusively epistemic) principle, Habermas is 
compelled to refine the epistemic principle of his Discourse Theory of Morality more 
convincingly.   
This epistemic refinement is a serious philosophical challenge for any moral 
epistemology and especially for a putative impartial and universalist moral epistemology 
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grounded solely in the cooperative use of human reason under communicative conditions 
of sincerity and reciprocity. It leads Habermas to make a complex yet crucial distinction 
between two specific modes of communication. This distinction draws attention to the 
respective aims and purposes of “strategic communication” and those of “practical 
discourse”. In this sense, Habermasian discourse theory takes a pragmatic turn towards 
understanding and reconstructing what a moral epistemology should do: it should identify 
communicative criteria necessary for impartial judgement in “settling questions 
concerning the normative regulation of our everyday coexistence” (Habermas, 1994, p. 
151). For Habermas, the grounds of this explanation are that there are unavoidable 
epistemic presuppositions for the possibility of establishing acceptable (i.e., morally 
valid) norms and that these presuppositions are necessary to avoid performative self-
contradiction during the justificatory procedure of practical discourse (Habermas, 1999b). 
This means communication aimed at the normative regulation of everyday coexistence 
and the construction of a generalizable norm or interest cannot descend into a strategic 
engagement wherein, for example, the true objective of one or more of the participants is 
predetermined and hidden from the others or where the interests of a particular group are 
privileged. Only those acts of communication that support mutual understanding and 
agreement in the coordination of social activity are considered by Habermas to be 
genuinely “communicative” and epistemically constitutive of moral validity: 
I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions in 
which all participants pursue illocutionary aims [i.e. mutual understanding and 
agreement on harmonizing their individual plans of action arising within practical 
discourse], and only illocutionary aims, with their speech acts… I regard as 
linguistically mediated strategic action those interactions in which at least one of 
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the participants wants to produce perlocutionary effects [i.e. preconceived aims 
and objectives] on his opposite number with his speech acts. (1999b, p. 129)  
 
Most apparent in this basic premise of Habermas’s moral epistemology is the need to 
keep practical discourse free of deception and illegitimate privileging of particular 
substantive interests over other substantive interests. This is because deception and 
privileging of one’s own interests denies the participants (including the deceiver) any 
possibility of impartially understanding the merits of others’ proposed courses of action. 
Without this ability to sincerely and collectively assess claims regarding generalizable 
interests, the participants cannot mutually agree on a norm or policy able to coordinate 
their actions. This idea is key to Habermas’s conception of communicative rationality. 
Moreover, recognizing that deception in communicating one’s ends is usually combined 
with a strong desire for personal strategic success, the prospects for understanding (and 
subsequent agreement) are further reduced. Habermas writes, “The teleological actor 
orientation toward success is not constitutive for the successful accomplishment of 
processes of reaching understanding, particularly not when these are incorporated into 
strategic interactions” (1999b, p. 126). 
 This move of placing the moral point of view squarely within a reconstruction of 
communicative and discursive rationality allows Habermas to address the challenge of 
defending his claimed impartial and universal moral epistemology by grounding it solely 
in the cooperative use of human reason – a use that entails specific conditions for 
discursive agreement. Habermas can now make a case for practical discourse as a non-
morally grounded means of justifying moral-validity claims. In order to secure this case, 
he makes a specific abduction from (in the sense of formulating a purely epistemic 
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principle that leaves behind any vestige of substantively moral presuppositions) his moral 
“principle of universalization” (U) to an epistemic “principle of discourse” (D): “Only 
those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all concerned in 
practical discourse” (1998, p. 41; 196, p. 107, 459; 1990, p. 66). Habermas’s formalist 
and proceduralist account demonstrates the prioritization of how norms are to be 
procedurally validated over what specific substantive norms come to be validated. 
Habermas even suggests that (U) is precisely the sort of “moral” principle – in the sense 
of appearing to retain “a residual normative substance” – that can and should be tested 
under the principle of discourse (1998, p. 45). This adds credibility to his assertion that 
mutual understanding and agreement achieved under (D) and the conditions of practical 
discourse comprise the source and ground of moral validity (as well as legal justice and 
political legitimacy within democratic societies) (1998). 
In the epistemological sense of justifying decisions from a moral point of view, 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality has relevance for educational governance in 
that (D) offers two important directions for thinking about administering public education 
in multiculturally pluralist democracies. First, it articulates a universally valid, non-
relativistic moral point of view from which educational policy and decisions can be 
justifiably constructed, rationally criticized, and revised. Second, it offers a practical 
principle for policy- and decision-making that supports, without being dependent upon, 
the moral predispositions to inclusion and non-coercion at the core of equitable 
conceptions of public education. For a field in search of a well-justified and impartial 
 
 
 
 
21
moral epistemology, (D) and its supporting epistemic conditions present an exceptional 
opportunity.  
2.1 Clarifying the Core of Collective Moral Intuitions: Reciprocity and Sincerity  
 Of utmost importance to the current research is how a pragmatic differentiation of 
the basic aims of strategic communication and communication for moral judgement bears 
upon Habermas’s conceptualization of the moral point of view. It is clear that such a 
point of view must, at a minimum, be inclusive and free of coercion as these conditions 
are embedded within (U). Why, however, are these conditions identified in the principle 
of universalization? This question connects the moral point of view directly back to the 
essential aim of language: reaching understanding. Habermas (1990) explains: “The 
sought-after moral point of view that precedes all controversies originates in a 
fundamental reciprocity that is built into action oriented toward reaching understanding” 
(p. 163). If a fundamental intuition about reciprocity is at the core of the moral point of 
view, then reciprocal perspective taking must be preserved in the conditions of practical 
discourse if such discourse is to facilitate mutual understanding. This, Habermas argues, 
is because reciprocity is part of a “substantive background consensus” on what it means 
to engage in unbiased moral deliberation (1998, p. 42). Collectively, there exists an 
intuitive appreciation that reciprocity in the sharing of perspectives is a requirement for 
impartial and universalist deliberations and judgements. This requirement takes on 
epistemic meaning when recognized as a necessary presupposition of individuals engaged 
in the cooperative construction of a generalizable interest. Habermas writes, “a 
universalistic conception [of morality] that wants to avoid false abstractions must draw 
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on insights from the theory of communication” (1998, p. 40). From such insights, 
Habermas concludes that reciprocity is an indispensable communicative condition 
because it upholds inclusion as a fundamental aspect of the moral point of view: a 
reciprocal exchange of reasons orientated toward reaching joint agreement cannot take 
place without the inclusion of all other relevant perspectives. 
 The condition of non-coercion as it appears in (U) appeals to a somewhat 
different but equally fundamental aspect of the moral point of view: sincerity. Like 
inclusion, non-coercion supports a moral intuition at the core of an impartial and 
universalistic viewpoint and provides an essential condition for reaching mutual 
understanding and joint agreement. In this sense, non-coercion is both a commonly 
accepted moral norm and a communicative epistemic norm for which there is no 
functionally equivalent alternative. On either moral or communicative grounds, therefore, 
non-coercion is a condition ruling out repression (in the negative) and opening space for a 
sincere exchange of reasons (in the positive). As a communicative norm, Rehg (1997) 
summarizes the importance of non-coercion as follows: “Insofar as some participants 
were kept from expressing their interests, either through internal or external coercion, the 
other participants could not be assured that their consensus rested on the better argument” 
(p. 64). Coercion, as such, interferes with the free and undominated mutual understanding 
of participants, blocking the insight made available only through a sincere exchange of 
perspectives. From the moral point of view, coercion similarly impedes the fundamental 
reciprocity needed for impartial judgements. The condition of non-coercion allows for the 
possibility that an agreement really is based on a cooperative search for an impartial 
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policy, a policy that is generalizable or universalizable because it is equally in the interest 
of all. Consequently, the condition of non-coercion is embedded in (U) to promote the 
sincerity of all participants’ self-understanding and self-expression in practical discourse.         
Through his restoration of the moral point of view, Habermas identifies shared 
moral intuitions about reciprocity and sincerity and then makes them epistemically 
meaningful to the search for joint understanding and justifiable agreement. He has a 
further objective, however, to provide the criteria of a cogent moral epistemology for 
posttraditional societies. Toward this objective, Habermas undertakes a rational 
(philosophical) reconstruction of the necessary presuppositions of argumentation (or 
discourse) as the indispensable conditions for establishing an impartial and universalist 
viewpoint. This viewpoint is now framed by the communicative action of jointly 
searching for understanding and agreement, and its reconstruction is now solely 
concerned with identifying the necessary epistemic conditions of communicative actions 
(actions oriented to mutual understanding). Habermas justifies the conditions of practical 
discourse on epistemic reasons alone by grounding them in argumentation and without 
reliance on reciprocity and sincerity as substantive moral norms. On the “right” of 
inclusion and “duty” to be truthful, for example, he asserts:  
The content of the universal presuppositions of argumentation is by no means 
“normative” in the moral sense [because this would lead to a circular justification 
of practical discourse]. For inclusivity only signifies that access to discourse is 
unrestricted; it does not imply the universality of binding norms of action. The 
equal distribution of communicative freedoms and the requirement of truthfulness 
in discourse have the status of argumentative duties and rights, not of moral 
duties and rights. (1998, p. 44)  
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While Habermas’s epistemic commitment to “inclusivity” is hereby retained in the 
practice of practical discourse, his commitment is not kept by presupposing a moral right 
of inclusion. The same epistemic commitment is kept for “the equal distribution of 
communicative freedoms” for “truthfulness”, and elsewhere, for “non-coercion” 
(Habermas, 1998, p. 44). For Habermas, these are the epistemic rights and duties that 
protect all interlocutors from the hidden, strategic, or simply mistaken understandings 
and intentions of others. This is an important strength of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of 
Morality: the provision of epistemic “duties and rights” that align with but remain 
independent from moral intuitions. This is often overlooked by those advancing “critical” 
perspectives on policy- and decision-making in educational administration in an effort to 
promote greater equity, democracy, and social justice. 
 In pluralistic societies, the impartiality and universalizability test required by the 
moral point of view can no longer be assumed individually from within a community of 
homogeneous value-orientations. Habermas states this point clearly: “the moral point of 
view can only be realized under conditions of communication that ensure that everyone 
tests the acceptability of a norm” (Habermas, 1998, p. 33). This requirement to actually 
test norms and policies intersubjectively supports the validity of moral judgment through 
cooperative deliberations on the impartiality and universalizability of contested norms 
and policies. 
 By contrast, his formal-pragmatic study of strategic communication reveals an 
inherent orientation of participants towards “success, i.e., the consequences or outcomes 
of their actions” (1990, p. 133). Strategic communications, as such, need not be oriented 
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by reciprocity or sincerity because the underlying telos is fundamentally different. The 
participants in such deliberations treat each other strategically whereby the coordination 
of their actions “depends on the extent to which their egocentric utility calculations 
mesh” (p. 133). The degree of cooperation in coming to accept a proposed action is left 
up to each individual’s instrumental reasoning. Moreover, collective moral intuitions 
about reciprocity and sincerity are no longer relevant to the structure of strategic action. 
In turn, the norms and expectations associated with an egalitarian viewpoint are not 
binding on strategic communication. Each discussant is free to influence the decision of 
the others by any means available.  
 Along with the loss of collective moral intuitions, the epistemically relevant 
conditions of inclusion and non-coercion can also be set aside or limited. This is because 
strategic reasoning needs no intersubjective support if the decision maker(s) see(s) no 
success value in the input of others. As a result, the understanding of those affected by a 
decision may be limited and the resulting agreement to act may be piecemeal so long as 
the preconceived end is obtained. Ironically, the strategic use of communication denies 
all participants – even those whose supposed interests are being promoted – the 
opportunity to collectively assess initiatives and to make informed choices about what 
actions are generalizable – i.e., equally in the interest of all. In this sense, the only 
meaningful presupposition of strategic communication is the eventual compliance of 
participants with the coordination of successful interactions – satisfying a presupposition 
that forebears the loss of moral insight and validity.    
2.2 The Four Necessary Conditions of Practical Discourse 
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Thus far, Habermas’s clarification of the core of collective moral intuitions and 
his differentiation between communication oriented toward success and that oriented 
toward understanding have clearly revealed two conditions necessary to taking a moral 
point of view: inclusion and non-coercion. It is now possible to extend his formal-
pragmatic analysis to identify the full set of specific conditions that must be in effect in 
order to constitute an impartial moral perspective and justifiable moral judgement. To 
identify the epistemic conditions necessary to the moral point of view, Habermas uses a 
philosophical argument to reconstruct the circumstances that must be functioning if 
participants in discourse are to avoid performative self-contradiction in the pursuit of 
mutual understanding and agreement.  
In order for participants to sufficiently test the moral validity of a norm and, 
thereby, come to a mutual understanding and agreement on its rightness, they must avoid 
communicating in a manner that is self-deluding, consciously deceptive, manipulative, or 
insincere. Moreover, the structure of the discourse must be such that communication is 
not contrary to the symmetrical and reciprocal orientation of communicating for the 
purpose of mutual understanding and agreement. In this sense, “the search for 
performative contradictions provides a guide” to the identification of inescapable 
presuppositions of argumentation (Habermas, 1990, p. 97). Through this “transcendental” 
argument, Habermas identifies and reconstructs the formal features of discourse that are 
universal and unavoidable if interlocutors are to perform in a way that is consistent with 
practical reasoning. In turn, this search tests the necessity of the “rules” or specific 
epistemic conditions within discursive validation of substantive moral norms. Habermas 
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outlines these four necessary conditions of discourse that must be satisfactorily fulfilled 
in the actual communicative practice of moral deliberation as stated by (D):  
(i) that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded; (ii) that 
all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions; (iii) that 
the participants must mean what they say; and (iv) that communication must be 
freed from external and internal coercion so that the “yes” or “no” stances that 
participants adopt on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely by the 
rational force of the better reasons. (1998, p. 44; 1990, p. 89; Rehg, 2009, p. 135) 
  
Note that, in the first condition of inclusion, Habermas allows that all competent actors 
affected by a validity claim are in an epistemic position (in principle) to make a relevant 
contribution and, additionally, that persons relatively unaffected by resulting decisions 
could, nevertheless, still make a relevant contribution to the discourse. As stated above, 
each of the four essential features of practical discourse entails specific argumentative 
duties and rights required to avoid strategic communication in the coordination of social 
activity and search for a generalizable interest. Moreover, each condition provides 
assurance against deception, self-delusion, and performative contradiction in the 
justification of moral norms.  
 To expect that participants in justificatory discourses “mean what they say”, for 
example, is an important mark of the “truthfulness” that is necessary when seeking 
mutual understanding and agreement. Interlocutors cannot identify jointly acceptable 
moral norms if their exchange of reasons is not made sincerely, under the condition of 
truthfulness. As an epistemic necessity, there must be an absence of deception in 
communication if participants are to openly assess their own views and interests and the 
views and interests of others in the process of constructing a generalizable norm or 
interest. This need for sincerity in the pursuit of mutual understanding and agreement has 
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already been recognized in stipulating the condition of non-coercion in (U). At this point 
in his rational reconstruction, however, Habermas is making an explicit appeal to non-
coercion and truthfulness on epistemic grounds, as conditions of sincerity supporting (D). 
Again, the underlying intuition concerns the need for sincerity in moral deliberations, but 
here the emphasis is on the epistemic function of conditions that are supposed to 
guarantee “openness”, “uncoerciveness”, and “transparency” (2003, p. 270). Sincerity in 
practical discourse, therefore, demands a self-critical attitude in which one is honest 
“with oneself” and an empathetic exchange of perspectives that is unbiased “toward one 
another” (p. 269). Hence, truthfulness and non-coercion are the necessary conditions of a 
discourse aiming at agreement on a course of action that is motivated only by collectively 
understood and jointly accepted reasons.  
 Habermas claims the same pragmatic and performative necessity for each of the 
two additional communicative norms: inclusion and participation. In this sense, the 
conception of practical discourse may be construed as a justifiably universal 
reconstruction of the moral point of view in that there exists no equivalent alternative to 
establishing impartial and objective understanding and agreement on the validity of 
substantively moral norms (Habermas, 1990). This is because inclusion and participation 
ensure that the epistemic meaning of reciprocity is respected in that each person affected 
by a decision understands and is willing to accept the foreseeable consequences for all 
concerned. As Okshevsky (in press) remarks on inclusiveness, “The giving and 
evaluation of pragmatic and ethical reasons prevents the marginalization of cultural self-
understandings and worldviews held by particular individuals and groups” (p. 25). The 
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epistemic meaning of reciprocal perspective taking is also captured in the condition of 
participation. Participation as such, offers non-levelling but symmetrical access to the 
exchange whereby “everyone possesses the opportunity to address matters under 
consideration” from the perspective of all involved thereby securing the equal 
distribution of communicative freedoms (p.25). Again, any act of communication that did 
not take place under conditions of inclusion and participation would necessarily 
contradict the aim of reciprocal perspective-taking.   
 Only cases of discourse satisfying all four specific conditions of inclusion, 
participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion can produce agreements that carry the force 
of moral validity as grounded in a collective understanding of what is equally good for 
everyone. With the identification of these epistemic conditions, Habermas structures his 
rational reconstruction of the moral point of view on the basis of a formal-pragmatic 
analysis of practical discourse. His analysis is of “the formal conditions under which 
speakers can make and understand meaningful utterances” (Baynes, 1992, p. 102). The 
result is a form of moral deliberation and judgement that is freed from any substantive 
moral moorings by procedural impartiality but still retains the traditional intuitions about 
what makes something the right thing to do: 
This convergence draws our attention to the fact that the project of a moral world 
that is equally inclusive of everyone’s claims is not an arbitrarily chosen point of 
reference; it is due, rather, to the projection of the universal communicative 
presuppositions of argumentation tout court [period]. (Habermas, 2003, p.261)      
 
While Habermas argues that inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-
coercion are necessary features of practical discourses, or “unavoidable presuppositions 
of argumentation” (Habermas, 1994, p. 56), he also acknowledges that these features will 
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be present as counterfactual idealizations in all actual cases of discourse. As a means of 
critiquing moral judgements, the conditions  of communicative interaction operate in a 
fashion similar to the regulative ideals used in geometry and science. While a rational 
(philosophical) reconstruction of the moral point of view cannot be derived or verified 
empirically through the study of concrete language use, the conditions remain necessary 
features of justificatory discourse that are operational in any specific instance of 
communicative action. As Thomas McCarthy (1991) observes: “Though never fully 
actual, regulative ideals are nonetheless actually effective in structuring our practices – in 
guiding our efforts to fashion just laws and institutions, in shaping our perceptions and 
criticisms of injustice” (p. 122). The value of the conditions of practical discourse, 
therefore, is greatest in the guiding and assessment of decision-making practices where 
the generalizability (i.e., the moral validity or justice) of an outcome is a concern. As 
such, it is the degree of their presence or absence that impacts directly on the moral 
validity that can be claimed of or ascribed to a norm or policy.   
The idealizing conditions of discourse are always counterfactual but open to 
improvement and fuller satisfaction in practice. A discourse-theoretical approach to 
testing norms and policies must actually place the necessary constraints on 
intersubjective deliberation. Participants must proceed under the presuppositions of 
practical discourse as necessary conditions for the non-instrumental use of language 
because the moral validity of contested norms can only be redeemed under such specific 
features of cooperative constraint. As such, the four necessary conditions of practical 
discourse operate as signifiers that the moral point of view is unobscured. Satisfactory 
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fulfilment of inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion frame the moral 
point of view, assuring that the norm in question has been sufficiently tested for its 
impartiality and universal acceptability. 
As the intent of this study is to promote the installation and vitalization of this 
moral point of view within educational administration, recording the current 
understanding of the specific features of discourse by senior decision-makers and the role 
these conditions play in adopting initiatives is an essential first step. This initial research 
is further necessitated by a near absence of empirical studies of Habermasian Discourse 
Theory in the context of educational administration. This lack of empirical research 
seems to underscore the difficulty of conceptualizing just how one is to go about gauging 
the descriptors often associated with Habermasian discourse. These descriptors include 
“power imbalance” and “distorted communication” or “unfettered debate” and 
“unconstrained dialogue” but tend to obscure the sense of communicating within specific 
conditions essential to establishing the moral point of view. What is an unfettered debate 
or unconstrained dialogue, for example, and how do these ideas relate to practical 
discourse?  
Given the conditions of reciprocity and sincerity, practical discourse may well be 
conceived as a mode of communication that is inherently “constrained” and “fettered” for 
good reasons. This suggests that studying a given decision-making process should take 
into account the constraints that align with reciprocity and sincerity as-well-as those that 
do not. In general, however, extant examination of Habermasian discourse in the 
educational literature does not offer specific direction for answering essential questions 
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posed from the standpoint of empirical research. Questions such as “What aspects of 
decision-making should researchers investigate from a moral point of view?” or “How, 
specifically, should critical research distinguish and affirm morally valid initiatives in 
educational administration?” are difficult to approach without first identifying the formal 
features that will need to be considered. While empirical correlates to the epistemic 
conditions of practical discourse may appear in the literature, their identification and 
significance as such is rarely made clear.     
In approaching such questions, and thereby setting the epistemic criteria of a 
moral point of view firmly within administration research, Habermas’s clear specification 
of conditions necessary for the justifiability of morally valid policy- and decision-making 
offers a promising avenue for empirical research. This facet of Habermas’s attempt at 
providing a universalist and cognitivist approach to moral epistemology is an ideal point 
for researchers to grasp the philosophical framework and apply it to real cases. 
Habermas’s identification of such conditions also marks moral judgement as a rational, 
public form of communication whereby specific conditions of argumentation must be met 
in order that agreement on a norm may claim moral validity. In this case, the provision of 
specific conditions of moral validity presents an opportunity to advance educational 
decision-making beyond the strategic rationality of systems thinkers, such as Senge, and 
toward empirical studies of the contribution communicative rationality can make to 
morally valid decision making. This latter point is due to the fact that provision of 
specific features of discourse can guide development of constructs that shed light on 
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deliberative practices. Such studies will begin to operationalize (D) for the particular 
subject matter of morality in the context of educational administration.  
 In an effort to move empirical studies in this direction, the current research 
focuses on the conditions of practical discourse as the most empirically accessible aspect 
of moral validity (Kelly, 2009b). “Practical discourse is an exacting form of 
argumentative decision making… it is a warrant of the rightness (or fairness) of any 
conceivable normative agreement that is reached under these conditions” (Habermas, 
1990, p. 198). As such, a claim to the moral validity of an educational initiative can only 
be constructed under the necessary conditions of practical discourse. The extent of 
presence or absence of these conditions, therefore, presents a point of access to gauging 
the rightness (or fairness) of policy decisions. While this newly opened point of enquiry 
presents many opportunities for a long-term research programme on the role played by 
conditions of practical discourse in formal education, the current study centers on district-
wide initiatives and the opinions of administrators who champion these wide-ranging 
prescriptions. This is because adopting such initiatives can reasonably be claimed to have 
the greatest formal impact on normative expectations for students, parents, teachers, and 
principals – as the constituents most likely to be affected by comprehensive changes to 
school-district policy.  
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Chapter Three 
Towards a Moral Epistemology in Educational Administration 
 
Current literature on educational administration and leadership is thick with 
demands for approaches to governance that promote certain substantive moral values. 
This increasing call for administrators to engage moral values and take a moral stance on 
policy- and decision-making often involves actively advocating for equity, social justice, 
and democracy. In keeping with the mounting conceptual interest in morally oriented 
perspectives, the empirical research is now regularly shaped by normative views and 
values, and offers a wide array of possible factors that inhibit morally right (i.e., 
equitable, just, socially just, democratic, and/or impartial) educational governance. These 
barriers include: inadequate time, ambivalence toward democratic reform, constituents 
unaccustomed to debating issues in an open forum (“public sphere”), school-community 
distrust of district administrators, school-board politics, shortage of finances, insensitivity 
of tenured civil servants, the inordinate number of tasks performed by district leaders, 
and uncritical interpretations of district policy (Goddard & Hart, 2007; Holdaway & 
Genge, 1995; Johnson & Pajares, 1996; Kelly, 2009a; Mintrom, 2001; Ryan & Rottmann, 
2009; Sheppard & Brown, 2006, 2007; Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009). 
The historical progression of thought in educational administration leading to this 
burgeoning concern for moral approaches to practice is rooted in the field’s deep and 
continuing quest for an appropriate knowledge base (Culbertson, 1988). From an 
organization theory perspective, this quest began by following general schools of thought 
within the social sciences in an attempt to explain, predict, and shape the behaviour of 
educational organizations. As such, the progression of ideas in educational administration 
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started with the goal of improving the organizational success of schooling. The current 
calls for equity, social justice, and democracy in educational governance, however, are 
now prompting the field to reconsider the success-oriented aspects of organization theory 
as a model for educational administrators. In turn, the proliferation of equitable, just, and 
democratic perspectives in the field indicates a need to reassess the progress made 
towards an appropriate knowledge base and suggests supplementing the current 
understanding of successful and/or effective educational governance with a suitable 
interpretation of the moral point of view.  
In order to better appreciate how directions taken in educational administration 
arrived at this point, what follows is a brief background description of the selected work 
of influential theoreticians from each organizational school and a discussion of the impact 
of that individual’s work on educational administration. From this charting of 
administrative thought, it will be possible to see how the field of educational 
administration is now pressed to secure a cogent moral epistemology as an important 
component of its knowledge base. The work of Shafritz and Ott (1991) is used to initially 
organize this chapter in that it provides excellent examples of how various schools of 
thought influenced organization theory and because it suggests how this influence may be 
read as a chronological progression of educational administration towards adopting a 
moral epistemology. 
After this chronological review, the next section of the chapter introduces Peter 
Senge’s influential conceptualization and presentation of “dialogue” and “skillful 
discussion”. The work of Senge and his colleagues is a prime example of present research 
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on the forms of communication that operate within organizations. The popularity and 
influence of Senge’s work in educational settings make it especially relevant to the 
current study. In addition, his provision of essential protocols of practice for these 
communication types invites a ready comparison with Habermas’s practical discourse as 
a suitable moral epistemology for educational administration.  
Such a comparison creates an excellent opportunity, taken up in the final section 
of this chapter, to explore the worth and implications of Senge’s prominent ideas for 
bringing a moral point of view to school-district policy development. Despite the 
incredible influence of Senge and his colleagues, and the deep commitment they 
demonstrate to improving organizational communications, systems thinking and the 
learning organization model are shown to hold no necessary moral or epistemic 
commitments. Instead, a contingent view of the conditions of communication emerges 
that fails to recognize either members of organizations as persons who deserve the 
unconditional respect of their administrators or the indispensable epistemic conditions of 
morally valid decision-making discursively understood. 
3.1 The Historical Progression of Thought in Educational Administration   
Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 1916 work on scientific management and 
management principles are highly characteristic of classical organization theory (Shafritz 
& Ott, 1991). The focus of the classical period was on maximization of production in 
order to achieve the economic goals of the organization. Key theories from this period 
incorporated a systemic and scientific view of organizational research, a belief in the 
importance of specialization and division of labour, and the necessity of acting in accord 
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with rational economic principles (Taylor, 1916/1991). A significant effect of Taylorism 
on educational administration can be found in the still relatively unquestioned top-down 
hierarchical relationship between school-district administrators, school administrators, 
and teachers. In formally differentiating the roles and responsibilities of managers and 
workers, Taylor established a structural order for organizations that resists collaboration 
and open dialogue. Another influence of Taylorism and scientific management on 
educational administration is a preoccupation with efficiency and effectiveness in the 
delivery of standardized curricula (Wotherspoon, 2009). By concentrating on efficient 
and effective management, administrators tend to prioritize the on-task performance of 
teachers and students while minimizing the interpersonal aspects of schooling 
(Sergiovanni, Kelleher, McCarthy, & Fowler, 2009).   
The neoclassical period of organization theory offers extensions of, and reactions 
to, the oversimplistic mechanistic views of the classical tradition. Neoclassicalists raised 
complicated issues concerning personal relations, power and politics, and organizational 
culture that foreshadowed many future schools of organization theory. Herbert Simon, for 
example, argued in 1946 that much of the organizational literature of the time did little 
but proclaim a series of contradictory and anecdotal proverbs of administration. In an 
increased effort to maximise the efficiency of organizations, Simon identified two 
constraints that impeded the ability of an individual member of an organization to operate 
effectively: “(a) limits on his ability to perform and (b) limits on his ability to make 
correct decisions” (Simon, 1946/1991, p. 110). With these observations, Simon 
compelled organization theory into research concerning human physiology, learning, and 
 
 
 
 
38
cognition. Within educational administration, the greatest impact of Simon was felt in the 
area of decision making, through his exploration of the effective limits of individual 
rationality (Sergiovanni, Kelleher, McCarthy, & Fowler, 2009) and the coining of the 
term “satisficing” to describe when “no best solution exists to any given problem, but 
some solutions are more satisfactory than others” (Hoy & Miskel, 2008, p. 19). Simon 
asserted that, due to the cognitive limits individuals bring to decision making, the locus of 
a decision must be carefully considered and aligned with the knowledge and experience 
of the decision maker. However, direct transfer of Simon’s work on appropriate location 
of decision making within organizations to the hierarchical structure of formal education 
often results in the further isolation of administrators in their assumed role as executive 
decision makers (Sergiovanni, Kelleher, McCarthy, & Fowler, 2009). That is, the 
accountability structure suggests an autocratic style of leadership wherein followers may 
be consulted for their knowledge and expertise, but the authority to make decisions is 
held securely by the administrator.  
It is arguable that Abraham Maslow’s A Theory of Human Motivation, first 
published in 1943, is the most influential of all works produced by the organizational 
behaviour school. In particular, his construction of a hierarchy of basic needs is still taken 
to be essential material for students of educational administration (Hoy & Miskel, 2008). 
The hierarchy assumes that “man is a perpetually wanting animal” and in constant pursuit 
of fulfilling five basic needs; these are, in consecutive order: physiological, safety, love, 
esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943/1991, p. 171). Applications of Maslow’s 
hierarchy in approaches to educational administration involve seeing needs in relation to 
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motivation. Unfulfilled needs can lead individuals to neglect the duties and 
responsibilities of their position and resist change and innovation. As such, administrators 
should be aware of potential gaps in the need fulfillment of students, teachers, and staff 
and adjust their behaviour so as not to exacerbate deficiencies or frustrate fulfillment of 
need satisfaction (Hoy & Miskel, 2008). For example, a teacher who displays a high need 
for safety may resist new teaching practices or curriculum unless reassured of her or his 
job security. Maslow’s interest in motivating the desired behaviour of organization 
members is a prototype of the psychological perspective taken by the organizational 
behaviour school. This school also inspired Chris Argyris (1993) whose work on action 
science led him to observe ineffective learning in organizations that he analysed using his 
concept of “defensive routines” (p. 15). This concept refers to any policy or action that 
insulates members of an organization from perceived threat. Argyris’s work has 
penetrated educational administration, both directly through his own studies (Argyris, 
1993), and indirectly through the writings of influential educational authorities including 
Senge (2006), Fullan (2001), and Leithwood & Steinbach (1995).    
Modern structural organization theory, which follows the organizational 
behaviour school according to Shafritz and Ott’s (1991) near-chronological historical 
account of organization theory, is concerned with the vertical and horizontal structure of 
organizations and the interrelation of well-defined units in the production process. 
Modern structuralists operate on four basic assumptions: organizations are rational 
undertakings that achieve their best results through systems of defined rules and formal 
authority; every organization has an optimal structure for achieving its ends; specialized 
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divisions of labour increase quality and quantity of production; and structural flaws cause 
most of the problems in an organization (Bolman & Deal, 1984). Very much in keeping 
with these assumptions is Blau and Scott’s (1962/1991) conception of formal 
organizations, but with the added caveat that “In every formal organization there arise 
informal organizations… [wherein] unofficial norms are apt to develop that regulate 
performance and productivity” (p. 214). In educational administration, it is widely 
accepted that the unofficial norms inherent in the informal organization of schooling can 
seriously impact policy implementation or other initiatives (Hoy & Miskel, 2008). For 
example, the hierarchical blueprint on which most educational organizations still operate 
gives rise to norms of communication that discourage open dialogue between district 
administrators, principals, and teachers (Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009).  
Katz and Kahn’s theorizing of “open systems” from 1966 typifies the influx of 
new ideas that entered organization theory after modern structuralism. For Katz and 
Kahn, “The general principle, which characterizes all open systems, is that there does not 
have to be a single method for achieving an objective” (Katz & Kahn, 1966/1991, p. 
278). The open systems perspective transposed ideas from biology and the physical 
sciences to the study of organizations as complex, dynamic, and adaptive systems (Senge, 
2006). In particular, open system theory emphasizes the interdependence of the 
organization on the wider environment. This view is in vivid contrast to earlier 
organization theory, especially modern structuralism, which understood organizations to 
be self-sustaining, fixed, and closed arrangements. The profound influence of the open 
system concept and other organic conceptions of organizations can be found in a wide 
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range of current educational administration literature, including Woods’ (2004) 
conception of “organic governance”, Spillane’s (2005) use of “three types of 
interdependencies identified by Thompson” (p. 146), and Hoy and Miskel’s (2008) 
affirmation that: “Open-systems theory is our general framework for exploring the 
conceptual foundations of educational administration” (p. 20). 
At this juncture in the historical development of organization theory, Shafritz and 
Ott (1991) mark a sharp turn of attention toward what they describe as a “multiple 
constituencies” perspective (p. 343). To this point, theorists and researchers of 
organizations have assumed that their work should seek to identify the nature of various 
cause-and-effect relationships within organizations as well as between organizations and 
their environment. On this assumption, organizations are generally taken to be unified, 
stable, and purposeful in working toward definable goals. For the most part, this approach 
to the study of organizations has itself assumed a position of value neutrality in relation 
to establishing empirical facts about the function of organizations, measuring structural 
performance, and applying a knowledge base to create effective and sustained change. 
With the arrival of a multiple constituencies perspective comes the proposal of alternative 
arguments positing that the operation of organizations, as well as the various theoretical 
perspectives used to understand them, is not value free, unified, or neatly parsed.  
Every organization may, instead, be viewed and shaped from a multiplicity of 
perspectives. Greenfield (1973) writes, “organizations are ideas held in the human mind, 
sets of beliefs – not always compatible – that people hold about the ways they should 
relate to one another” (p. 560). On this account, an organization is as diverse as the array 
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of interests and objectives held by its constituents and the study of organizations, as such, 
resists simplistic rationalization of spurious functions and structures. This view of the 
organization further voices an innovative proposal that meaningful theory and research 
should acknowledge, document, and address the role of specifically moral values in 
organizational life. Keeley (1983/1991) states this idea well: “theories imply not only 
how a puzzling phenomena can be explained – an empirical matter – but what needs to be 
explained – a normative matter” (p. 362); and laments that “the analysis of moral rights 
and obligations has not attracted much serious attention in organizational theory” (p. 
367). 
This new research focus on understanding the complex interests and meaningful 
interactions of various organizational stakeholders soon takes to investigating constituent 
uses of power. In his 1981 analysis of the key role of power in decision making, Pfeffer 
recognizes power as the ability to bring about a desired outcome in a specific social 
relationship and, by natural extension, political activity “is focused around the acquisition 
and use of power” (Pfeffer, 1981/1991, p. 408). This insight frames the view from a 
power and politics perspective on organization theory. For Pfeffer, power and its political 
pursuit are largely unacknowledged in the study of organizations, nor do organizational 
actors give much consideration to who holds power and how it is used within the 
organization. Because of the veiled nature of power, dominant organizational ideals such 
as efficiency, productivity, and effectiveness are rarely examined or challenged.  
The mantle of power in organizations also functions to give decisions an 
appearance of rationality when, in essence, many decisions result from what is described 
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as A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). This 
model understands organizational decision making to be an activity that can be 
undertaken only by those available and that generates solutions determined in large part 
by ambiguous information and random streams of events. According to Pfeffer’s 
(1981/1991) reading of Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) garbage-can theory, it is only 
in retrospect that many organizational decisions appear to be the result of well-
understood processes that involve planning, rational consideration, and regulative 
procedures. This appearance, moreover, is further legitimized when powerful actors in 
the organization condone the process, and support and abide a decision. It is difficult to 
know the degree to which the garbage can model is representative of educational decision 
making or the influence it has had as a topic of educational administration research. 
Undoubtedly, this garbage can contains remnants of truth and the model is consistent 
with the way in which at least some decisions are made in education. Perhaps, the most 
noteworthy example of its upshot is Hoy and Miskel’s (2008) warning that “The garbage 
can metaphor is a description of how decisions sometimes occur; it is not a suggestion for 
action” (p. 345).  
A late but influential arrival to the progression of ideas in educational 
administration is that of organizational culture. Shafritz and Ott (1991) describe 
organizational culture as “the unseen and unobservable force” that is always behind the 
activities that can be seen and observed in an organization (p. 481). Schein (1985) 
provides a more comprehensive, formal definition of this force which includes the 
collective values, conceptions, and behavioural norms held by members of an 
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organization. The key aspects of organizational culture, for Schein, are the basic 
assumptions and beliefs that are adopted and shared by each member of the organization, 
but that operate unconsciously and without critical examination. In this sense, the 
organization’s culture is a learned and complex product of group experience that can be 
modified or unlearned only under the right conditions. Over time, however, an 
organizational culture can become so ingrained in its members that, even when change is 
necessary to save the organization, that crucial change may inadvertently be blocked. 
From an organizational culture perspective, such situations require a transformational 
leader (Bass & Riggio, 2005; Burns, 1978; Leithwood & Duke, 1999) capable of re-
envisioning the organization and transforming the culture at its deepest level (Schein, 
1985). Though it is perhaps the most controversial perspective on organization theory 
(Shafritz & Ott, 1991), organizational culture is a conceptual instrument that has clearly 
resonated in the field of educational administration (Fullan, 2001; Gronn, 2002; Hall & 
Hord, 2006; Hoy & Miskel, 2008; Sarason, 1996; Sergiovanni, Kelleher, McCarthy, & 
Fowler, 2009; Young, Levin, & Wallin, 2007).        
Since the late 1970’s, innovative and alternative directions sought in organization 
research have clearly impacted the theory and practice of educational administration. In 
particular, considerable and crucial reframing of educational policy and decision-making 
has taken place around accounting for the diverse interests of all constituents, recognizing 
the influence of power and politics in schooling, and understanding the organizational 
culture of various educational sites. It is still an open question, however, whether the 
progression of thought in educational administration will complete a full moral turn made 
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available through these new directions in research. A commitment to this turn would 
bring formal recognition of an impartial point of view squarely to the center of leadership 
and governance practices in education.  
What is clear is that educational administration literature, compelled mainly by a 
prescriptive concern to promote what is normatively “right” and critique what is 
“wrong”, now takes a visible and enduring interest in the role of values, power and 
politics, and organizational culture (Foster, 1986; Greenfield, 1986; Hodgkinson, 1996; 
Sergiovanni, 1990). These new approaches to the study of educational governance have, 
moreover, been key in advancing implicitly moral issues of equality, social justice, and 
democracy in the field (Beane, 2002; Hargreaves & Fink, 2008; Gooden & Dantley, 
2012; Hope, 2012; Lees, 1995; Martin, 2013; Milley, 2002; Pinto, Portelli, Rottmann, 
Pashby, Barrett, & Mujuwamariya, 2012; Ryan & Rottmann, 2009; Stevenson, 2007). In 
this sense, the current work is consistent with the increasing concern for establishing a 
moral epistemology that gives an account of the nature and criteria of justifiable claims to 
moral rightness in the practice of educational governance. By articulating and examining 
what it means to take a moral point of view in Habermas’s sense on substantive issues, 
the present research takes its place in the progression of thought in educational 
administration towards identifying and adopting a suitable moral epistemology.    
3.2 Senge’s Influential Conceptualizations of “Dialogue” and “Skillful Discussion” 
With more than one million copies in print, Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline: 
The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization, first published in 1990 and revised 
in 2006, remains highly influential in educational administration. This work, as well as 
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Senge et al.’s The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, published in 1994, provides an excellent 
theoretical backdrop to a more focused discussion of ideas influencing educational 
administrators as they seek a means of addressing the progression of thought and moral 
turn their field has taken. The extent of The Fifth Discipline’s influence can be gauged by 
its direct adaptation in Schools that Learn: A Fifth Discipline Fieldbook for Educators, 
Parents, and Everyone Who Cares about Education (Senge et al., published 2000, revised 
2012). As Senge’s main contribution to educational administration, “learning 
organizations” are defined as “organizations where people continually expand their 
capacity to create the results they truly desire” (Senge, 2006, p. 3). Administrative 
interest in building educational learning organizations is often supported by statements 
such as Fullan’s identification of school development as “changes in schools as 
institutions that increase their capacity and performance for continuous improvements” 
(Fullan, 1992, p. 103).  
One way to interpret the popularity of adapting Senge’s work to educational 
administration is to suggest it exemplifies the field’s present quest for organizational 
frameworks that recognize and value the orientations and interests of all constituents 
(Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009). In the current study, for example, respondents cited 
the work of both Senge and Fullan and used the terms “learning organization” and 
“organizational learning” in describing the most advantageous models of school district 
development as seen from the perspective of multiple constituencies. Senior 
administrators in this study acknowledge the value of the learning organization model to 
increasing the involvement of members of the school system in achieving initiatives, 
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furthering  evidence that Senge is routinely granted the status of “guru” by teachers and 
practitioners of educational administration and ensuring his sway on current and future 
generations of administrators. It is important, therefore, to see if Senge’s ideas offer 
meaningful resources for addressing the progression of thought and moral turn taken in 
the field of educational administration; to see if Senge and his colleagues’ thoughts can 
support giving serious attention to the analysis of moral rights and obligations in 
educational organizations (Keeley, 1983/1991). 
Senge and his co-authors’ presentation and development of the learning 
organization is vast. At issue for the current study is Senge’s narrower explanation and 
promotion of particular modes of linguistic communication within the context of public 
education. For Senge, the specific types of communication that are essential to forming 
and shaping learning organizations, and therefore indispensable to educational learning 
organizations, are “dialogue” and “skillful discussion”. Moreover, Senge’s influential 
conceptualization and presentation of dialogue and skillful discussion, in addition to his 
provision of essential protocols of practice for these communicative venues, invite a 
ready comparison with Habermas’s practical discourse as a suitable moral epistemology 
for educational administration. Such a comparison creates an excellent opportunity to 
explore the worth and implications of Senge’s prominent ideas for bringing a moral point 
of view to school-district policy development.   
In his presentation of the learning organization, Senge draws attention to the kinds 
of communicative practices that commonly occur within organizations by focusing on 
various forms of discourse. For Senge, the general parsing and analysis of discourse is 
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integral to developing a wider understanding of, and an improved capacity to build, 
learning organizations. Senge’s analysis draws a clear distinction between “dialogue” and 
“discussion” and, based on the work of David Bohm with significant input from Isaacs 
(1999), begins by marking each as a distinct but mutually important aspect of discourse. 
Senge explains: 
…discussion is the necessary counterpart of dialogue. In a discussion, different 
views are presented and defended, and as explained earlier this may provide a 
useful analysis of the whole situation. In dialogue, different views are presented 
as a means toward discovering a new view. In a discussion decisions are made. 
(Senge, 2006, p. 230) 
 
The difference between dialogue and discussion is primarily a matter of the function each 
can perform within the learning organization. Dialogue is a means of exploration and 
discovery – it provides members of the learning organization with a process for openly 
exploring their own and others’ values, beliefs, and assumptions. The communication that 
takes place during dialogue should be a free exploration that brings out “the full depth of 
people’s experience and thought, and yet can move beyond their individual views” (p. 
224).  
With this aim, Senge provides the following three essential protocols for dialogue: 
“1. all participants must ‘suspend’ their assumptions, literally to hold them ‘as if 
suspended before us’; 2. all participants must regard one another as colleagues; 3. there 
must be a ‘facilitator’ who ‘holds the context’ of dialogue” (p. 226). When a dialogue 
meets these three criteria, the participants are reasonably assured that their values, beliefs, 
and assumptions may be freely expressed without judgment by others. In this way, 
defensive and protective attitudes can be diminished, facilitating non-coerced and truthful 
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exchanges with the possibility of discovering deeper insights into the workings of the 
organization (Senge et al., 1994). Moreover, gaining such insight into people’s views of 
the organization through dialogue is essential to participation in team learning: “The most 
effective practice we know for team learning emerges from the conversational form 
known as dialogue” (Senge et al., 2012, p. 116). In turn, the capacity for engagement in 
team learning is crucial to developing learning organizations. As such, it is difficult to 
overstate the importance of dialogue in Senge’s collaborative model of the learning 
organization.  
Discussion or more specifically “skillful discussion”, by comparison, is a means 
of team decision-making – it provides members of an organization with a process for 
presenting, explaining, and defending their positions on particular issues so they can 
reach agreement (Senge et al., 1994, p. 385). This form of discourse is the way in which 
learning organizations converge on a conclusion or course of action; it is the means of 
reaching decisions and formulating plans. Senge and co-author Rick Ross are clear on 
this point, and provide an extended articulation of possible decision-making procedures 
and protocols that fit with the learning organization model. Their analysis of decision 
making as “skillful discussion” outlines an analogy between traditional discussion and 
game playing: “the purpose of a game is normally ‘to win’ and in this case winning 
means to have one’s views accepted by the group” (Senge, 2006, p. 223). This analogy 
provides meaningful insight into the individually oriented consensus that characterizes 
much decision making within organizations and resonates well with the experiences of 
many teachers and administrators. Senge and Ross’s point is that this traditional approach 
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to organizational decision-making is unproductive as it does not allow for reasoned 
evaluation of different positions because competing interests reduce communication to a 
game of strategy. Although this aspect of discourse “can be useful”, Senge is quick to 
emphasize that learning organizations need “a different mode of communication” (p. 
223). This, again, is because the patterns of communication that characterize traditional 
discussion are focused on winning, and trying to win discussions through debate-style 
communication is incompatible with the open exchange of ideas and collaboration 
essential to learning organizations. Senge further argues this point by noting that when 
members of an organization approach communication with the attitude that there must be 
winners and losers, important norms of discovery and effective decision-making such as 
coherence, truth, and freedom of expression are often sacrificed.     
It is clear from this analysis that, for Senge and his colleagues, although both are 
essential components of learning organizations, the ground rules and goals of dialogue 
and skillful discussion differ; dialogue is the preferred mode of communication for 
exploration, discovery, and insight, while skillful discussion is a more intentional form of 
communication wherein members of learning organizations seek closure on an issue. 
What is clearer still is that Senge views the need for establishing shared meaning and 
understanding as essential to both forms of communication. In this sense, the protocols 
for dialogue and skillful discussion both specify the importance of truthfulness and non-
coercion as key features of communication within the learning organization (Senge et al., 
1994). There is a sense as well that the forms of communication appropriate for learning 
organizations are inherently reciprocal – requiring a balance of perspectives and a feeling 
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of security so that all participants “can speak freely” (Senge et al., 1994, p.390). As such, 
Senge and his colleagues offer a new “dialogic” direction for organizational 
communication that can stand over and against conventional modes of communication, 
such as debate or traditional discussion, that do not encourage genuine discovery, 
understanding, or agreement (Isaacs, 1999, p. 339).  
On the above reading, the intrinsically dialogic formulation of communication for 
learning organizations appears consistent with Habermas’s clarification of the core of 
collective moral intuitions. This suggests that the reciprocity and sincerity of dialogue 
and skillful discussion as presented by Senge and his supporters have much to offer a 
moral view of public education grounded in communicative practices. If the intention of 
Senge’s dialogue is to reveal what members of an organization really believe and value, 
then this form of communicative practice comprises an important step toward morally 
valid decisions. Dialogue may act as the initial or informal means of finding the varying 
and common interests of members of an organization. This is because Senge’s 
conceptualization of dialogue exemplifies a participatory, truthful, and non-coercive 
approach to communication within organizations. Its potential for the administration of 
public education is, therefore, important to explore and its influence is arguably positive 
from a moral point of view consistent with communicative rationality.  
Moreover, as dialogues progress or coalesce into communication aimed at formal 
decision-making, the potential moral relevance of skillful discussion becomes evident. 
Decisions about policy and an educational organization’s courses of action need to be 
made and it is at this point, when initiatives and governing prescriptions are formed, that 
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the differing beliefs and values held by individual members of the school system – 
especially its formal leaders and administrators – are most likely to exert their influence. 
If such initiatives are to align with shared moral intuitions, then the dialogic conditions 
outlined by Senge will need to be maintained beyond the discovery process and into the 
actual decision making. In short, and in terms of moral validity, Senge’s dialogic 
protocols must extend past their role in facilitating understanding and into the arena of 
formal agreements and this, in turn, requires an ongoing orientation of all members of 
educational learning organizations towards reciprocity and sincerity.  
 In its most general form, “dialogue… is a conversation with a center, not sides… 
in which people think together in [a reciprocal and sincere] relationship” (Isaacs, 1999, p. 
19). It involves acts of reciprocal perspective-taking where judgements follow not from 
the monological viewpoint of a single agent but from seeking to jointly establish a 
universalizable norm or policy in the equal interest of all. On these grounds, it should not 
be surprising to find a certain amount of overlap in the work of Senge and Habermas. 
Recall that Habermas interprets Kant’s approach to moral reasoning from a dialogical 
perspective, he argues for an additional requirement of intersubjective dialogicality that 
goes beyond individual moral reasoning. For Habermas, moral reasoning and judgement 
must be submitted for public examination in practical discourses where each participant 
gives their perspectives on an issue freely and without coercion. This further requirement 
of actually engaging with the other is viewed by Habermas as epistemically necessary. It 
acknowledges an irreversible move towards the “detranscendentalization” of reason 
(Habermas, 1999b) that emphasises the fallibility of subjective understanding and 
 
 
 
 
53
presupposes that “no one can speak for another through recourse to a realm of a priori 
reason” (Rehg, 1997, p. 194).  
 Habermas asserts that moral reasoning requires an intersubjective cross-testing of 
norms from within an impartial and universally oriented point of view. A full test of the 
rightness of a norm is possible only through a cooperative dialogue between real 
interlocutors. Rehg summarizes these aspects of Habermas’s discourse theory of morality 
as follows: “Although Habermas (like Kant) conceives reason as an elevated source of 
unity among persons that goes beyond desire and interest, the individual has access to 
moral reason in its full sense only through dialogue” (Rehg, 2003, p. 85) and “[For 
Habermas] individuals ‘take’ the moral point of view precisely insofar as they give 
themselves over to such a process of dialogical interchange, to the give-and-take of 
opinions striving toward consensus” (Rehg, 1997, p. 76). Rehg concludes that 
Habermas’s project rests on a “dialogical conception of moral reason” (Rehg, 2003, p. 
85). In his own work from the same period, Habermas posits the finer point of “mutual 
understanding” as the central aim of reciprocal perspective-taking undertaken in actual 
instances of dialogical interchange: “In dialogue, interlocutors want to understand each 
other and, at the same time, to reach a mutual understanding about something, that is, to 
come to an agreement” (Habermas, 2003, p. 56) and “‘Dialogue’ is seen as the model for 
an exchange between interlocutors reaching mutual understanding about something in the 
world” (p. 71). 
 In this regard, Habermas views sincere attempts at mutual understanding and joint 
agreement as a critical link between the impartial reasoning central to a discourse theory 
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of morality and the reciprocity and intersubjectivity of communication generated by 
dialogue. Hence, a fundamental agreement with Senge rests on Habermas’s reading and 
reconceptualization of Kant that provides a wholly dialogical conception of reason 
whereby the conditions governing practical discourse are rationally reconstructed from 
the unavoidable presuppositions interlocutors have to make when engaging in a search 
for mutual understanding and agreement. As such, Habermas provides an intersubject-
oriented and cooperative analysis of full moral reasoning that is similar in its initial 
appearance to Senge’s dialogic modes of communication in which people think together.  
3.3 The Conditions of Practical Discourse and Senge’s Point of View 
Clearly, Senge’s ideas on how best to operate an organization have progressed a 
long way from Taylorism and notions of scientific management, and his conception of 
learning organizations is strongly aligned with a view of school districts as open systems 
that perform better through the collaborative engagement of all constituents (Sheppard, 
Brown, & Dibbon, 2009). Whether, however, Senge’s explanation of the role of dialogic 
communication in learning organizations offers sufficient resources for constructing a 
moral epistemology for public education remains an open question. The epistemic 
conditions (or protocols) of dialogue and skillful discussion do appear consistent with the 
progression of thought in educational administration and with collective moral intuitions 
as articulated by Habermas. Moreover, there are examples in the literature that suggest 
the merit of viewing Senge’s conception of “dialogue”, in particular, as a moral means of 
decision making because it “demonstrates respect” for the “fundamental values”, 
“equality”, and “perspectives” of all members of the school system across all levels of the 
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administrative hierarchy (Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009, p. 49). On this 
interpretation, Senge’s dialogue makes individuals feel that the “equality of all 
participants is universally understood [and] they are valued and respected for their views” 
(p. 19). Nevertheless, such interpretations tend to preconceive dialogue as a substantively 
moral means of making decisions. As such, Senge’s decision-making process is 
supplemented with a set of moral convictions that are, in turn, meant to secure the moral 
validity of the outcomes.         
In all fairness, however, it should be said that Senge’s dialogic theory is not 
proposed in order to be adopted as a moral epistemology for learning organizations. 
While it may lend itself to moral intuitions, the aim for Senge and his colleagues is to 
make educational leaders aware of the increased effectiveness and success made possible 
through dialogue and skillful discussion in the context of the learning organization model 
(Green & Etheridge, 2001; Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009). This aim, however, 
leaves the learning organization theorists’ analysis of dialogic communication 
underdeveloped from a moral point of view specifically because the impartiality of moral 
policy decisions is not sufficiently addressed. This point and its implications are clarified  
in the following section by making a close comparison of the dialogic protocols presented 
by Senge and his colleagues with the necessary conditions of practical discourse. In this 
way, Senge’s highly influential ideas can be shown to support practical discourse as an 
important mode of communication for learning organizations while, at the same time, the 
suitability of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality as an impartial (i.e., moral) 
epistemology for educational organizations can be further advanced.   
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 Initial comparison of Habermas’s practical discourse with Senge’s analysis of 
dialogue as a practice inherent in learning organizations suggests somewhat differing 
purposes for each mode of communication. For Senge, dialogue amounts to a 
collaborative and collective discovery of beliefs and values within the organization. For 
Habermas, practical discourse is epistemic to the validation of claims to moral 
justifiability and rightness; hence determining the validity of moral norms is necessarily 
discourse-dependant. The differences should neither be exaggerated nor minimized. Yet, 
if discovery is understood as an important precursor to validation through discourse, then 
common ground may be seen to exist between the two frameworks at least at the level of 
their dialogic genealogy. The contiguity of discovery and validation suggests a common 
intent whereby each mode of communication is undertaken in order to discover and 
clarify the worldview of participants, later allowing the rational force of the better 
reasons to convince all participants of the rightness of their ensuing decisions.   
There are also parallels between the respective sets of conditions under which 
discovery and assessment are to take place. There is a sense within both frameworks, for 
example, that discovery and assessment should be collective and cooperative 
undertakings. When Senge states that “all participants must ‘suspend’ their assumptions”, 
the premise of this condition is that, by “being aware of our assumptions and holding 
them up for examination”, collective agreement can be sought: that the truth and 
coherence of the participants’ assumptions can be explored collectively (Senge, 2006, p. 
226). Senge’s second condition of dialogue then takes up the need for uncoerced 
cooperation, “Dialogue can occur only when a group of people see each other as 
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colleagues in mutual quest for deeper insight and clarity” (p. 228). Colleagues must be 
willing to cooperate in the exploration and testing of assumptions, even when faced with 
differences of view. In the same vein, Habermas claims “The practice of argumentation 
sets in motion a cooperative competition for the better argument, where the orientation to 
the goal of a communicatively reached agreement unites the participants from the outset” 
(1998, p. 44). This is why communicative acts must be free from deception and coercion 
and why Habermas’s third and fourth conditions of practical discourse address these 
concerns. Deception and coercion can tip the communication away from cooperative 
exploration of what is equally in everyone’s best interests. Only in the recognized 
absence of these factors can participants reach mutual understanding and agreement 
based solely on the giving of reasons.    
Still, meaningful distinctions exist. From the perspective of establishing moral 
validity, it seems the most significant difference between these two dialogic conceptions 
of communication is captured in the single phrase “relevant contribution” from 
Habermas’s first condition of practical discourse. For it is in the interpretation of this 
phrase that much of the case for satisfying either the counterfactual conditions of moral 
validity or the contingent conditions of strategic validity appears to rest. If, for example, 
the senior administrators of an education system hold a moral imperative of student 
learning as the purpose of their organization, then dialogue around new initiatives need 
only satisfy inclusion on the basis of relevant expertise in the effective teaching of 
students. From the perspective of establishing the protocols conducive to strategic 
thinking, there is no epistemic right of inclusion for all affected in dialogues on 
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educational initiatives. In such cases, it may be assumed that instrumental reasoning is all 
that is required for the successful implementation of the imperative.   
Notwithstanding the limited interpretation of inclusion that suffices for strategic 
thinking, there may exist organizational norms of inclusion that warrant prudential 
consideration by senior administrators and some educational leaders may well “practice 
the art of inclusion” out of a sense of moral respect for their constituents (O’Toole, 1996, 
p.37). If, however, the intent is to establish the moral validity of an initiative, then all 
who might conceivably be affected by the initiative have an epistemic right of inclusion. 
From the epistemological perspective of practical discourse, as a rational reconstruction 
of the impartial point of view, this right of inclusion is necessitated by the norms of 
argumentation. All who might be affected by a policy or decision have a right to 
participate in the consideration of its adoption or rejection because all affected persons, 
and possibly others as well, may have a relevant perspective to bring to its understanding 
and assessment. Only by satisfying this condition can the impartiality of a proposed 
policy be fully tested through communicative rationality.  
It is key philosophically, therefore, to distinguish between grounding the criteria 
of a moral epistemology (i.e., the conditions of practical discourse) in presupposed moral 
norms or in universal, epistemic norms of argumentation. As already discussed, 
Habermas makes this distinction to avoid having practical discourse appear premised on 
any substantive moral norms (such as “inclusion” understood as a right to equal respect), 
which would beg the question of its derivation as a universal moral epistemology. The 
aspect of this distinction that matters most epistemically, moreover, is the possibility of 
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incorporating new perspectives relevant to establishing what is in the general interest of 
all constituents. Administrators may promote inclusive dialogues to abide by the principal 
of equal respect but, for Habermas, the condition of inclusion in practical discourse is an 
epistemic necessity. The degree to which Habermas successfully argues for a non-moral 
grounding of practical discourse on the merits of avoiding performative self-contradiction 
in the epistemic practice of argumentation is, therefore, highly important. As a key 
philosophical underpinning of practical discourse, Habermas’s universal-pragmatics 
marks it as a distinctly separate and philosophically robust mode of communication for 
the purpose of establishing moral validity in comparison with Senge’s dialogic 
enterprises. As such, the necessity of the conditions of practical discourse, and inclusion 
in particular, rests on a sound reconstruction of the impartial point of view that does not 
need supplementing with moral convictions. At a more practical level, the practice of 
inclusion may be firmly grounded in either the moral norms presupposed by critical 
perspectives on public education or in the epistemic norms of argumentation. Inclusion is, 
no doubt, an important consideration, both from a substantively moral perspective, as the 
generally accepted norm of respecting and representing the diversity of needs present in 
multicultural societies, and from an epistemic perspective that does not resort to a circular 
justification based on a moral assertion. On either account, the necessity of inclusion is 
not contingent on other considerations. Philosophically, however, defending inclusion in 
decision-making as a substantive moral norm may prove more challenging in a 
posttraditional society. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a means of convincing 
people of the universal necessity of inclusion as a moral norm without recourse to 
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communicative rationality. That is, redeeming the validity of inclusion as a moral right, if 
it were challenged as such, appears to require some form of justificatory discourse which 
(if Habermas is right) will inevitably resemble practical discourse.       
Systems thinking and the learning organization model hold no such necessary 
commitments, either to members of organizations as persons who deserve the respect of 
their administrators or to the indispensable epistemic conditions of morally valid 
decision-making discursively understood. In terms of strategic thinking, inclusion and 
participation in policy- and decision-making are instrumental considerations governed by 
strategic salience to the organization wherein the relevance of a person’s contribution is 
measured against the optimization of the systemic imperatives, not by whether the 
decision is equally in the impartial interests of all. Constraining participation in dialogue 
and skilled discussion within the behavioural norms and strategic objectives of an 
organization, instead of within the norms of practical discourse, may not present a 
contradictory set of aims and assumptions within a private organization. In public 
education, however, the norms of strategic communication ought to be superseded by a 
moral imperative, such as equal respect for all, or by an epistemic principle, such as (D). 
While this latter approach requires a communicative rationality oriented towards 
inclusiveness for epistemic reasons, it by no means contradicts the moral impulse to 
include as many constituents of school systems as possible in the development of policy. 
It simply supports such intuitions with a well-justified and well-defended philosophical 
framework.   
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The implication for public education is clear. Alongside the responsibility of 
making successful decisions in educational administration is the reasonable assumption 
that public education is a vital institution carrying out a moral imperative to improve 
people’s lives. Seen as a generalizable interest or value held in common, the impartial 
and universal benefit of public education is consistent with other egalitarian concepts and 
expectations such as justice in law, democracy in governance, and universal health care. 
Public support for the benefit provided by each of these institutions presupposes the 
validity of an impartial and universal point of view – i.e., some guiding ideal about the 
equality of all persons and an obligation for the equitable fulfillment of their needs. As 
such, there exists a moral dimension within each of these public domains. From a critical 
perspective, this moral dimension is often expressed in terms of equity and social justice 
and rests on whether a principle supporting impartial and universal interests is 
collectively respected (Okshevsky, 2001; 2004).  
Maintaining the morality or “rightness” of decisions by acting in the interest of all 
persons is presupposed, therefore, in the administration of public education and should be 
a crucial consideration when adopting initiatives. It is on grounds such as these that the 
progression of thought in educational administration has come to rest. When theoreticians 
in the field call for decision-making practices grounded in imperatives of democracy, 
justice, or equity, it is to this notion of an impartial and universalistic consideration of all 
constituents’ interests that they implicitly appeal.  From this moral point of view, 
educational policy and initiatives should be continually assessed for impartiality and 
universality in their adoption, interpretation, and application. In keeping with Habermas’s 
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conception of practical discourse, such assessment can only justifiably take place under 
epistemic conditions of inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion. 
The incorporation of such views and expectations in public education gives a 
much stronger sense of the necessity of certain conditions of moral rightness than is 
evident in Senge’s dialogic but success-oriented theory. In public education, the moral 
point of view should not only guide the decision to adopt and sustain an initiative, it 
should also shape the decision-making process. This claim motivates development of an 
epistemic perspective on educational policy that goes beyond describing how to make 
strategically successful decisions. A moral epistemology for public education should set 
the criteria for initiatives that are morally just, compelling the public and ongoing 
examination of all educational policy, and, as with the current study, promoting a deeper 
consideration of the communicative conditions necessary for impartial understanding and 
mutual agreement.    
With the exception of inclusion, however, a comparison of the norms of practical 
discourse and the protocols of dialogue and skillful discussion in the context of public 
education need not be taken as signalling the incommensurability of Habermas’s and  
Senge’s respective positions. On the contrary, the comparative importance of 
participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion in these communicative processes 
demonstrates a significant overlap in the two theoretical perspectives. In large part, this 
commonality may be attributed to the conceived purpose of dialogic communication 
insofar as it aims at understanding and facilitating agreement. In subsequent chapters, 
however, this overlap will be further explored in the specific context of senior, school-
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district administration in Newfoundland and Labrador. This exploration will show clear 
distinctions between the theoretical overlapping of strategic and moral conditions of 
validity and current understanding of the conditions in the concrete context of 
administrative practice.  
 Before continuing in this practical direction, there is a final point of interest to be 
made at the theoretical level. When Senge raises the importance of “guiding ideas” with 
regard to the learning organization, the general interest in establishing morally valid 
imperatives within educational learning organizations reveals further grounds for arguing 
the general overlap of these perspectives. For Senge, “Guiding ideas constitute the 
governing concepts and principles that define why an organization exists, what we seek 
to accomplish, and how we intend to operate” (2006, p. 285). As such, it is possible to 
identify the moral validity of initiatives as a guiding idea for public education. The 
direction charted in this study, to revitalize and resituate the moral point of view within 
educational administration, can thereby be posited as a guiding idea commensurate with 
Senge’s conception of a learning organization. Once the moral underpinning of public 
education is acknowledged, this guiding idea can be articulated in principle and the 
norms for operating in accord with this imperative can be investigated in context. 
Habermas’s principle of discourse (D) and, more importantly for this study, the 
supporting conditions of practical discourse, offer a well-articulated and well-theorized 
approach to establishing the moral point of view as means of constructing morally valid 
policy and governance in public education.   
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
 
 The purpose of the current study is to investigate the ways in which epistemic 
conditions of inclusion, participation, non-coercion, and truthfulness are recognized and 
practiced in school-district policy- and decision-making. This research further aids in 
establishing the groundwork for developing innovative approaches to decision making in 
educational administration that better instantiate the necessary epistemic conditions of 
practical discourse. While policy- and decision-making has long been a subject of inquiry 
in the field of educational administration, very little attention has been paid to the place 
and extent of epistemic conditions supporting moral validity in decision-making 
processes. This research helps fill the gap in existing studies of educational decision-
making through an advanced, discourse-theoretical understanding of the attitudes and 
practices of senior district administrators. The approach taken is via direct interviews 
with district leaders, asking questions about their conceptions of inclusion, participation, 
non-coercion, and truthfulness, and the role each condition plays within the context of 
school-district administration. By garnering the professional experiences and thoughts of 
senior administrators, the current research encourages thoughtful and informed reflection 
on how inclusion, participation, non-coercion, and truthfulness may be better represented 
in decision-making processes.  
It should be made clear, however, that by examining educational administration 
from a moral point of view, the intention is not to use Habermas’s Discourse Theory of 
Morality to criticize the senior administrators who participated in this study for the 
decisions they make or the procedures they follow. The emphasis of this research is 
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instead focused on understanding administrators’ opinions of the conditions of discourse 
while acknowledging and respecting the practical limits of the organizational positions 
they occupy. While prospects for a more “critical” direction in future research and 
practice will be raised, the current study seeks primarily to provide a better understanding 
of respondents’ current attitudes and to focus clearly on examining the epistemic 
dimensions of moral validity; “Anyone who goes beyond procedural questions of a 
discourse theory of morality… will very quickly run up against the limits of his own 
historical situation” (Habermas, 1994, p. 176). It should, therefore, be noted that much of 
the following discussion involves relaying the views of district administrators and 
distinguishing between “epistemic conditions of strategic validity” – as described from 
within administrative roles – and “epistemic conditions of moral validity” – as identified 
by Habermas – as recorded in their interviews.  
 The work of critiquing specific attitudes, practices, and decisions from a discourse 
theoretical perspective is left to future research, however. This is because the current 
research makes only an initial foray into the working life of senior district administrators, 
to ask them the relevance and meaning of the counterfactual conditions of practical 
discourse. Understanding their views of the conditions in context is an important first step 
toward instituting a feasible discourse-theoretical practice around policy development. 
While such research can provide reference points to guide a more critical assessment of 
current practice, the acceptance of critical assessments and the directions for change they 
may present are dependent on a clear consideration of the educational setting. Moving too 
quickly to applications of the theory may incur a serious reduction in the force of critical 
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appraisal, a failure to provide specific direction for addressing current practices, and a 
crucial loss of credibility and support from the viewpoint of educational administrators. 
For these reasons, the current research seeks to clarify the meaning of the conditions and 
the role they play – to better understand their counterfactuality in the current setting of 
school-district administration – as a basis for further research and practice establishing 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality as a viable moral epistemology for educational 
administration.         
4.1 Ethical Considerations 
This study proceeded under Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human 
Research (ICEHR) ethics approval number 2009/10-087-ED. Given the focus of research 
on one of only four English speaking school districts in Newfoundland and Labrador and 
the relatively small community of senior district administrators in the province, potential 
participants were advised that their participation did carry some risk of identification (see 
Appendix 1). For this reason, there is no direct attribution of quotations used in the 
discussion of “The Four Conditions in an Educational Setting”. Nevertheless, all 
quotations used in this chapter are taken directly from the six interviewees (unless 
expressly attributed to a secondary source). This approach to the interview data is 
undertaken in an attempt to further protect the anonymity of the respondents and in 
recognition of their candour. It is also taken with the assurance that these are the actual 
words and opinions of senior school-district administrators in Newfoundland and 
Labrador as they consider each of the conditions of practical discourse in the context of 
their professional practice. Prior to all interviews, respondents completed a form 
 
 
 
 
67
acknowledging the potential risk of identification and giving their informed consent to be 
interviewed for this study (see Appendix 1).    
4.2 Participant Recruitment  
Potential participants were recommended to the principal researcher by the 
supervisory committee. These recommendations were based on an interest in recording 
the views of senior, district-level administrators and on the committee’s considerable 
knowledge of and experience working with district administrators in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. Initial contact with potential participants was made by e-mail. Respondents 
who expressed an interest in being interviewed were sent a letter of informed consent by 
e-mail. This letter provided the background information and aims of the study, and 
outlined the scope of their requested participation in agreeing to one semi-structured, in-
depth qualitative interview (see Appendix 1). A total of four senior administrators from 
the school district under study and two former senior administrators from different 
districts within Newfoundland and Labrador agreed to be interviewed. 
4.3 Limitations of the Study 
The structural regularity of the interviews provides some support for the validity 
of the findings. Still, the generalizability of the current research could be regarded as 
problematic in that it is limited in scope to a handful of first-person accounts of the 
conditions in context. Such concern, though reasonable, is not of major interest in the 
confines of the present study. Instead, the current interest is in providing a groundwork 
for developing future research in the area of moral validity and educational 
administration, and in providing a better understanding of how the moral point of view 
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fits with current attitudes and practices in the field. The research is, in this sense, an 
important and novel contribution to the field of educational administration and it is 
gratifying to have the value of the work affirmed by the respondents: “I want to thank 
you for the stimulation and causing me to think about this. What you’re doing here is 
important…anything that moves this understanding forward, I think, is a real benefit to 
all of us.”      
4.4 Data Collection 
All interviews were scheduled and conducted by the principal researcher and 
digitally voice recorded for transcription. Two sets of interviews were completed. The 
initial set took place in late July of 2010. These interviews were conducted in person at 
the school-district office. The respondents interviewed at that time were the Assistant 
Director of Programs, the Director of Education, and a Former Assistant Director of 
Human Resources. The second set of interviews was conducted by telephone during 
April and May of 2011. The Assistant Director of Human Resources (who spoke of his 
intention to retire shortly after the interview), the new Acting Assistant Director of 
Human Resources (an interim position filled by a Senior Program Specialist), and a 
Former Director of Education comprised this second set of interviews.  
4.5 In-Depth Qualitative Interviews: A Suitable Approach 
While a general Interview Guide (see Appendix 2) was used throughout the study, 
the style of the present interviews is best described as semi-structured. The semi-
structured approach to data gathering is characterized by an in-depth, conversational 
interaction between interviewer and respondent (Babbie & Benaquisto, 2010; Klenke, 
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2008; Seidman, 2006). In this way, the Interview Guide acts as a general plan of inquiry 
and may be used to redirect answers for the purpose of elaboration while allowing the 
respondent to set the direction of topics and related themes (Bryman, Teevan, & Bell, 
2009). In-depth interview studies are respondent focused and provide an opportunity for 
participants to explain events and processes, and to express their own sense of an idea or 
concept in relation to their experience (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999). 
Respondents are also free to choose and frame their own examples of practice thereby 
relaying meaningful context in their answers. In addition, an open-ended conversational 
approach allows the researcher to take a student or novice role during the interview 
(Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006). This encourages the interviewee to take an 
expert role – filling in background information or taking the time to express his or her 
thinking in greater detail – an attitude which may generate more insightful and fresher 
responses.  
As an initial study of the conditions of practical discourse in the context of 
school-district administration, the in-depth qualitative interview method represents a 
suitable approach. With no specific concern or incident under investigation, the 
respondents were given a great deal of leeway in formulating their replies. This degree of 
flexibility allowed answers to be rethought and revisited throughout the interview, as 
respondents refined their thinking on the roles of inclusion, participation, truthfulness, 
and non-coercion in their administrative practices. At the same time, the semi-structured 
nature of the questions did provide a general focusing of discussion around specific 
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issues associated with the conditions of discourse and prevented an overworking or 
continued repetition of thoughts.  
Each interview followed a similar though broad pattern. The respondents were 
first asked to provide some background information on the various positions they had 
held in the Newfoundland and Labrador school system. They were then asked to describe 
a district-wide initiative they had been part of while fulfilling their responsibilities as a 
senior, district administrator. The provision of background information and expert 
context took roughly one-third to one-half of the time allotted to each interview. The 
largest portion of the interview was directed at examining the role played by each of the 
four necessary conditions of practical discourse in adopting the initiative previously 
described by the respondent. The intention in using this pattern was, first, to have the 
interviewees begin thinking about their professional roles and the practices and 
responsibilities they associated with each position. Second, this pattern established a 
concrete situation familiar to the respondents within which to situate and reflect upon the 
role of the idealizing conditions of discourse. In this way, the well-acknowledged 
counterfactual nature of the conditions could be explored in a practical context based on 
first-hand information and from inside the actual practices and experiences of various 
school-district administrators. As respondents observed, “I sort of relive the whole thing 
while talking to you about it… thinking about this one particular district-wide thing that 
occurred, in that context, I would make the observations that I’ve made.” Or: “I’m 
interested in your four concepts. I’ve thought about all four of those at different times but 
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not in a concentrated, cohesive thought process… you’ve forced me to put them in 
context and think about them in a deeper way.”  
4.6 Analysis of the Interviews 
Following completion of both sets of interviews, the digital recordings were typed 
out in their entirety by the principal researcher and printed. The printed transcriptions 
were then carefully analyzed by the principal researcher and open coded on the basis of 
content providing “Professional Background”, the description of “The Initiative”, and 
discussion of “Inclusion”, “Participation”, “Truthfulness”, and “Non-coercion” in the 
context of administrative decision-making. The open coded content was identified by 
different colours of highlighter marked in the margins of the printed document. In 
addition to this initial categorization of the content, general margin notes were made of 
possible themes and patterns emergent in respondents’ discussion of the four conditions 
of practical discourse. 
Information for the following chapter, “Sketching the Perspectives”, was drawn 
from parts of the interviews open coded “Professional Background” and “The Initiative”. 
The sketches provide select relevant details of the administrators’ career paths and 
experiences with the Newfoundland and Labrador school system. This chapter also 
outlines each administrator’s discussion of a district-wide initiative with which they had 
direct involvement.    
Once the sketches were completed for each set of interviews, a more focused 
coding was made of the content initially coded as relating to one of the four conditions of 
practical discourse. This second reading of the transcripts was made across the coded 
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content categories rather than sequentially within individual transcripts. For example, 
content pertaining to “Inclusion” was examined from one transcript to another. This 
cross-interview review of the content categories was repeated for “Participation”, 
“Truthfulness”, and “Non-coercion”. During this second reading of these sections of the 
transcripts, special attention was given to margin notes and the patterns of responses 
developing across interviews but within the condition categories.  
Consistent patterns of responses that were evident within a condition category – 
discussions of “Truthfulness” in relation to empirical research, for instance – were 
recorded on a separate sheet of notes. These consistent patterns in administrative 
reasoning associated with each of the four conditions of practical discourse were then 
grouped and characterized by the principal researcher. This resulted in a condition-by-
condition characterization of the respondents’ common attitudes and opinions. The result 
is a composite picture of each condition and its role in administrative decision making 
from the perspective of the participants. 
Once this amalgamated characterization of the administrators’ attitudes toward 
each condition was made, the principal researcher undertook a third reading of the 
condition categories expressed in the transcripts. As with the second reading, the third 
reading focused on the open coded conditions of practical discourse. However, these 
categories were now read sequentially within each interview with the aim of identifying 
emerging themes. This thematization of respondents’ reasoning around the conditions in 
general was also noted separately and checked for consistency across each interview 
transcript. While the intent of this process was to allow the emergence of themes and 
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subthemes from the interview data concerning the conditions in context, attention was 
given to the active development of themes relevant to the current study. In this sense, the 
resultant themes and subthemes are informed by ideas central to Habermas’s discourse 
theory of morality. The thematic findings thereby exhibit a distinctly Habermasian 
interest in the interview data. In particular, the process of thematization reflects an 
interest in understanding the similarities and differences associated with conceiving of 
the conditions from a strategic or moral perspective.  
 The results of this process of analysis are twofold. First, each of the four 
conditions of practical discourse is characterized in an educational setting based on a 
close reading of respondent opinion. As such, the characterizations of the individual 
conditions are a rather direct finding or expression of opinion that is attuned to the daily 
realities faced by senior administrators in education. Second, the major themes and 
subthemes drawn and developed from the current research represent an active 
thematization of administrative reasoning in education that, while supported by the 
interview data, reflects issues of special relevance to the study of communicative 
rationality in this context.  
This approach to analyzing the interview data generated findings that represent 
both the characteristic understanding and opinion of senior administrators toward the 
necessary conditions of moral validity and a thematic representation of important 
considerations in the application of a moral point of view in school-district 
administration. In this way, the analysis of the interviews is consistent with the 
overarching aims of the current study in providing a thematic groundwork for developing 
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the moral point of view in educational administration and in providing a better 
understanding of how the necessary conditions of practical discourse are characterized in 
current attitudes and practices in the field. The characteristic and thematic results of the 
current study are detailed and supported in Chapter 6: “The Four Conditions in an 
Educational Setting”.  
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Chapter Five 
Sketching the Perspectives 
 
 The perspective offered by each respondent provides significant insight into the 
roles and responsibilities of senior administrators in the Newfoundland and Labrador 
school system. It is apparent in the interviews that the career path of an administrator may 
lead them into many formal positions at various levels of responsibility in the hierarchy. 
This wide path allows the gathering of experience and expertise throughout various areas 
of specialization in the system but, in particular, the departments of finance, programmes, 
and human resources. It also offers a notable degree of mobility both geographically 
across the entire public school system and regionally within the various individual 
districts. This wide range of administrative experience that is common to the participants 
lends force to observation of regular patterns inherent in their collective attitudes and 
understandings.  
Taken together, these attitudes and perspectives offer meaningful context to the 
study of morally valid decision making in school-district administration. The 
respondents’ collective familiarity with senior administrative positions and with the 
organizational role and expectations inherent therein provides a solid representation of 
executive views in the Newfoundland and Labrador school system. This solid 
representation of leading attitudes and perspectives supports a firm foundation for an 
initial study of Habermas’s epistemic conditions in the context of educational 
administration and for understanding this context from the moral point of view provided 
by discourse theory.     
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5.1 The Director of Education 
 The Director of Education holds a Doctorate in Educational Administration from 
the Ontario Institute for the Study of Education. At the beginning of his career, he taught 
high-school students for five years before working as a Program Specialist for eighteen 
years. He spent a further three years as an Assistant Superintendant and, at the time of the 
interview, had served as the Director of Education for the district for nine consecutive 
years. The school district for which he is responsible covers a large and sometimes 
remote geographical area. It averages a total of 12,000 kindergarten to grade twelve 
students and maintains sixty-five individual schools.  
The district-wide initiative presented by the Director as context for discussion of 
the conditions of practical discourse was “an initiative to enhance student learning in the 
school district.” This project aimed to advance a culture of learning throughout the 
district that was student-learning focused, results-oriented, and “combined in a seamless 
web our accountability initiatives, our enrichment initiatives, our creativity, our student-
centered approaches and our teacher-driven approaches.” The Director characterized this 
educational scheme as: 
Enhancing the culture [such] that student learning was to be the main goal of our 
school district and that organizational learning, or the learning of all the adults in 
the system in order to more strategically focus on student learning, must be the 
second goal.  
This core idea grew from the Director’s experience and research, and the impetus to set 
this idea as a district-wide initiative came from his interpretation of the role of a director 
of education: 
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When I came to the district, I determined, based on my own experience and my 
own research and my own notions of what a directorship should be, that the main 
focus needed to be on student learning and that needed to be the overarching goal 
that guided everything else that we did.   
The Director of Education further defined his organizational role in terms of a moral 
obligation to seek and promote such educational initiatives: “I believe it is our, not only 
legal obligation, but our moral mandate – our moral imperative, if we want to use 
Fullan’s term – to do so.” On this point, his conception of the “purpose” of formal 
education aligned exceedingly well with educational administration literature that seeks 
to optimize “strategic thinking” in the service of “maintaining a moral purpose that is 
focused on improving learning for each student” (Sheppard, Brown, & Dibbon, 2009, p. 
72).  
5.2 The Assistant Director of Programs 
At the time of his interview, the Assistant Director of Programs had worked in the 
Newfoundland and Labrador school system for twenty-five years. The breadth of his 
experience within the system is extensive and varied. He began his career as a high-
school teacher and, after eight years, became a Program Specialist for another five years 
in the areas of Math, Science, and Technology. He then spent two years in the position of 
Assistant Director of Programs at a school district in Newfoundland and Labrador other 
than where he was working at the time of the interview. Following this, he moved into 
the role of Director of Education at the same school district. He held that position for four 
years. When interviewed, he was in his sixth year as the Assistant Director of Programs 
for the school district of current interest.   
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The initiative discussed by the Assistant Director of Programs was a new, district-
wide kindergarten to grade twelve “evaluation, assessment, and grading policy.” This 
policy was intended to incorporate the latest research on evaluation, assessment, and 
grading into teaching practices across the district. The Director of Programs characterized 
this initiative as a “change process” analogous to “the new model for school 
development.” This change was motivated by the opinion that existing policy was not as 
supportive of student success as it could be: “We’re doing it because our existing policies 
are, some of them, are rotten to the core. They’re substantially flawed and they’re causing 
substantial failure rates in our education system.” At that time, the policy was at the full-
scale implementation phase. Draft policies originating at the district office had already 
undergone localized field trials and consultation with principals, vice-principals, teachers, 
and educational psychologists at these locations had helped shape and revise the final 
policy: “We had groups of people at the district office working on putting together the 
draft policies that went out to the field for review and feedback.” The aim of these 
consultations was described as “strategic [in] ensuring that we do take the necessary time 
to do the up-front stuff that’s so critical in allowing decisions to be effective and 
sustainable over time.”      
5.3 The Assistant Director of Human Resources 
The Assistant Director of Human Resources outlined over thirty-five years of 
professional service to schooling in Newfoundland and Labrador. His career began as a 
classroom teacher in elementary and junior high school. He first moved into 
administration as a school principal and then to the district office as a Program Specialist 
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in the area of school development. From this position, he went on to became a Senior 
Education Officer working mainly in human resources and, finally, to the position of 
Assistant Director of Human Resources. This role put him at the center of recruitment 
and hiring as well as professional development, collective bargaining, and grievance 
issues within the district. He retired from this executive position shortly after being 
interviewed for this study. 
The Assistant Director of Human Resources drew on his experience with “school 
consolidations” as a long-term and ongoing context for consideration and discussion of 
the conditions of practical discourse. He described school consolidation initiatives as 
aiming to identify infrastructure needs with a view to “maximizing learning opportunities 
for all students and the provision of excellent facilities for all students.” While these were 
the two main objectives of the district office, the Assistant Director of Human Resources 
identified the initial source of consolidation as a provincial government mandate set in 
2004 to integrate three regional school districts into a single district. Senior 
administrators at the newly consolidated district office saw this mandate as an 
opportunity to improve programming by addressing inefficiencies created by aging and 
under-populated school buildings. The overall restructuring plan made use of available 
demographic and geographic data, and attempted to incorporate local knowledge of 
specific issues such as road conditions for potential bus routes and maintenance schedules 
for existing school buildings. Consolidation strategies were presented to the Board of 
Trustees and, if acceptable, introduced for consultation at meetings with school staff and 
the general public. The Assistant Director of Human Resources described the gathering 
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and collation of data along with staff and public consultations as the main strengths of the 
process: “It’s a process that I’d follow in the future for any major initiative, getting 
stakeholder input [and] having good information, good data makes for a better chance for 
good, sound decision making.”           
5.4 The Acting Assistant Director of Human Resources 
Three weeks prior to the interview, this respondent had changed roles within the 
district office, moving from a position as a Senior Education Officer in student support 
services to the Acting Assistant Director of Human Resources. He began working in the 
Newfoundland and Labrador school system as a classroom teacher and entered an 
administrative role, first, as a vice-principal and then as a principal at a regional high 
school. He began employment at the school district office as a Program Specialist and 
had served long enough at the district to be eligible for retirement at the time of the 
interview. The Acting Assistant Director of Human Resources was also pursuing a 
doctorate degree in Educational Leadership at an out-of-province university in Canada.   
The initiative discussed by the Acting Assistant Director of Human Resources 
was the reorganization of schools within the district, specifically, the decision to 
consolidate two area high schools: “Bringing the two high schools together is probably as 
big an initiative as we’ve gone through and probably one of the more complex.” The 
combining of the schools was driven by two ideals central to district governance: “We 
wanted our children in good facilities, modern facilities [and] we wanted our children to 
have good programming options in the high school.” While the expression of these core 
ideals echoes the Assistant Director of Human Resources’ perspective, there is a 
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remarkable difference in understanding as to the administrative level of decision making 
surrounding this initiative. While the previous Assistant Director saw school 
consolidation as a government mandate, the current Assistant Director viewed 
consolidation as a district level undertaking: “The decision came from district office 
because we needed new facilities and they [the two high schools] needed to be 
consolidated to get better facilities for children.” Moreover, the Acting Assistant Director 
of Human Resources clearly stated that the responsibility for such initiatives rested with 
senior district administrators. The respondent saw the role of senior administration as one 
of executive leadership informed by data and research: “That’s our job, to analyze 
numbers, look at what options are out there and what the current literature is and then 
present options to the Board [of Trustees] and to the community.” When asked for a 
general characterization of his work on the initiative, the respondent commented that, 
“my role in the process was part of the strategic planning and part of the, you know, just 
making it work.”  
5.5 A Former Assistant Director of Human Resources 
Though retired from the Newfoundland and Labrador school system at the time of 
her interview, this respondent had held an array of administrative positions. These 
included Program Coordinator, Assistant Director (termed “Assistant Superintendent” at 
the time) of Programs, and Assistant Director of Human Resources, and it was in the 
context of leading the personnel department in another school district that she offered her 
example initiative. It may be of further interest to note that this former Assistant Director 
of Human Resources is the only women represented in this study of senior administrators 
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and that there were no women occupying senior administrative positions at the school 
district office when these interviews took place.  
The former Assistant Director of Human Resources reflected on a large-scale, 
school consolidation initiative that had affected nearly every student in her district. In a 
similar vein as the Assistant Director of Human Resources at the school district of 
interest, she described this initiative as “An expectation from government [to] downsize 
and become more efficient.” A central responsibility of her department was to report on 
the potential reassignment and redundancy of teachers. These reports were combined 
with those of the Finance and Programs departments and generated a general plan that 
represented “the most appropriate educational decision” based on available data and the 
collective experience and expertise of each department. This consolidation plan was then 
submitted to the elected Board of Trustees for review. When approved, the plan was 
made public and parents were asked to respond: “We were looking for anything we had 
omitted in our consideration.” When asked to expand on what constituted an “appropriate 
educational decision”, the former Assistant Director of Human Resources raised a core 
idea in her view of educational administration to always maintain the best possible 
relationship between students and teachers: “We felt the reorganization was going to 
provide a better situation for student and teacher.” Moreover, she identified this idea as 
an educational imperative that was necessary to the integrity of the whole system: “If 
you’re in the system, you hold a position, and no matter what that position is, your job is 
to protect the student-teacher relationship.” It was from this perspective that she 
understood and assessed the district-wide initiative to consolidate schools. Adopting this 
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imperative also allowed related decisions to be made with a strategic outlook toward 
successful implementation and sustainability.   
5.6 A Former Director of Education 
 The former Director of Education interviewed for this study has over thirty years 
of experience working in the educational system of Newfoundland and Labrador and 
holds a Doctorate in Educational Administration from the University of Ottawa. His 
various roles in administration progressed from vice-principal to principal and from 
Assistant Director of Programs to Director of Education, a position he had held at two 
different school districts within the province. He is also well versed in administration at 
the post-secondary level, having served four years as the Associate Dean of Graduate 
Programs at Memorial University’s Faculty of Education.  
 The former Director of Education chose to outline an initiative designed to 
promote “shared decision making and collaboration” within his school district. The 
specific aim was to empower regional principals with greater decision-making authority 
concerning daily aspects of schooling from support for innovative teaching practices to 
discretionary spending on building maintenance. This was seen by the respondent as a 
means of decentralizing district governance through a greater levelling of the 
organizational structure:  
The hierarchy serves an important role…it’s not that the person at the top of the 
hierarchy makes all the decisions, [instead] it’s someone who can take 
responsibility for leading a team which is quite different than administering or 
managing a team.  
The respondent also explained that this collaborative model of leadership engaged 
principals in learning about “dialogue” and “consensus building” in order to tap the 
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collective expertise available within the organization. The former Director of Education 
further explained the initiative as a way of demonstrating authentic respect for people 
while fulfilling the responsibilities of a leadership position: “By including people in the 
process [through dialogue and consensus building] and genuinely respecting and valuing 
their contributions, people step up to become meaningful participants in the decision-
making process.” When asked about the initial decision to move the district toward a 
more distributed mode of decision making, the respondent acknowledged the initiative 
engendered a somewhat paternalistic paradox: “I was talking about the importance of 
inclusion and participation… but at the same time I was saying this is my vision for the 
organization… I was mandating inclusiveness [in decision making].” In feeling an 
obligation to resolve this inconsistency, the respondent referenced the work of O’Toole 
(1996) and said that ultimately his philosophy of leadership was akin to O’Toole’s and 
“rooted in the most fundamental of moral principles – respect for people.”  As such, his 
decision to implement shared decision-making within the district could be justified in that 
it advanced a moral imperative of equal respect.        
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Chapter Six 
The Four Epistemic Conditions in an Educational Setting 
 
 This chapter provides discussion of the four necessary conditions of Habermasian 
discourse in the educational setting of school-district administration. The discussion 
draws on the interview data and is divided into four parts (sections 6.1 to 6.4) wherein 
characterization of each condition is based on the comments of the participants. These 
characterizations are intended as a general presentation of how the conditions are 
currently viewed in the field – the role of each condition, its importance, and its place in 
district-wide initiatives. As such, they address a central aim of the current research in 
examining practitioner attitudes toward adopting district-wide educational initiatives in 
Newfoundland and Labrador from a discursive moral point of view. 
 Interwoven throughout the four characterizations is a further thematic exploration 
of ideas central to Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality. This thematic approach to 
the interview data is intended to support discussion relevant to the additional aim of the 
current study in working toward development of a Habermasian perspective on moral 
validity within the context of educational administration. This thematization of 
participant responses shows there already exists certain common ground between a 
Habermasian conceptualization of the conditions necessary for securing the moral 
validity of a policy and senior district administrators’ understandings of the conditions 
required for the strategic viability of an initiative. This commonality concerns 
acknowledgement of the initial importance of the conditions but further analysis also 
shows subtle (and not so subtle) differences in understanding the various conditions that 
emerge from viewing them as necessary to the strategic validity or moral validity of an 
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initiative. These two major themes of similarity and difference in how the conditions are 
understood are further divided and discussed in terms of five subthemes: two subthemes 
of similarity and three subthemes of difference. 
 One detailed exploration of the common ground rests on substantial evidence of 
administrators’ recognition of the importance of the conditions in the context of their 
practice as overlapping with the conditions necessitated by strategic planning. This 
overlap of importance is demonstrated in the high degree of agreement among all 
respondents that the four conditions are essential features of successful and sustainable 
initiatives. When considered in the context of school district administration, the value of 
each condition emerged early (during the first interview) and presented a consistent 
pattern across participants. At no time did a respondent dismiss or downplay the 
importance of a specific feature of practical discourse. The general and consistent opinion 
was that inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion are essential components 
of effective and sustainable initiatives. Another subtheme of similarity draws on evidence 
that the administrators understand and are consistent in affirming that the conditions are 
always counterfactual in practice. All the respondents concurred that, in a practical sense, 
the conditions must be understood as scalar and be seen as more-or-less realised in any 
particular case. In this sense, the respondents note a reality inherent in their positions and 
practices that restricts the prospect of completely satisfying the conditions.  
 In addition to the similarities – an initial recognition of the importance of the 
conditions in principle and an unambiguous understanding of their counterfactuality – 
three subthemes of difference are discussed. The first of these subthemes is that 
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respondents frequently offered strategic reasons as to why the conditions are important 
for effective and sustainable initiatives. These accounts of the strategic salience of a 
condition were separated from statements solely acknowledging the importance of the 
conditions and/or describing how the conditions were respected in their example 
initiative. This finding shows a generally high appreciation and articulation of the 
conditions as strategically salient. A second subtheme of difference emergent in all of the 
interviews is the interrelated nature of the conditions. In this sense, the conditions are not 
viewed by the administrators as equally and independently necessary to the development 
and implementation of policy. Instead, the degree to which one condition is realized is 
seen to impact the degree to which the remaining conditions may be satisfactorily met. 
Following from this observation, the respondents (with the exception of a single 
respondent to the condition of non-coercion) further noted a third related subtheme: that 
strategically limiting one condition can enhance prospects for realising the other 
conditions, especially those considered by administrators to be more essential to the 
successful implementation of an initiative. From this strategic perspective, placing 
limitations on the conditions helps focus the activity of the district and is, therefore, an 
inherent prerogative of senior administrators who have the responsibility, expertise, and 
experience to determine appropriate levels of inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and 
(non-) coercion around discussion of initiatives within their school district. In relation to 
the general characterization ascribed to each condition, the characteristic view of the 
condition in this context may rest on a subtheme of difference (the willingness to limit 
inclusion for strategic reasons, for instance) or a subtheme of similarity (the recognition 
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of non-coercion as a scalar ideal, for instance), whichever subtheme is most closely 
identified with and tends to best represent the collective view of the condition as seen 
from within this educational setting.      
6.1 Inclusion: Setting the Table 
 Sometimes we set moral concepts up against utilitarian practice but they don’t 
 have to be. Sometimes the most moral way to go, I would argue most times the 
 moral way to go, is the most effective way of implementing or creating change.   
 
This statement is a prime example of the generally expressed opinion that the moral and 
strategic interests of school districts are best understood as overlapping rather than as 
competing. This idea was expressed repeatedly by each respondent and was made across 
all four conditions of practical discourse. As such, the interviews generate a strong case 
for the general overlap and recognition of the four conditions as important considerations 
of moral and strategic deliberation in school-district administration.  
 Moreover, the interviews revealed that each individual condition of practical 
discourse is also regarded in an important and essential sense by the administrators:  
 There are some things that are definite in the directions that I believe are 
 important, that are non-negotiables. One would be inclusion, the other would be 
 participation, the other would be truthfulness. So there’s three right there that are 
 essential principles [of administrative decision making] if we’re to have an 
 effective organization.  
 
In their recognition of inclusion as an important condition for making decisions around 
district-wide initiatives, for example, the respondents are very clear: 
 Inclusiveness is an important concept… and change agents, change leaders, 
 would be well advised to take into account the importance of inclusiveness in any 
 decision-making process. To ignore that is likely to almost always result in 
 decisions that are less sound, less sustainable, and less permanent over time.  
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With regard to inclusion, this statement is representative of the overlapping attention 
given this condition, however the reasoning behind the claim appears motivated by 
decidedly strategic interests. The respondent, for example, lists “less sound, less 
sustainable, and less permanent” as the motivating reasons for inclusiveness. This 
explanation of the role of inclusivity in decision-making is notably consistent with much 
of the administration literature (Senge, 2006). Yet, it begins to open a conceptual gap in 
understanding inclusion as aiding the strategic success of an initiative and recognizing the 
indispensable role it plays as an epistemic condition of moral validity.  
 While an initial similarity appears to develop around the condition of inclusion as 
“an important concept”, this similarity can be teased apart based on the respondents’ 
offering of reasons for inclusiveness in decision-making. Through further examination, 
the interviews suggest it is primarily the strategic salience or prudential value of the 
conditions that dictates their place in decision-making procedures. That is, the epistemic 
value of the conditions for securing moral validity is not the primary reason given by 
respondents in support of their importance. The conditions may “sometimes” or “most 
times” be sought for their epistemic contribution to morally justified policy initiatives but 
they are more frequently privileged for their strategic value in securing the success of a 
new programme. This, in turn, may lead to cases where the epistemic necessity of the 
conditions for moral validity is intentionally compromised for strategic purposes in 
securing the preconceived ends of the organization.   
 Another subtheme of similarity evident in the interview data is the acceptance of 
inclusion as scalar in actual practice. This evidence of the inherent counterfactual nature 
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of inclusion as an idealization tended to surface in connection with two aspects of the 
organization: hierarchy and communication. With regard to inclusiveness in 
communication, respondents consistently cited a norm-governed reality that places limits 
on who and when constituents are to be included in decision-making processes: “I would 
just add what I feel is a dose of reality… there has to be respect for the normal methods 
and means of communication.” For these administrators, there exists an appropriate scale 
of inclusiveness that is inherent in the effective functioning of the organization’s channels 
of communication: “An organization chooses its times to communicate when it is ready 
to communicate and all of those features are important and responsible parts of an 
organization that exists within a legislative framework.” As such, inclusion is often 
intentionally limited. While this limit on inclusion may only be a temporary step in the 
decision-making procedure, it further indicates a decidedly success orientated attitude 
toward communication. This, in turn, suggests that the counterfactuality of the conditions 
as they appear in an educational setting may not always be a matter of inherent structural 
barriers but attributable to the preconceived aims of particular individuals within the 
organization.   
  In addition to the observation that the communicative norms and select goals of 
the organization mean the condition of inclusion may be intentionally limited, the 
respondents also noted a structural “reality” of their organizational positions that 
warranted placing appropriate limits on inclusion. The hierarchical nature of the school 
system was seen to require restrictions on the inclusive practices of even the most senior 
district administrators. These inherent limits on the inclusivity of senior administrators 
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were attributed to the expectations of bureaucrats and elected officials, such as members 
of the Board of Trustees or members of the provincial Ministry of Education, who 
oversee the education system. As such, the respondents expressed an acute awareness of 
constraints, which they described as “practical”, “legal”, and “dangerous to ignore”, 
placed on how they were permitted to operate in fulfilling their organizational role and on 
the range of policies they could bring forward for district-wide implementation. This 
sense of a constraining organizational reality was regularly given as a further reason for 
partial or selective adherence to conditions establishing moral validity:  
 A Director [of Education] has a direct link in responsibility to the Deputy 
 Minister of Education and governments are anything but collaborative in how 
 they do business. So it’s a dangerous place to engage in inclusiveness and 
 participation and the whole issue of being truthful and honest. It's more dangerous 
 from a Director's perspective than being an Assistant Director or certainly than 
 being a Program Specialist or a Senior Educational Officer.  
 
This rationale for curtailing the conditions of practical discourse due to the structural 
reality faced by even the most senior administrators is especially linked to inclusion and 
concerns over whom in the education system may be included at the level of policy 
development:  
 At that level [of senior district administration], it's probably even more dangerous 
 to engage in some of these things [“collaborative decision making” or “genuine 
 dialogue”] because you do have direct responsibility to a School Board [of 
 Trustees] and they come from models that are very traditional.  
 
 While ongoing pressure to demonstrate prudential respect for greater levels of 
authority may help explain the current practice of scaling inclusiveness in the decision-
making procedures of the Newfoundland and Labrador school system, this more-or-less 
realized notion of inclusivity also represents a substantial barrier to moving a discourse-
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theoretical moral point of view to the center of school-district administration. This 
finding suggests the existence of a gap between the rationally reconstructed necessity of 
inclusion and the prudential considerations that administrators feel pressured to 
accommodate. Identifying this gap and its particular relevance for the condition of 
inclusion is, therefore, an initial but important subject raised by the current research.      
 This study does identify a firm and consistent overlap in the importance of moral 
and strategic conditions of validity according to senior administrators (and in keeping 
with influential theorists such as Senge). The overlapping importance, however, is 
tempered by differences in interpreting the role or value of the conditions in decision 
making. As already discussed, prudential considerations involving structural and 
communicative realities clearly impact the inclusiveness of district policy development. 
Administrators may also see inclusion as an important condition but decide to limit the 
scope of decision making for reasons of employee expertise. As such, limits on inclusion 
tend to be based on the leader’s understanding of an employee’s official position within 
the organization, the leader’s conception of appropriate norms of communication, and on 
the leader’s assessment of whether a subordinate has the requisite level of expertise to 
make a valuable contribution to the initiative. In short, it is the strategic salience of 
inclusion as a general criterion supporting the success of new policy that tends to garner 
the respondent’s attention.  
 What is common to all three strategic determinants – official position, appropriate 
communication, and requisite expertise – of inclusion is that the initial decision to include 
personnel is made at the discretion of the senior leadership. That is, the choice to include 
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someone in the discussion of an initiative is the prerogative of senior administrators and 
such choices are apt to be made for instrumental reasons intended to secure effectiveness 
and sustainability. Moreover, this discretionary authority is expressed as an inherent 
aspect of the senior leader’s role in the organization. Although the decision to include is a 
reasoned judgement, its validity is grounded in organizational norms of decision making 
that are characteristic of the school system. While the key criteria for inclusion are norm 
referenced according to position, communications, and expertise, the condition of 
inclusion is discretionary – inclusivity is shaped by the expertise and experience of the 
senior administrators. 
 You need to include as many people as it takes to make your decision as valid as 
 you can make it within practical parameters. If there’s a chance that someone is 
 going to add something to the improvement of that decision, include them. If 
 you’re going to need them in the implementation of the decision, include them, 
 but it’s within practical parameters.   
 
 From this perspective, inclusivity is designed to satisfy strategic validity whereby 
the initiative stands to gain effective and sustained implementation through appropriate 
levels of inclusion. This appears to represent an interpretation of the leadership role in 
decision-making processes from a primarily strategic or prudential perspective. In the 
interview data, this view of the leader’s role in decision-making was associated most 
regularly with the subtheme of strategic salience, in the sense that the importance placed 
on inclusion was largely motivated by an interest in the condition’s strategic relevance to 
successful implementation of organizational change. Inclusion, for example, has 
important strategic value: “Very little change will be sustainable and permanent if you 
don’t have, or if you ignore, the inclusiveness piece.” Again, it is this sense of the 
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strategic value of inclusion that was most often expressed and frequently presented in 
terms of effectiveness and/or sustainability:    
 To expect that you can effectively make decisions that are focused on changing an 
 organization to improve it without factoring in the degree and nature and extent of 
 participation or the whole piece around inclusiveness would be, you know, fool-
 hearty. 
 
 While the strategic salience of inclusion is a prevailing outlook of the 
respondents, a further, definitive reason offered for limiting the condition of inclusion is 
the expressed need to guide the district toward fulfilling assumed educational 
imperatives. That is, senior administrators justified the normative and discretionary 
attitude taken toward inclusion (and the other conditions of practical discourse) as a 
necessary approach to meeting the strategic requirements of predetermined educational 
imperatives. Such educational imperatives – often identified as “student learning” or 
“maximum learning opportunity” – are set as a goal and measure of “successful” and 
“sustainable” district policy. With these imperatives posited as the overarching aims of 
the school district, senior administrators focus on developing and implementing 
initiatives that satisfy strategically acceptable levels of inclusion for reasons of strategic 
validity.  
 Do we, as a school district and principals in their school, set up that table… create 
 those parameters which focus the discussion, which focus the expectation – yes, 
 we do. I believe it is our, not only legal obligation, but our moral mandate – our 
 moral imperative, if we want to use Fullan’s term – to do so.  
 
 From a teacher efficacy, teacher satisfaction, lack of teacher stress perspective… 
 my reading of the research would indicate that teachers feel greater satisfaction 
 and greater sense of control in an environment where purposes are clear, where 
 there is opportunity to talk about those purposes, and where there is a common 
 focus on student learning.  
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These examples show how an educational imperative can focus the activity of the school 
district but with the understanding that strategic limitations must be placed on inclusion 
and that the choice of imperatives is the prerogative of senior administrative staff: “The 
discussion, and the dialogue, and the opportunity for input, and the opportunity for 
growth, and the opportunity for individual expression is rich, rich, rich but it is within a 
box [built by senior administrators].”  
 As such, the most enduring characterization of inclusion as expressed by the 
respondents is one of “setting the table”. This characteristic captures a sense of 
inclusivity as strategically salient, yet, in effect, a condition that may be limited in order 
to achieve the goals of the district office. The choice of whom to include in a decision 
should follow certain normative expectations inherent in the organizational and 
communication structure. Failure to consider these conventions can impair the success 
and sustainability of an initiative. The inclusion of others in policy development is, 
moreover, made at the discretion of senior personnel who view this prerogative as the 
appropriate domain of a responsible leader. On these grounds, district leaders may also 
include someone in a decision-making process on the basis of their expertise or relevant 
experience with similar initiatives. Ultimately, however, those constituents who are 
invited into a decision-making process must recognize that the table is already set, with 
the goals of the initiative and the parameters of communication predefined by senior 
administration.    
6.2 Participation: A Common Feature that is Persistently Counterfactual 
 In terms of participation, the first thing you have to look at is trying to create 
 structures within the district but also helping schools create structures within the 
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 schools whereby teachers work together and school administrators work together 
 and district teams work together in thinking about, talking about, planning, and 
 actually implementing initiatives. 
 
Statements such as this are clear indicators of the respondents’ recognition of 
participation as an important condition for decisions surrounding district-wide initiatives. 
The reasons for placing high value on participation, however, tended not to be explicitly 
given in the interviews. Instead, the respondents preferred to associate participation with 
an all-purpose view of its salience. Participation, for example, was said to encourage 
constituents to “come onboard”. It was also stated that participation is “critically 
important” and that the district administration would “always strive for participation”. 
When talking specifically about their example initiative, administrators were clear in 
asserting that “No one can say they didn’t get a chance to participate” or that “There was 
a possibility for every single person who wished to participate”. In the contexts supplied 
by the respondents, therefore, participation is clearly identified as an important feature of 
initiatives but the rational for this condition is opaque.  
 Unlike the discretionary process of selecting for inclusion, however, all 
participants are actively encouraged by senior administrators to engage in shaping and 
directing initiatives. Once admitted to the discussion or implementation of an initiative, it 
was generally believed that a participant had an obligation to contribute their thoughts 
and opinions, and to actively engage in realigning their practices where necessary. In this 
sense, a discernable difference between inclusion and participation begins to emerge from 
the interview data. Inclusion is under the discretionary authority of the senior 
administrators who consider and determine who to include in the discussion of an 
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initiative, based on organizational norms and relevant expertise. Participation, however, 
is encouraged and expected of everyone who is included in the process of making a 
decision or implementing an initiative. In addition, although participation is understood 
as an important aspect of policy- and decision-making, little was said about why this is 
the case. Instead, the respondents made general claims that participation is encouraged 
and expected in district-wide initiatives.    
 While direct attribution of the salience of participation was not forthcoming, the 
respondents did consistently raise the interrelated nature of the conditions as particularly 
relevant for participation. Their understanding of the conditions as having an interrelated 
effect in practice led to the common opinion that limiting one condition may promote 
other conditions. From this perspective, participation was strongly linked to the other 
conditions and often discussed in terms of the strategic limiting of conditions. It was 
stated, for example, that placing limits on inclusion can enhance participation in assessing 
an initiative by supporting the participants’ sense of taking part in an uncoerced 
discussion:  
 If you want good input from the staff, you need to give them the opportunity to be 
 away from other people that may influence their ability to speak freely… the 
 participation we encourage is that way by having the private meetings with staff 
 members.  
 
In this regard, administrators expressed a strong understanding of the importance of 
participation and the lengths they were willing to go to in support of this condition, 
especially for staff members, even to the point of limiting other relevant conditions.  
 Despite such efforts, or perhaps because of them, the respondents were also 
acutely aware of the challenges to participation faced by the district. From their point of 
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view, a chief concern is the fact that not everyone who is invited to aid in developing or 
implementing a policy will actively participate – even when conditions such as inclusion 
are favourably adjusted. The nagging potential for lax participation, especially by 
teaching staff, was further identified as a possible source of prolonged organizational 
disruption and of failure to fully adopt policies throughout the district. As such, the 
respondents indicated that they had spent considerable time trying to better understand 
why the participation rates in the district were frequently below their expectations: “We 
do have participation, but probably not as much as we would like and probably not at the 
level that it could be because, I think, there is a degree of cynicism out there.” In addition 
to cynicism, respondents see a systemic apathy towards their attempts at encouraging 
constituent participation in decision making: “Sometimes there’s an apathy that’s in the 
system… in leadership, it’s important for everyone to make that second and third and 
fourth effort to ensure that we’ve given enough opportunities for people to speak.” 
 From the perspective of the administrators, cynicism and apathy appear as 
persistent obstacles to full participation in district-wide initiatives. As a subtheme 
relevant to Habermasian discourse theory, cynicism and apathy can be interpreted in light 
of the counterfactual nature of participation in all decision-making practices. As an 
inherently more-or-less realized condition of practical discourse, the understanding that 
participation cannot be fully met in any particular case seems less concerning. Instead, 
the counterfactual aspect of participation allows a refocusing of the issue from one of 
attempting to achieve full constituent participation to one of working to ensure there are 
opportunities for constituent-wide participation. By promoting and facilitating 
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participatory practices, administrators can acknowledge the counterfactual nature of 
participation without either moving toward autocratic decision making or expecting 
unfeasible levels of participation. In this way, real opportunities for participation can 
work against cynicism and apathy while staying within the reasonable limits of the 
organization’s capacity for involvement. A heightened awareness on the part of senior 
administrators of their role in encouraging participation and providing for it could address 
observations such as “to have broad-based and full-scale participation, obviously, 
sometimes is impractical” while acknowledging that “people have learned to be very 
cautious about trusting senior leaders… they’ve been told so many times that they’re to 
engage in shared decision-making at will and then they see that it doesn’t really happen.”  
   Overall, the evidence suggests that participation is understood by the respondents 
as a vital condition for promoting organizational compliance and improving large-scale 
initiatives. This crucial need for participation remains, however, unlikely to be fully met 
even through the concerted efforts of senior administrators. Given the recognition of 
importance and the expressed willingness of administrators to support and encourage 
participation, it seems reasonable from their perspective to attribute less-than-ideal 
participation rates to cynicism (lack of trust) and apathy (lack of interest) among 
constituents. Yet, by accepting the counterfactual nature of participation, it may be 
possible for administrators to refocus their interest in this key condition by concentrating 
directly on its promotion and facilitation within the district. In this case, the possibility 
for a more positive interpretation of constituent participation exists whereby its 
particularly counterfactual character (whether described as cynicism, apathy, or 
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impracticality) is taken as a good reason to give it close attention during decision making. 
Such a melding of the philosophical and real-world understandings of participation would 
be consistent with the current research in that the respondents’ view of participation 
characterizes it as a common feature of strategic and moral validity that is persistently 
counterfactual in all actual instances of policy- and decision-making. 
6.3 Truthfulness: What Research and Imperatives Provide 
 Recognition of truthfulness as an important condition for making decisions 
surrounding district-wide initiatives is evident in the interviews: “I think truthfulness is 
key, here.” Statements such as, “We all like to go out and be honest and truthful” were 
prevalent in the transcripts. As in the case with participation, although to a lesser degree, 
a counterfactual or scalar notion of truthfulness was also clearly expressed by the 
respondents: “I don’t think truthfulness is an absolute. I think it’s more on a scale...it’s an 
ideal to strive toward.” On first reading the interview data, therefore, there appeared to be 
some similarity between how the respondents conceived of truthfulness and its 
conception within Habermasian discourse theory. It is evident that the respondents 
describe two major subthemes of truthfulness in the development and implementation of 
district-wide initiatives. Truthfulness is important and it is a matter of degree.  
 On closer reading, however, the importance of truthfulness in initiative 
development appears unresolved in that it is seen as directly related to the need for open 
communication and to strategic planning. That is, the respondents tended to speak of 
truthfulness as relevant to securing the success of new policies and to sincere attempts at 
understanding the authenticity of initiatives. This two-fold view of truthfulness was 
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reflected in the characteristic descriptions of the role played by truthfulness in policy 
development. Each of these characterizations is discussed in relation to either the 
strategic or communicative relevance of this condition as reported by the respondents.   
 The first characteristic of truthfulness described by the respondents is a general 
understanding that truthfulness is linked to factual information encountered first-hand in 
the district or through secondary literature on education. This characteristic was phrased 
in terms of the ability to make truthful claims about a given initiative. In this sense, the 
truthfulness of a claim made in support of a district-wide initiative is grounded in 
empirical data – the available evidence. Empirical evidence is, therefore, seen by the 
administrators as the warrant of “truthful claims” that set the direction for the district: 
“You look at all the available evidence, then you make a decision that you feel is best.” 
Moreover, such truthful claims are regarded as essential to successful and sustainable 
initiatives: “Within a broad initiative like this one, or any initiative, you’re not going to 
get anywhere without being truthful.”  
 The importance of making truthful claims and the public display of truthfulness in 
their strategic planning is further understood by the administrators as vital to establishing 
constituent trust in district decision-making:  
 If you’re going to mobilize people to prepare them for good decision making, 
 decision making that will be sustainable and efficient over time, the element of 
 trust and truthfulness and honesty, that whole notion is critical in the process and 
 without it people will not genuinely participate.  
 
This sense of needing to establish a sense of trust within the district tends, however, to be 
linked to the strategic interests of administrators in creating successful, sustainable 
initiatives. Their working conception of truthfulness thereby gives this condition 
 
 
 
 
102
relevance as a strategically salient consideration in securing constituent trust. Viewed as 
an “element of trust” needed for strategic reasons, this conception of truthfulness loses its 
relevance as a necessary epistemic condition in the rational reconstruction of a moral 
point of view. To summarize, this first characteristic sense of truthfulness as given by the 
respondents is of truth grounded in facts and is recognized by the respondents as an 
indispensable element of trust, the trust that is essential to leading effective and 
sustainable change: “Change leaders attempting to achieve systemic change, permanent 
change, strategic change would be well advised to ensure that the processes that they put 
in place have a substantial element of trust and truthfulness and openness.”  
 The second characteristic of truthfulness expressed by respondents conveys a 
sense of acting in accord with one’s basic, fundamental beliefs about the ends of 
education. This attitude was expressed in terms of “your decision is true [if] it protects 
the system’s integrity” or of truthfulness as “almost a missionary value” for the 
educational imperative. Spoken of in this way, truthfulness exhibits a close overlap with 
its conceptualization as a necessary condition for reaching the understanding that 
precedes jointly attained agreements. Policy- and decision-making must reflect the 
common aims of the district: “That’s the way I would see truthfulness. How true is it [a 
proposed initiative] to what your focus is and what your purpose is and what you know is 
right and what you know is accurate.” Characterized in this way, truthfully expressed 
educational imperatives permit the validation of district policy through open 
communication.  
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  Moving further in the direction of truthfulness as an important condition of 
communication, the respondents also spoke of its extending even to the self-reflexive 
understanding of one’s own intuitions and beliefs about the ends of education. “Part of 
what you’re doing in the kind of initiative I’m talking about is drawing out the truth that 
we collectively hold among ourselves.” Communicating truthfully with others about what 
one believes is regarded as highly important as administrators seek the collective ideals 
of the school district. Although the function of truthfulness as an epistemic value in 
establishing moral validity is not readily articulated in the interviews, there is a subtext 
acknowledging the role of truthfulness in authenticating initiatives and tacitly affirming 
district-wide imperatives. This interpretation indicates that the respondents have an 
awareness that truthfulness has an important role in decision making that goes beyond the 
strategic presentation of empirical data. In this sense, truthfulness is seen to have an 
imminent relation to an authentic understanding of policy initiatives. If this is the case, it 
suggests that the administrators’ indirect understanding of the role of truthfulness in the 
search for authenticity already extends beyond what is presented by theorists such as 
Senge (2006). Whether this understanding of the importance of truthfulness to decision-
making could provide a means of fostering a more robust view of this condition as 
epistemically necessary to moral rightness remains an open question.  
 On the whole, truthfulness is understood in two ways by the respondents: as an 
important strategic consideration in establishing constituent trust, and as an essential 
condition for the communication of educational imperatives that can be understood and 
supported by others as the authentic aims of education. The parallel of this finding to the 
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progression of thought in educational administration is striking. On the one hand, the 
practitioners, alike with theorists in the field, are seeking an empirical knowledge base to 
guide, support, and warrant their decisions. On the other hand, the administrators, akin to 
administration researchers, are tacitly expressing a need for some means of aligning their 
policies with their convictions – on the assumption that their convictions are right. The 
respondents’ thoughts on truthfulness, thereby, highlight and emphasize an important 
distinction that has yet to be well clarified in the educational administration literature: the 
difference between using the “truth” (in the sense of citing empirical evidence in support 
of educational propositions) to drive decision making, and communicating “truthfully” 
(without concealment of agendas or self-deception) about educational imperatives, 
policies, and initiatives. This is an important distinction because the truth of the former 
cannot on its own validate the rightness of initiatives. Nor can the truthful authentication 
of initiatives attain the greater sense of “moral rightness” without broad public 
participation in such deliberations. The understanding of the proximity of truthfulness to 
rightness presents an opportunity, however, to further the cause of practical discourse in 
educational administration as a moral epistemology that can collectively assess and 
validate the rightness of policies and initiatives under communicative conditions. 
6.4 Non-Coercion: Consent is Best, but Pressure has its Place 
 Discussion of non-coercion and its role in executive decision-making elicited the 
most variant and ambivalent array of respondent comments. Among these is a high 
recognition of non-coercion as an important consideration in making decisions 
surrounding district-wide initiatives. For example, a general sense of the importance of 
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non-coercion for its own sake was frequently offered: “You have to work to ensure that 
decision making is not influenced by coercion. The only way to do that is really to 
engage in a genuine dialogue [as proposed by Bohm and Senge]” and; “In this particular 
initiative, the notion of coercion hasn’t been one that has come to the fore for a great deal 
of discussion. No one has said to me, ‘I feel coerced’.” However, the importance of non-
coercion was also presented for the sake of its strategic implications: “From a practical 
level, you will get nowhere if you are beginning from the assumption of coercive 
strategies – certainly not anywhere with anything important. As Fullan says, ‘Nothing 
that’s important can be mandated’” and “If you go back to the early implementation 
literature, we knew then that it’s not a very effective idea, if you want something done, to 
just write someone a letter whom you know doesn’t want to do it and say, ‘Do this!’.” As 
such, the respondents clearly understand non-coercion as intrinsically and strategically 
important, although they were more able to cite and defend the value of this condition on 
the basis of practical reasons.  
 Compounding the variation in ascribed value that accompanied discussion of non-
coercion was a persistent interest the respondents showed for re-terming the subject of 
their responses. For example, the subject of non-coercion was often recast by the 
administrators in terms of the appropriate use of pressure: “I might not use the word 
coercion, but I would use the word pressure, but that’s the job… there was certainly 
pressure [on district leaders] to build a plan but it’s pressure that I would say is 
appropriate.” Moreover, once the term “pressure” was brought into the discussion of non-
coercion, the respondents were quite willing to consider the important role appropriately 
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applied pressure played in decision making: “Pressure injected into the decision-making 
process at the right time can have a big pay-off, but I think it requires a certain skill set 
and a certain set of experiences.” In moving the interviews in the direction of this 
terminology, some respondents clearly indicated the strategic salience of pressure and, 
thereby, linked the strategic validity of an initiative to their ability to limit non-coercion 
when appropriate. Indeed, understanding the strategic limiting of non-coercion was 
generally considered an essential administrative skill.   
 While the shift in terms from “non-coercion” to “pressure” was clearly significant 
for some respondents, others were quite comfortable initiating a discussion of the 
function of “coercion” as an “important element” in their practices. For these 
administrators, the occasional use of coercion was a straightforward part of satisfying the 
demands of the organization: “If you ask me whether or not coercion is important, it 
absolutely is. It is an important element in the overall change process.” and 
“Coerciveness in the decision-making process, in my view, is an important element. It 
represents some of the glue that holds the decision-making process together.” Moreover, 
for these administrators, coercion has a strategic salience that is to be acquired and honed 
through practice and experience:  “Coercion is an important element in the recipe but it 
certainly has to be used cautiously… I would say it’s probably like salt, a little will do 
you.” This data suggests that, as with the use of pressure, coercion has an important place 
in the strategic management and shaping of district policy, although it should be used 
with discretion and expert knowledge. Such evidence also reinforces an acceptable 
limiting of non-coercion in decision making. So, while non-coercion is viewed by the 
 
 
 
 
107
respondents as a meaningful and vital consideration in their strategic planning – as an 
important condition for establishing the strategic validity of an initiative – they also value 
its counterparts in the form of pressure and coercion. In this regard, the interview data 
reveals a good deal of strategic thinking surrounding this condition in current approaches 
to policy- and decision-making. 
 “Of course, coercion is on a continuum between persuasion and coercion.” As 
with the other conditions of practical discourse, (non-)coercion was at times referred to as 
a scalar concept whereby the fulfilment of the condition was never completely realized in 
practice. In this case, the idea that all organizational decision-making will have a degree 
of coercion is well represented. Also consistent with discussion of the other conditions, 
statements were made on the interrelated nature of (non-)coercion, inclusion, 
participation, and truthfulness, and on the implications of coercion, in particular, for 
satisfying the conditions generally. Such statements include, “If you do something to 
coerce me… it undermines truthfulness” and “My experience has been the more coercion 
that is brought into play, the more some people will argue that… they didn’t have an 
opportunity to participate or… they were not really included in the process.” Here, again, 
the emphasis of the respondents is placed on coercion and the observation that it can 
negatively impact the other conditions of validity.   
 Consistent, however, with the variance in opinion surrounding the discussion of 
non-coercion, certain respondents did on occasion express an absolute conceptualization 
of the condition as an unconditional feature of decision making that should never be 
compromised: “I don’t share the view that coercion has to exist in an organization. I think 
 
 
 
 
108
wherever it exists it’s a nasty piece of business and it’s destructive” and “If the district 
authority makes all the policy decisions without engaging the people throughout the 
organization and people are going to be affected then that becomes coercion because the 
policy is defining what will happen.” This attitude toward (non-)coercion tended to be 
given in the spirit of “respect for others” as a moral principle to abide by in policy 
development. Still, as no distinct moral epistemology was articulated, it is difficult to 
interpret such statements. That is, “respect for others” was not explicitly offered as a 
justifiable moral principle that could withstand philosophical assessment and be applied 
as an impartial criterion for assessing policy. Although it may, in spirit, be read as an 
expression of collective moral intuition concerning reciprocity, “respect for others” was 
simply asserted as a universally valid moral precept. Hence, the value of this principle in 
grounding a suitable moral epistemology for the field of educational administration 
remains undefended. In this regard, non-coercion appears vital to the voluntary and 
constructive engagement of constituents while itself bearing only an informal and tacit 
sense of moral worth. 
 While respondents generally agreed that gaining the consent of as many staff 
members as possible was always the best approach to advancing an initiative, there was 
much disagreement about whether coercion should be part of district decision-making 
and, if used, the degree to which coercion is acceptable. Some respondents, for example, 
were quick to take an opportunity to change the term under discussion from “non-
coercion” to “pressure”. This forthright acceptance of “pressure” as an important part of 
decision making seems to indicate an unspoken awareness that “coercion” is negatively 
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valued in egalitarian societies and an interest in actively distancing the district from 
coercive practices. Others, however, had little or no difficulty accepting coercion as an 
“important element” in decision-making processes. For these administrators, the periodic 
coercion of constituents, particularly teachers and other staff, who refused to agree to an 
initiative, is an accepted responsibility and an appropriate use of the power inherent in 
their organizational position. Increasing the complexity of the issue, still other 
respondents adamantly rejected the use of coercion in decision-making and claimed to 
energetically seek the approval, or at least the consent of, every employee who may be 
affected by a wide-scale initiative.  
 The high degree of variance in administrators’ willingness to reject, accept, or 
utilize coercive practices highlights the general sense in which a strategic view of the 
conditions appears to prevail in district administration. From this strategic perspective, 
non-coercion is thought of as a highly contingent characteristic of decision making that is 
regarded with ambivalence by most senior administrators. If the interview data provides 
representative examples of the respondents’ attitudes, their view is that non-coercion is 
strategically salient to achieving the ends of the organization and should be maximized 
whenever possible as the best assurance of a policy’s success. Moreover, coercion in the 
decision-making process can and should be reduced whenever possible by purposefully 
limiting other conditions of practical discourse, such as inclusion. In this sense, the 
interrelated nature of the conditions is well acknowledged and put to use when deemed 
appropriate by senior administrators. Through such practices, the respondents affirm a 
belief that the most effective support for an initiative is to be gained through seeking the 
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informed consent of their constituents. In this sense, non-coercion is clearly seen as an 
important ingredient in successful and sustainable initiatives.  
 However, the importance of coercion as a factor contributing to the viability of an 
initiative is also well acknowledged in the interview data. This evidence clearly connotes 
the other side of the administrators’ ambivalence towards non-coercion as a decidedly 
contingent condition. Moreover, the accepted use of coercion (or pressure) in school-
district administration, especially in ensuring successful implementation of policy 
initiatives by school staff, stresses the complexity of maintaining that both non-coercion 
and coercion lend strategic validity to decision making. In turn, the need for expertise in 
navigating this complexity is quick to surface in the interviews: “Timing is critical 
because if you apply pressure too soon, some of your otherwise supporters, you know, 
people who have buy-in, will be critical that you were too harsh.” From this strategic 
perspective, non-coercion is no longer portrayed as a vital condition that will, 
nevertheless, always be counterfactual in practice (as is the case with participation), but 
as a relevant tactical consideration that may be actively limited in furtherance of district 
initiatives. The result is a generally strategic characterization of non-coercion that 
oscillates between garnering the consent and assuring the compliance of staff and other 
constituents. The administrators’ collective understanding of non-coercion in policy- and 
decision-making is thereby characterized as consent is best, but pressure has its place. 
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Chapter Seven 
Considerations in Applying a Discourse Theory of Morality 
 
 The interviews raise concern over whether applying the conditions of practical 
discourse to the context of school-district administration may prove to be an instance of 
implausible theorizing or impractical idealism. In addition, questions arise concerning the 
ability of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality to be sufficiently sensitive to the 
particular circumstances of specific cases and contexts of administrative decision-
making. As such, this application of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality invites 
consideration of at least three questions that are central to theorizing and adapting his 
work for real world application. The following chapter addresses each of these issues 
under sub-headings of plausibility, particularity, and practicality of the conditions of 
practical discourse.  
 In the first instance, the plausibility of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality 
largely depends on his claim that the conditions are universal and necessary 
presuppositions of argumentation. The question here is: are the conditions identified by 
Habermas universal conditions of discourse that are essential to impartial mediation 
between all the possible value orientations present in pluralistic societies, or are they 
simply Eurocentric norms of deliberation? Answering this question in the latter risks 
greatly diminishing the philosophical value of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality 
for guiding and assessing the impartiality and universality of decisions made in the 
current (and other) context(s).  
 In the second instance, the question is one of context sensitivity and whether 
Habermas’s discourse theory provides a procedural framework that is genuinely open to 
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expressions of the particular views and interests of a heterogeneous society. This question 
asks if practical discourse should be understood as an inclusionary practice or as an 
inherently exclusionary practice in need of substantial modification. Examining this 
question leads to an interpretive discussion of the meaning of the conditions in light of a 
willingness to reach joint understanding. Also included is a brief introduction to the idea 
of discourses of application and the important role such discourses can play in further 
assuring the context sensitivity of a discourse theory of morality.             
 In the third instance, on the question of practicality, the stringent requirements of 
the conditions of practical discourse as counterfactual idealizations may appear too 
demanding to be of value to practitioners and researchers in the field of educational 
administration. Then again, if read too literally, the counterfactual nature of the 
conditions could be understood to render nearly all district-wide initiatives immoral from 
the outset, despite the best intentions of administrators, because the procedures by which 
they are approved do not (and can not) meet the requirements of practical discourse. The 
risk in either case is a serious reduction in the interest of administrators, and the field of 
educational administration more generally, to adopt Habermas’s Discourse Theory of 
Morality for guiding and assessing district initiatives. To address this problem, the role 
that trust and, more specifically, “rational trust” can play in bridging between 
counterfactual idealizations and organizational realities is explored. 
 The interviews, therefore, disclose important implications of applying Habermas’s 
Discourse Theory of Morality that align with major theoretical concerns raised in 
connection with placing the conditions of practical discourse in concrete contexts. To 
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summarize, the objections to be addressed are that Habermas’s discourse theory should 
not be applied as a moral epistemology to school-district administration because (a) 
practical discourse is not an impartial and universal means of reaching agreements in 
pluralistic societies, and/or because (b) the conditions of practical discourse do not allow 
for the particularity of individual cases to be sufficiently considered, and/or because (c) 
the conditions of practical discourse are simply too demanding and restrictive for real-
world application. If any of these claims is valid then the moral point of view articulated 
through this research risks rejection by practitioners and researchers who deem this 
theoretical framing too biased, too insensitive, or too demanding. In what follows, 
clarification of the plausibility of Habermas’s epistemic conditions as universal and 
necessary to the moral point of view is made, an interpretation of the conditions as 
allowing sufficient opportunity to consider the particular features of individual cases is 
offered, and a discussion of the practicality of a discourse-theoretical model of decision 
making when supplemented with a conception of rational trust is provided.   
7.1 Plausible Conditions: Addressing Concern over Universal Presuppositions 
 Arguably, the earliest and most ardent voice against the plausibility of 
Habermas’s rational reconstruction of the universal conditions of practical discourse is 
Thomas McCarthy. McCarthy’s (1991) problematizing of a Discourse Theory of 
Morality turns on the assertion that ethical communities instil in their members a set of 
value orientations rooted in particular traditions, practices, and experiences. These 
substantive values form a fixed world view that is often incommensurable with the 
diversity of understanding held by others. On this account, there is little reason to think 
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that Habermas’s moral epistemology is any less a product of his own particular, Western 
world view. As such, it becomes questionable whether Habermas’s depiction of reaching 
mutual understanding and agreement under putatively universal presuppositions of 
argumentation is a universally valid approach to moral validity, conflict resolution, 
and/or social coordination. If the universality of practical discourse is shown to be in 
doubt, then it would be of little worth or relevance for resolving seemingly intractable 
political, legal, or moral conflicts outside European traditions. Moreover, as Western 
democracies continue to diversify, his project as constructed on supposed universal 
presuppositions would have less and less validity as an acceptable moral epistemology, 
even for modern societies. As McCarthy writes, “Habermas’s conception of practical 
discourse is too restrictive to serve as a model, even as an ideal model, of rational will 
formation and collective decision making in the democratic public sphere” (p. 198).  
 There is a clear sense in McCarthy’s rejection as “too restrictive” (or too Western, 
in this case) that, if adopted as a decision-making model, the substantive claims inherent 
in Habermas’s conception of practical discourse will preclude the majority of public 
decisions from attaining impartial and universal moral validity. While this rejection aims 
at Habermas’s overarching intention (i.e., of attaining valid mutual understanding and 
agreement through the practice of practical discourse), the primary concern for the 
current research is the implicit denial of Habermas’s claim to rationally reconstructing 
universal presuppositions of argumentation as the conditions of practical discourse. As 
McCarthy (1991) points out, Habermas’s rational reconstruction of practical discourse 
“raises the question of whether the model succeeds in capturing universal conditions of 
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reaching understanding in language, that is, general and unavoidable presuppositions of 
communicative action, or whether it represents instead a thinly disguised Eurocentrism” 
(p. 134). 
 The stakes are high for Habermas and he shows an acute awareness of the 
implications of McCarthy’s appraisal, particularly in “the regulation of culturally 
sensitive matters, such as… the public school curriculum” (1998, p. 144). In practice, 
such policy decisions are regularly based on normative evaluations formed from within 
culturally specific traditions. While public school policies, for example, are generally 
made through dialogical procedures, there is potential for minority groups to be excluded 
from participating in these procedures simply because they are not versed in the 
communicative norms of European tradition. Such exclusion is not necessarily intentional 
and may occur even when well-intentioned efforts are made to encourage minority 
participation in policy development. If, however, Habermas’s conditions of practical 
discourse are in fact culturally bound conventions of conduct (i.e., particularized norms 
of communication) learned through the traditions of the European majority, then 
embedding them in moral argument and the decision-making processes of public 
education may further suppress the interests of already marginalized cultures and, indeed, 
represent a thinly disguised Eurocentrism in educational governance. The best case in this 
scenario is an institutional entrenchment of deliberative processes favouring majority 
interests. At worst, though, the systemic and perpetual prejudicing of educational 
initiatives may lead to disengagement from schooling or adoption of coercive strategies 
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by minority groups frustrated with their lack of representation. Neither outcome would 
legitimate promotion of Habermas’s moral point of view in educational administration. 
 Habermas’s response to McCarthy is often indirect and tends to build upon and 
refine concepts central to practical discourse as a specific practice of cooperative 
reasoning. This is certainly true of “the exacting presuppositions of argumentation that 
force participants to decenter their own interpretative perspectives [or “the formal 
conditions of practical discourse”]” (2003, p. 86). For Habermas, the “universality” of 
these conditions rests in their pragmatic “necessity” to practical discourses aimed at 
mutual agreement in the social coordination of action. He argues that these are the 
presuppositions communicatively engaged actors must make if they are to participate in 
the fundamental social practice of coordinating their actions in the interest of all. In this 
sense, the formal conditions have “an ‘inevitability’ stemming from the conceptual 
connections of a learned – but for us inescapable – rule-governed behaviour” (2003, 
p.86). This means that the conditions transcend all culturally substantive value 
orientations because there exists no functional equivalents, no set of alternative 
conditions, that could fulfill the fundamental aim of mutual understanding and agreement 
through cooperative practical reasoning.  
 At this point, it is worth briefly reviewing Habermas’s justification of the 
conditions of practical discourse as necessary and, therefore, universally present in 
communicative rationality. The basis of his justification rests in demonstrating the 
existence of a performative contradiction in cases where interlocutors aim at 
understanding each other’s positions on a controversial norm without recourse to certain 
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presuppositional orientations. Truthfulness, for instance, must be given on the part of all 
participants if a collective understanding of an issue is to be established. Truthfulness is a 
necessary guard against self-deception and the deception of others for which there is no 
possible substitute. As such, truthfulness exhibits its necessity to practical discourse and 
so too for each additional condition: inclusion, participation, and non-coercion. As 
presuppositions of argumentation, each is indispensable to the act of reaching a shared 
understanding (even about what constitutes the necessary features of argumentation); 
hence each is affirmed as a necessary condition of practical discourse aimed at 
establishing a generalizable norm: “The presuppositions themselves are identified by 
convincing a person who contests the hypothetical reconstruction offered that he is 
caught up in performative contradictions” (Habermas, 1990, p. 89). In this sense, 
Habermas is simply identifying the transcendental presuppositions that interlocutors 
always already abide by in the cooperative search for mutual understanding and 
agreement. He therefore avoids giving a Eurocentric (or ethnocentric) account of 
intersubjective moral reasoning by identifying the presuppositions necessary to any and 
all communicative practice. Habermas then formalizes these logically necessary 
conditions of communicative reasoning in order to provide performative criteria for his 
moral epistemology.       
 There is, however, an additional subtlety of Habermas’s analysis that bears 
mentioning. Habermas is careful not to claim that he has given a purely transcendental 
argument or “ultimate justification” for the universal rules of practical discourse as facts 
of reason. That is, Habermas does not want to maintain that his conditions of practical 
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discourse are “immune to the fallibilism of all experiential knowledge” and, therefore, 
universal and absolute as a priori knowledge available through transcendental deduction 
(1990, p. 95). Instead, he insists that he is providing a transcendental-pragmatic 
justification of his discourse theory that depends on a weak form of transcendental 
analysis whereby “the fact that there are no alternatives to these rules of argumentation is 
what is being proved; the rules themselves are not being justified… this kind of 
argumentation cannot accomplish a transcendental deduction in the Kantian sense” (p. 
95).  
 The emphasis, as such, is on aiding those who are sceptical of Habermas’s 
rational reconstruction to become aware of the presuppositions inherent in their own 
arguments, pointing out the performative contradictions they would engage in if they did 
not abide by those presuppositions in argumentation, and corroborating through counter-
examples that there are “no alternatives to the presuppositions” that can provide an 
impartial route toward reaching an intersubjective understanding (p. 97). In this way, 
Habermas’s modification of the transcendental argument, to incorporate a pragmatic 
sense of language use, avoids engaging in speculative metaphysics while still maintaining 
that the presuppositions he articulates are founded in a “fact of universal pragmatics” 
(1994, p. 50). This move also opens the prospect of corroborating (or refuting) his 
discourse theory with empirical evidence or examples, provided such evidence is itself 
submitted to argumentation (i.e., discursive justification of its validity).  
 Inasmuch as the inescapability of Habermas’s reconstruction of the moral point of 
view may satisfy shared assumptions about morality, there remains a further criticism 
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that specifically questions the universality of “impartiality” or “impartial judgement” that 
forms the core of a modern moral point of view. Ferrara (1988) sets the concern as 
follows: “Its [Habermasian discourse theory’s] central presupposition – the possibility of 
sharply distinguishing form from content – can rarely be satisfied" (p. 251). From this 
observation it follows, for Ferrara, that what Habermas proposes in his Discourse Theory 
of Morality amounts to “one language game alongside others [and] while the plausibility 
of this claim cannot be denied [as] a reconstruction of what we Western moderns 
[understand as impartial justice]” it thereby endorses a “substantive [and Eurocentric] 
vision of good [that is not universally applicable]" (p. 250). Ferrara is first targeting 
Habermas’s claim that the epistemic conditions of discourse are purely formal and 
procedural (i.e., that they constitute a universal pragmatics of argumentation), and not 
substantive moral values or a Eurocentric view of what is good. To Ferrara, the 
substantive value or good that is at the core of Habermas’s rational reconstruction of the 
moral point of view is the need for impartiality in moral judgements. Ferrara implies, 
however, that impartiality is a Western assumption about what it means to be moral and 
just, and, as a distinctly Western assumption, the criteria securing impartial judgements 
cannot form the basis of a universally acceptable moral epistemology. Whereas, for 
McCarthy, the practice of practical discourse appears as a Eurocentric form of moral 
deliberation, for Ferrara the central aim of impartial judgement is not necessarily a 
universal function of morality.    
 As to Ferrara’s objection, it can first be asked if the impartial moral point of view 
is an accepted modern view of how to coordinate social interactions. On this point, even 
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Ferrara grants the plausibility of this view as “an inescapable standpoint for us” in 
Western pluralist democracies from which there is no turning back (p. 250). For us 
moderns, then, Ferrara appears to agree with Rehg (1997) that Habermas’s Discourse 
Theory of Morality proposes a “unique sort of metavalue [or metagood or metapractice] 
that one cannot rationally reject” without great cost, such as a complete disengagement 
from the testing of moral validity claims (p. 147). On these grounds, there seems little 
objection to applying the conditions of practical discourse to administrative decision-
making in Canada's public school system. That is, if one presupposes the context of a 
modern pluralist democracy, then the universality of Habermas's reconstruction for such 
a setting appears plausible. In cases such as the current study, therefore, Habermas’s 
discourse theory appears to furnish universally valid criteria for moral justification. 
Still, Habermas understands his Discourse Theory of Morality as a universal-
pragmatic reconstruction of the necessary conditions of validity claims to moral 
rightness. It's not simply plausibility for a modern world view and Western social 
institutions that he is after. This is an especially important consideration in light of 
Canada’s continuing cultural diversification (Wotherspoon, 2009) and in recognition of 
the epistemic traditions of Aboriginal Peoples (Madjidi & Restoule, 2008). The greater 
question of universality, however, can readily be turned on the sceptic and proponents of 
communicative rationality might ask whether he or she is willing to give up impartiality 
in favour of some other substantive value that could regulate peaceful social interactions? 
Once such a discourse is entered, Habermas’s own program of establishing the 
universality of his discourse theory can be undertaken in the argument. Ferrara, for 
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example, might be asked if he would not want his own proposal for an alternative moral 
epistemology to be understood and judged without prejudice. Would he not expect, in 
this case, that his proponents and opponents alike take an impartial view of his proposal, 
engage in a sincere and reciprocal attempt to examine and understand his position, and 
freely decide if they agree with him? Moreover, would he not want some assurance that 
the examination of his proposal is performed without bias, that certain conditions pertain 
during the deliberations to ensure that a common understanding and mutual agreement as 
to its validity is achieved? And, if pressed on this point, it is not unreasonable to expect 
that Ferrara would have to specify some set of conditions akin to inclusion, participation, 
truthfulness, and non-coercion. Finally, if Ferrara agreed that, short of disengaging, he 
had no alternative but to submit his proposal to such a procedure (thinly sketched as it is 
here), this would certainly appear to count as further evidence that Habermas has given a 
more or less acceptable rendering of necessary conditions of moral validity.        
Of course, the same may be said of Habermas. Although much of his project 
depends on the claim of the universal necessity of the conditions governing practical 
discourse, he cannot simply turn to empirical evidence (or collective intuitions) to 
substantiate his position. This is because the validity of such evidence would need to be 
assessed under the same rationally reconstructed conditions of cooperative reasoning 
(Rehg, 2009). For Habermas, there exists no alternative means of testing empirical claims 
that can fulfil the pragmatic aim of reaching understanding through language while, at the 
same time, avoiding the necessary presuppositions of argumentation. This he attributes to 
the fact that “The presupposed objectivity of the world is so deeply entwined with the 
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intersubjectivity of reaching an understanding” (2003, p. 100). Given Habermas’s 
position that all reasoning aimed at reaching understanding between people must involve 
the formal pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation, the epistemic conditions under 
which empirical validity and moral validity must be sought will not differ (Apel, 1992; 
1980). Without recourse to empirical evidence that could, without undergoing a 
justificatory discourse, definitively verify the culturally transcendent nature of the 
conditions, the trans-cultural concern questioning the plausibility of Habermas’s 
Discourse Theory of Morality as a universally valid moral epistemology remains 
irresolvable on the basis of empirical research alone.   
 This, however, does not mean that empirical evidence cannot be given in support 
of the validity of Habermas’s rational reconstruction of the conditions as universal. It 
simply means that such evidence would not constitute proof of the truth of their 
universality but, instead, stress the fallibility of Habermas’s reconstruction and hold open 
the possibility that empirical evidence, offered at some point in time, might work to 
refute Habermas’s project. Somewhat ironically, McCarthy suggests this very possibility 
of introducing empirical evidence in validating Habermas’s reconstruction of the 
universal presuppositions of communicative rationality. In this sense, McCarthy is in 
agreement with Habermas as to at least one direction open to exploring the empirical and 
theoretical adequacy of practical discourse as a universally valid model of moral 
justification: “Several lines of research suggest themselves [including] investigation of 
pathological or distorted patterns of communication in the light of the standards and 
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conditions established for normal communication by formal pragmatics” (McCarthy, 
1991, p. 138).  It is along these lines that the current research travels.  
 While investigating whether the epistemic conditions of practical discourse, as 
rationally reconstructed by Habermas, can offer productive guidance and assessment of 
school-district policy, it is also possible to see if the conditions fit with administrators’ 
collective and individual understanding of what is important in decision making. To this 
extent, the interviews show some parallels between the actual conditions sought in policy 
development and the necessary conditions of practical discourse. On the indispensability 
of participation, for instance, “It’s critically important to create, not only the perception, 
but also the reality that people did have a clear opportunity to participate in multiple 
ways.” On the basis of such evidence, a fit can be found in that the interviews yield 
insight into an overlapping recognition of the salience of the conditions to public decision 
makers. The importance of the four conditions to senior administrators, in turn, 
underscores the plausibility of Habermas’s rational reconstruction. For it appears that 
whether district leaders’ interests are strategic or communicative, these are the conditions 
that demand their attention and are unavoidably interwoven with both aims. 
 While the interview data is not conclusive, it does support the plausibility of the 
necessary presuppositions as already inherent in the decision-making practices of public 
administrators who are well aware of their mandate to act in the general interest of all 
their constituents. As such, the interviews may be read as validating the universality of 
the four conditions of practical discourse, at least in the current setting of educational 
administration. This interpretation is possible despite those aspects of the interviews that 
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do not appear to fit so well with Habermas’s universal norms of practical discourse. 
There are many instances, for example, where the conditions are not seen by the 
respondents as absolute, irrevocable “rights” of communication. At such times, the 
administrators link the conditions to strategic considerations of “buy in”, “support for”, 
and “success of” initiatives. As such, the working knowledge they have of the importance 
of the conditions often exhibits a closer fit with an instrumental, ends-means mode of 
reasoning.  
 Even this finding can, however, be interpreted in support of the conditions as 
universally relevant. This is because it suggests that even a tacit understanding of the 
communicative function of the conditions can lead to their effective use in securing the 
preconceived ends of the school system. That is, the value placed on the conditions – 
albeit for strategic reasons – is itself an indication of their perceived importance in the 
decision-making process. Administrators have learned that their constituents have certain 
expectations concerning inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion, and if 
these expectations are not adequately satisfied then district initiatives are less likely to be 
successful. In this sense, the administrators appear to be reflecting a set of universally 
valid communicative expectations but for pragmatic reasons of their own understanding.         
 Of course, the question of whether the evidence provided at this time corroborates 
or undermines Habermas’s claim of identifying universal presuppositions of 
argumentation remains open. What is being suggested is merely one interpretation of the 
empirical support that can be established for Habermas’s rational reconstruction. Further  
interpretations may abound and these particular findings “must be checked against [other] 
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individual cases” (Habermas, 1990, p. 97). Yet, without evidence or reasons to the 
contrary, it is still the case that collective understanding of, and mutual agreement on, this 
and like questions can only take place under a set of impartial conditions closely 
resembling those identified by Habermas as necessary for communicative rationality. 
7.2 Particularistic Conditions: Attending to Inclusivity and Context Sensitivity 
 Early formulations of Habermas’s discourse theory were often criticized for 
failing to allow the particularities of individuals and relevant aspects of their 
circumstances to surface in moral deliberation (Johnson, 2001; Young, 1997; 1995). 
Drawing again on the work of Ferrara (1988), this criticism is articulated in the claim that 
Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality provides "no adequate role for reflective 
judgment understood as a capacity to mediate the universal and the particular without 
eliminating the specificity of the particular" which leads to “the lack of context-
sensitivity in his universalism” and the eventual quashing of each individuals’ sense of 
identity (p. 251). For Honneth (1995), the issue of accounting for the particularity of 
others in discourse is a matter of supplementing communicative rationality with a sense 
of “care” for the other as a means of furnishing the moral point of view with “the 
affective impulses of reciprocal recognition” (p. 319). In this way, the particularity of 
each human being can be recognized and “asymmetrical acts” that do not conform to the 
modern principle of equal treatment for all can be morally redeemed (p. 316). A further 
reconceiving of moral discourse as a practice more capable of attending to the 
particularity of others is offered in the work of Young (1995). Her interest is in 
articulating “an ideal of asymmetrical reciprocity” that does not obscure “the difference 
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and particularity of the other position” (p. 346). Such an ideal would entail that “We 
mutually recognize one another, and aim to understand one another…we each must be 
open to learning about the other person’s perspective, since we cannot take the other 
person’s standpoint and imagine that perspective as our own” (p. 354). The upshot for 
Young is that “Normative judgement is best understood as the product of dialogue under 
conditions of equality and equal respect. Ideally, the outcome of such dialogue and 
judgement is just and legitimate only if all the affected perspectives have a voice” (p. 
360).    
 While objections to Habermas’s work on the basis of a greater need for attending 
to the particularity and situatedness of individuals can be subtle and varied, it is possible 
to thematize these objections as taking a common interest in the “reciprocity” that takes 
place between individual subjects in discourse. Moreover, depending on how the concept 
of reciprocity is interpreted, there may actually be a general agreement between 
Habermas and his critics in this dispute. If this is so, the dispute appears more likely a 
matter of how to meaningfully operationalize reciprocal communication and sufficiently 
fulfil the conditions of inclusion and participation. By parsing the above objections, for 
example, it is possible to identify the reciprocity thread that ties them together. Ferrara 
claims the need in practical discourse is for reflective judgement that discovers and takes 
account of the contextuality of differently situated actors. Honneth posits care for the 
other as a precondition of the reciprocal recognition that can generate asymmetrical 
treatment. For Young, practical discourse lacks an asymmetrical reciprocity that does not 
reduce the difference between participants but allows the equal expression of all voices. 
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Each objection can, however, be addressed by taking seriously Habermas’s statements 
about the sort of reciprocity he is advocating. The following comment illustrates this 
point well: 
 Generalized reciprocal perspective-taking requires not just empathy for, but also 
 interpretive intervention into, the self-understanding of participants who must be 
 willing to revise their descriptions of themselves and others (1998, p. 42). 
 
Such statements convey a clear need for mutual recognition and reflexivity in practical 
discourse. All participants must be willing to reflect on the interests and value-
orientations of others and themselves alike, and this attitude must extend beyond an 
initial sense of self-interest or empathy and open all participants to a collective appraisal. 
This requires a non-levelling symmetry in cooperative acts of communication that does 
not attempt to appropriate or assimilate, but actively seek the “inclusion of the other in 
his otherness” (1998, p. 40). In fact, Habermas has gone so far in his articulation of a 
reciprocity that is sensitive to difference that, as early as 2001, Johnson was able to 
suggest that his later formulations of communicative rationality “have opened up 
possibilities for a new and productive episode [that] must be seen to rest precisely on its 
open-ended and dialogic character” (p. 59).   
 Perhaps, disputes over the inclusivity of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of 
Morality should also draw attention toward the meaningful operationalization of sincerity 
in the form of truthfulness and non-coercion. Engagement in practical discourse allows – 
indeed, requires – that particular interests and value-orientations be incorporated into the 
joint search for acceptable practical norms, an elaboration of what it means to 
communicate a sincere self-clarification and make an honest appraisal of interests and 
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values seems forthcoming. In terms of moral intuitions about sincerity, it may be the case 
that Habermas’s philosophical account of the conditions of practical discourse provides 
space for further development of critical practices. More imaginative self-clarifications 
and aesthetic self-explorations may have an important role to play in satisfying the 
condition of truthfulness, for example. Such work could assist in the identification and 
articulation of relevant personal perspectives. Or it may be that a wider range of literary 
forms including storytelling, drama, autobiography, and narrative could encourage 
participation in discourse through a more positive expression of individual perspectives 
and values (Johnson, 2001). To the extent that such forms of expression are practiced and 
familiar to certain participants, they may present a less coercive, in the sense of more 
comfortable and less intimidating, means of disclosing one’s identity and contextual 
reflections. On these grounds, such forms deserve further consideration when working to 
enhance the communicative conditions of sincerity and the collective agency of all parties 
in practical discourse.         
 Regarding the context-sensitivity available in practical discourse, Habermas 
clearly acknowledges major additional considerations beyond the initial justification of 
norms. To this point in the current study, the presentation of Habermas’s Discourse 
Theory of Morality as a theoretical framework has focused on the moral justification of 
norms and policy, and the function of the conditions of practical discourse in that respect. 
Once a norm is considered justified under conditions of practical discourse, it may be 
accepted as part of a constellation of valid norms guiding moral interactions. This 
reservoir of morally just norms can, however, create a need for a “further discursive step” 
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in Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality (1994, p. 37). Habermas writes: "The 
application of norms calls for argumentative clarification in its own right. In this case, the 
impartiality of judgement cannot again be secured through a principle of universalization; 
rather, in addressing questions of context-sensitive application, practical reason must be 
informed by a principle of appropriateness" (1994, p. 14). At this next step, interlocutors 
work together to choose the most appropriate moral norm for a given situation as they 
move from a procedure of justification to one of application. This secondary step is 
articulated in the concept of “application discourses” and the “sense of appropriateness” 
in applying justified norms to particular cases. Rehg (1997) explains this transition as 
follows, “At issue is not the justification of a general norm but rather the question of 
which concrete action is warranted in the light of prima facie norms and situational 
particulars” (p. 247).  
 On this aspect of his discourse theory, Habermas especially endorses the work of 
Klaus Günther (1993) and often defers to Günther as the authority on this matter. 
However, unlike Habermas’s clear articulation of the conditions of practical discourse, 
Günther provides no clear stipulation of conditions for application discourses. Rather, it 
seems implied that discourses of application would necessarily take place under the same 
presuppositions of argumentation that ground the conditions of practical discourse. This 
is implied because both practical discourses and application discourses require 
argumentative clarification. If an application discourse is to result in the appropriate 
choice and application of a valid norm, then the participants cannot dispense with the 
necessary presuppositions of argumentation. This is a reasonable assertion because the 
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conditions necessary to the possibility of understanding and impartiality still need to be in 
play in discourses of application – to assure that everyone's interests are understood in the 
circumstances and that the application of a norm is made appropriately in the specific 
context. In this sense, the conditions assure that discourses of application remain oriented 
towards understanding and impartiality in the appropriate choice and application of 
norms. In application discourses, as in practical discourses, the conditions act to preserve 
the reciprocity and sincerity inherent in the moral point of view. Inclusion, participation, 
truthfulness, and non-coercion establish a moral viewpoint for both the justification and 
application of norms, enhancing opportunity for participants to consider what is right in 
general and appropriate for them in a given situation. 
 The possible implications of considering application discourses and the principle 
of appropriateness in educational policy and practice are many (Martin, 2012). The 
interest at hand, however, is in noting the provision of this supplementary step as an 
important resource for addressing concerns over the level of context sensitivity inherent 
in Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality. In introducing the sense of situational 
appropriateness, Habermas and Günther clearly acknowledge that the individuals most 
affected by a norm or policy are in an epistemically relevant position to determine its 
applicability. They are opening space in Habermas’s discourse theory for deliberating on 
“the right thing to do in the given circumstances” (1994, p. 36). In deciding what is 
appropriate, however, participants in application discourses are not free to dispense with 
the moral point of view. They cannot, for example, act exclusively or deceptively if the 
aim is impartial understanding and joint agreement. Habermas explains, “In discourses of 
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application, the principle of appropriateness takes on the role played by the principle of 
universalization in justificatory discourses. Only the two principles taken together 
exhaust the idea of impartiality” (p. 37). In this way, the impartiality that is so intrinsic to 
mutual understanding and agreement is preserved in the movement from the justification 
to the application of norms and policies.   
  This preservation of the moral point of view is particularly relevant to directions 
sought in the current research. The specific interest, here, is in theorizing and 
understanding the conditions of practical discourse in relation to initiative development in 
school-district administration. A further intent is to explain and recommend Habermas’s 
Discourse Theory of Morality as a suitable moral epistemology to the field of educational 
administration – to outline and promote it as a means of assuring educational initiatives 
are morally valid. As such, the theoretical framework and interviews have focused solely 
on the conditions of practical discourse in relation to the justification of initiatives. 
Introducing the concept of application discourses, however, hints at a much broader 
research programme open to this course of inquiry. It raises the possibility of examining 
whether the moral point of view operates not just in the development but in the actual 
application of educational policy.  
 While further study is left to the future, the need to maintain a moral point of view 
in the situated application of policy suggests the conditions of practical discourse could 
supply a key entry point for this research. Habermas, moreover, outlines a number of 
possible types of rational collective will formation that could be foci of administrative 
studies. In addition to practical discourses for the justification of policies in the general 
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interest and application discourses for determining situational appropriateness of policy, 
Habermas introduces conceptions of ethical-political discussion, negotiation of 
compromises under fair bargaining conditions, and pragmatic implementation discourses 
(McCarthy, 1991). Common to each of these types is “the neutralization of power 
differentials attached to conflicting interest positions or concealed in traditional value 
constellations” (p. 192). So, while each type of intersubjective deliberative practice may 
be bound to its own distinct formal principle that defines an acceptable outcome, it 
appears that the conditions of practical discourse would still be needed to orient this 
collection of communicative procedures toward mutual understanding. Furthermore, 
practical discourse would remain as the central practice of justification for the moral 
integrity of the “whole web” of overlapping communication types. For these reasons, the 
study and application of conditions of practical discourse in institutional settings is 
singularly important (p. 193).       
7.3 Practical Conditions: Resourcing “Rational Trust” for Educational Settings
 Inasmuch as this research lends support to Habermas’s rational reconstruction of 
the conditions of practical discourse as a plausible framework for educational decision-
making, it also focuses attention on the highly demanding intention of fulfilling the 
conditions satisfactorily in practice. Recall that each respondent indicated their direct 
experience with the scalar nature of all four conditions and characterized participation as 
inherently and disappointingly low. As apprehension concerning their fulfilment may 
pose a serious impediment to the acceptance of a discourse-theoretical model of decision-
making in school-district administration, an attempt at supporting the practicality of the 
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conditions in this context appears warranted. Again, McCarthy offers a clear-cut and 
succinct summation of the issue: “Since political discourses always take place under less 
than ideal conditions, it will always be open to dissenters to view any given collective 
decision as tainted by de facto limitations and thus not acceptable under ideal conditions” 
(1991, p. 197). If this is the case, then no actual decision-making procedure or policy can 
fulfill the requirements of moral validity, and it may appear that no initiative may 
justifiably be deemed morally valid. This repercussion of real-world instances of practical 
discourse may, thereby, impair the moral standing of all policy decisions made at public 
institutions. The implication for the current study – an implication that certainly 
resonated with the respondents – is that educational administrators and researchers in the 
field might find the conditions of practical discourse too unrealistic or idealistic for 
guiding and assessing policy initiatives. Moreover, even if school-district administrators 
were to take a more communicative moral point of view in decision making, the district’s 
initiatives would remain tainted by the de facto limitations of the actual procedure. In 
turn, by excluding at the outset all but the most generally accepted policy decisions from 
valid considerations of moral worth, practical discourse resists wide adoption in 
institutional decision-making processes and invites rejection by public administrators as 
too restrictive and demanding.    
There is some support in the educational administration literature for rejecting 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality on the grounds that it is of little practical value 
to the field. Evers and Lakomski (1991), for example, claim “According to the theory’s 
own argument [that is, Habermas’s recognition of the counterfactual nature of the 
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conditions], we could never know whether or not the ideal speech situation was actually 
obtained” (p. 163). This is coupled with the further claim that Habermas appeals to 
“doubtful evidence for the existence of such a [ideal speech] situation” (160). As these 
claims amount to an attack on the feasibility of Habermas’s project it is important to 
reply to them. Key here is Habermas’s forceful defence of the conditions as constitutive 
of a regulative ideal oriented to reaching shared understanding and agreement on a 
generalizable interest or norm. As such, the relevant distinctions not taken into account 
by Evers and Lakomski (1991) are twofold. First is the difference between discovering 
the conditions in “empirical evidence” and grounding them in a “rational reconstruction”. 
Second is the subsequent difference between supposing the existence of an “ideal speech 
situation” and identifying “idealizing conditions” having practical effect in actual 
practical discourses. While both of these distinctions are important in marking the 
progress of Habermas’s theorizing, missing their importance is not necessarily an 
omission on the part of Evers and Lakomski. Note, for example, the considerable and 
continued efforts Habermas made in addressing the issue of plausible necessity as derived 
through his universal-pragmatic analysis of argumentation. Indeed, Habermas’s 
willingness to take seriously the voices of his critics and to rethink his project of 
communicative rationality is well acknowledged (Rehg, 1997). As such, it may 
reasonably be argued that the negative assessment made by Evers and Lakomski 
represents a historically-specific lacuna in administrative understanding.  
At this point in the development of his Discourse Theory of Morality, Habermas 
struggled with general criticisms of the type levelled by Evers and Lakomski. As Baynes 
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wrote in 1992, Habermas’s use of terms such as “species-wide competencies” in 
identifying universal presuppositions of argumentation appeared to make practical 
discourse dependent “upon the empirical validity of its reconstruction of specific human 
competencies” (p. 109). On this reading, critics might well ask on what empirical 
evidence Habermas bases his claim of universal conditions of practical discourse. In 
response to such readings, Habermas sought to emphasize the universal-pragmatic 
justification of discourse-theoretical idealizations at the core of his Discourse Theory of 
Morality (Gunnarsson, 2000). On this account, any empirical example of a deliberation 
that satisfactorily meets the conditions of practical discourse can be explained as the 
result of interlocutors who are (consciously or unconsciously) avoiding performative self-
contradiction in a cooperative search for mutual understanding and joint agreement on a 
generalizable norm or interest. While Habermas does suggest that empirical evidence can 
work to corroborate his rational (but fallible) reconstruction of the necessary conditions, 
“subjecting them to indirect verification” (Habermas, 1990, p. 32), the universality he 
claims for the presuppositions of argumentation is not dependent on producing such 
evidence. That is, the occurrence of discursive situations approximating the conditions of 
practical discourse do not in themselves provide the justification of his Discourse Theory 
of Morality. So, while support for Habermas’s position may be found in the actual 
conditions enacted during communicative interactions, the validity of his philosophical 
argument is not dependant on observing such evidence but on the rational demands of 
communicative action.  
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This reading makes it possible to better address the second and perhaps more 
serious concern posed by Evers and Lakomski. Emphasizing the formal-pragmatic 
justification of practical discourse as a rational reconstruction of the necessary 
presuppositions for the possibility of impartial argumentation brings a concurrent shift 
from “ideal speech situation” to “idealizing conditions”. With this shift, emphasis is now 
placed on the critical perspective made available by advancing the presuppositions of 
argumentation as idealizing conditions of practical discourse – conditions that may now 
be used to rationally criticize and revise decision making procedures but without 
demanding the impossible – i.e., their complete realization at any specific instance. This 
shift makes it clear that Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality is not intended to 
establish a fixed place or “situation” in the world but to construct a point of reference or 
orientation for guiding and critically assessing the impartial coordination of social 
interactions.  
Practical discourse, as such, is a moral end only in the sense of advancing a moral 
epistemology, a means of normative assessment that reconstructs an ongoing orientation 
toward the epistemic conditions that operationalize (D) for intersubjective moral 
deliberation. The idealizing conditions provide an orientation toward taking a moral point 
of view in the regulation of interests as the formalized presuppositions of argumentation 
– the presuppositions people always already make in reaching an understanding. This 
means critical questions can be asked of actual decision-makers concerning their 
orientation to inclusiveness or truthfulness, for example. In this way, Habermas’s 
theorizing of practical discourse can provide educational administration research with “an 
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ideal that can be more or less adequately approximated in reality, that can serve as a 
guide for the institutionalization of discourse and as a critical standard against which 
every actually achieved consensus can be measured” (McCarthy, 1978, p. 309). In 
overlooking the rational reconstruction of specific conditions of practical discourse and 
thereby misinterpreting the conditions as ontological suppositions, Evers and Lakomski 
miss-assess the potential of Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality as a critical ideal 
for educational administration research.         
 Still, even if the philosophical coherence of Habermas’s rational reconstruction of 
practical discourse affirms its value as a regulative ideal, the many constraints inherent to 
organizational decision-making place additional demands on its real-world application. 
This challenge to the practicality of communicative theories of morality for institutional 
settings is recognized in the philosophical literature on education (Martin, 2012). More 
generally, Apel (1980) notes that an ethics of communication based on idealized 
presuppositions does not necessarily take into account the fact that administrators 
“remain bound to their real social position and situation” (p. 279).  In formal education, 
for instance, time, confidentiality, resources, and the general competencies of decision 
makers are often factors that influence how a decision is made. In grappling with the 
practicality of applying Habermasian discourse theory to educational settings, the 
counterfactual nature of the conditions in real policy discussions is still seen as a reason 
for concern. Martin (2012), for example, has sought to address this issue by modifying 
and extending the conditions or “rules of argumentation” to create a better fit with 
educational settings: “By restating the pragmatic presuppositions of discourse, reasons of 
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educational relevance can become more salient to participants” (p. 158). In this way, he 
suggests that the condition of non-coercion be interpreted more specifically to include a 
“developmental coercion criterion” to protect “those who are not yet dialogically mature 
enough to participate in public discourse” from distorted educational processes such as 
“indoctrination” (p. 158).  
 How fruitful it may be to amend and/or extend the conditions of practical 
discourse for application to educational settings is debatable. Certainly, as shown in the 
literature, there is philosophical interest in seeking fuller interpretations, 
operationalizations, and applications of these “clearly counterfactual” epistemic 
conditions for a variety of reasons (Martin, 2012, p. 156). In the specific sphere of 
educational policy studies, it might therefore be asked of theorists such as Martin if a 
reasonable case could be made for the extended operationalization of inclusion, 
participation, and truthfulness as may be applicable to this particular domain? Perhaps, 
such theorizing could follow in a similar vein to Martin’s (2012) work extending the 
condition of non-coercion as an operant criterion for moral policy development in 
education? Habermas certainly appears to invite such explorations when he points out 
that:  
 It has become clear to me in retrospect that (U) only operationalized a more 
 comprehensive principle of discourse [i.e., (D) plus the four conditions necessary 
 for moral justification] with reference to a particular subject matter, namely, 
 morality. The principle of discourse can also be operationalized for other kinds of 
 questions, for example, for the deliberations of political legislators or for legal 
 discourses [or, presumably, for deliberating on educational policy]. (1998, p. 46)  
 
Likewise, it appears that Martin (2012) willingly takes up this challenge and devotes 
much of the second section of his text to proceeding precisely as Habermas suggests: 
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 I examine different ways in which Habermas’ Discourse Principle (D) can be 
 applied to the educational domain. I argue that the most promising approach is to 
 revise his moral principle of universalization (U) in order to account for the 
 educational interests of citizens and persons who may be unable to participate 
 fully in public discourse. (p. 14)  
 
 Despite the encouragement of Habermas, and however philosophically plausible 
Martin’s results, extensions of the basic criteria of (U) are unlikely to satisfy the practical 
concerns of applying counterfactual rules of argumentation to rationally criticise and 
revise administrative decision-making. From the matter-of-fact perspective of current 
administrators, it is difficult to appreciate how adding another counterfactual requirement 
to the already morally operationalized discourse principle might facilitate widespread 
application of practical discourse in education. In short, the problem of practical 
application lies elsewhere. It is the inherent counterfactuality of the epistemic conditions 
of practical discourse that raises concern over its general adoption as a realistic procedure 
for educational decision making. What is needed, therefore, are strategies for facilitating 
satisfactory fulfilment of the conditions in real-world settings.  
 Recall Günther’s (1993) sense of the appropriate application of discursively 
justified norms. His theorizing of application discourses does not suggest a new or 
amended set of epistemic criteria but works to improve case sensitivity within the 
necessary conditions identified by Habermas for practical discourse. On these grounds, 
the following section offers a different theoretical course from that taken by Martin 
(2012), one that attempts to address the counterfactuality of the conditions in a manner 
consistent with the practical interests of contemporary educational administration 
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research while, hopefully, continuing to support and extend the philosophical relevance 
of Habermas’s rational reconstruction of discursive criteria for the field.  
 Regarding the problem of overcoming real-world constraints, no one has worked 
more consistently or systematically in addressing problems associated with practical 
application of Habermasian discourse theory than William Rehg. For Rehg, the basic 
issue to be addressed is one of philosophical abstraction: “In view of the strong character 
of discourse-ethical idealizations, one might rightly ask whether discourse ethics does not 
abstract too much from the empirical limitations of real actors and their conflicts” (1997, 
p. 182). In Insight and Solidarity, Rehg (1997) sees a promising way forward, despite the 
counterfactual nature of the conditions, to concrete instances of situating a discourse 
theory of moral decision-making through the incorporation of “something like… rational 
trust” (p. 237). Rehg tentatively posits rational trust as a means of addressing the 
objection to the practical value of Habermasian discourse that it is too constrained by its 
idealizing conditions.  
 For Rehg, rational trust bridges between what is called for and what is possible in 
real processes of discourse. It acknowledges that those affected by a decision must to 
some degree “trust the opinions of experts… trust the public processes of debate and 
decision-making… have some confidence in one another’s sincerity… [and in] the 
representatives’ capacity to consider thoughtfully a variety of view points” (p. 237). In 
this sense, the moral validity of a decision is situated within the trustworthiness of 
decision-making procedures and, specifically, in the sincerity and reciprocal perspective 
taking of those entrusted with making public policy. If decision makers can maintain the 
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trust of their constituents by displaying reciprocity and sincerity, then there is good 
reason to seriously consider their decisions as morally valid. This is because they have 
made a convincing effort at understanding the foreseeable consequences and side effects 
of an initiative and because their decision has met (or could meet) with the acceptance of 
all concerned in practical discourse. That is, the decision makers have employed a moral 
epistemology in assessing the initiative such that, given time and resources, the 
deliberations could satisfy the demanding conditions of practical discourse, stay in 
keeping with collective moral intuitions, and result in the understanding and agreement of 
their constituents that the “right” decision was made. Rational trust, as such, grants by 
general agreement that (D) will be operationalized for moral deliberation in advance of 
the decision.  
In support of his project needing something like rational trust, Habermas 
recognises that “trust” must be present as part of “the intersubjective commonality of 
communicatively achieved agreement [based upon] reaching understanding in language” 
(1999a, p. 142). That is, to reach joint understanding and agreement, interlocutors must, 
without alternative, depend on “mutual trust in [the] subjective sincerity” of the other (p. 
142). While this suggests that a step toward incorporating some form of “trust” is 
necessary for concrete implementation of practical discourse, there is also a tacit 
assumption by Habermas that trust must have a grounding in the actual conditions of 
discourse, perhaps by way of shared moral intuitions about reciprocity and sincerity. If 
so, then rational trust, as established between participants in moral deliberations, is 
warranted by the satisfactory and mutual fulfilment of the specific conditions of 
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argumentation. Interlocutors have good reason to trust each other insofar as everyone 
involved in a decision appears sincerely engaged in cooperative reasoning and 
perspective-taking under the necessary conditions of practical discourse. By extension, 
constituents may have good reason to trust their representative decision makers if the 
specific features of practical discourse are in evidence. 
 This is an important point as Rehg (1997) introduces the idea of rational trust as a 
bridging mechanism between idealizing and actual conditions of practical discourse but 
leaves open the question of what would merit consideration as “criteria of rational trust” 
(p. 238). He only surmises that such criteria are likely to have “a moral weight of their 
own” (p. 238). He further suggests that if constituents can trust their public decision 
makers without recourse to the conditions of practical discourse, then Habermas’s 
reconstruction may not correctly depict the specific features of intersubjective, 
cooperative reasoning. While these suggestions may prove of interest for future 
philosophical and empirical research, it appears an implausible task to construct a set of 
independent criteria warranting the rational trust of constituents in their representatives 
that does not take into account satisfactory levels of inclusion, participation, truthfulness, 
and non-coercion as the basis of the warrant. To use Rehg’s own words, “We can 
intuitively elicit these conditions [of practical discourse] by asking…which features of a 
discourse would increase our confidence that the outcome of a discussion is [morally] 
trustworthy” (2003, p. 86). From this perspective, it appears that only if the specific 
conditions identified by Habermas are shown to form inadequate “criteria of rational 
trust” would they require supplementing with additional conditions or discarding 
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altogether in favour of criteria that are, perhaps, more rationally trustworthy. Moreover, 
as with the conditions of practical discourse, any set of alternative criteria satisfying 
rational trust for a pluralistic society would also need to pass a close examination of its 
universality and necessity – an examination made all the more difficult for criteria 
carrying a moral weight of their own. 
 Despite the rather open-ended direction for rational trust indicated by Rehg 
(2003), when taken with Habermas’s comments it does appear to comprise a 
supplemental and sensible addition to situating a Discourse Theory of Morality in 
concrete contexts of public administration. As a practical means of addressing the 
counterfactual conditions of discourse, for example, a conception of rational trust could 
offer a rough gauge of the moral validity of initiatives – not as a fifth idealizing condition 
but as an indicator of general satisfaction (or lack of satisfaction) with levels of inclusion, 
participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion present in a public decision-making 
procedure. Understood as a rough gauge of moral validity, rational trust allows for social 
and institutional stability while assuring that the always necessarily less-than-ideal 
character of organizational decisions is open to critical assessment against the idealizing 
conditions of practical discourse.  
 It is possible to find support for this application of rational trust by turning to 
Rehg’s (2009) recent consideration of the function of the necessary presuppositions of 
practical discourse: 
 In effect [the four conditions are] a set of dialectical process norms, cast as an 
 ideal procedure. Moreover, as counterfactual, the norms are not only abstract but 
 primarily negative: they ask us to test for possible blind spots – excluded persons 
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 who may have contributed an important argument, prejudices that undermine 
 reasonable assessment, and so on. (p. 137)  
 
In line with this pragmatic conceptualization of the conditions, rational trust provides an 
opportunity to check the full set of dialectical process norms at a glance, assess if they are 
functioning, and be assured there are no remaining blind spots in the moral vision of the 
decision makers. As an amalgam of the conditions’ roles in supporting moral validity, 
rational trust renders the discourse-theoretical moral framework more serviceable at a 
practical level by providing a heuristic for the study of institutionalized discourse in 
educational administration.  
 Viewed as a rough gauge of moral validity satisfying conditions of practical 
discourse, decisions appealing to the rational trust of constituents would always remain 
open to critical assessment using criteria of inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-
coercion. In terms of its heuristic value in the critical assessment of policy initiatives, it 
may also be possible to reduce the number of criteria comprising rational trust in a way 
that makes the concept even more applicable for educational administration. Such a 
reduction in the criteria of rational trust can be made by subdividing the four specific 
features of practical discourse into two more general categories corresponding to 
collective moral intuition: reciprocity and sincerity. This further step requires working 
backward from the four epistemic conditions of practical discourse to the formal-
pragmatic analysis of argumentation, and, finally, to Habermas’s identification of 
collective moral intuitions and how individuals come to understand each other and reach 
jointly acceptable decisions.  
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 Such a restructuring in the epistemic criteria of rational trust to the intuitions 
everyone shares about moral judgement is consistent with having confidence in a 
representative’s sincerity and capacity to consider a variety of viewpoints. A move to 
fewer criteria would also assist and encourage applications of the conditions of practical 
discourse to the context of educational administration by tailoring the meaning of 
reciprocity and sincerity to practical considerations found in the field. Aligning inclusion 
and participation with a general conception of “reciprocity” as the act of perspective 
taking undertaken by administrators during the development of initiatives, for example, 
would help specify practices that satisfy two of the specific criteria of rational trust. 
Similarly, a general assessment of actual practices in light of criteria of rational trust 
would also be possible by placing truthfulness and non-coercion under the wider, morally 
intuitive category of “sincerity” in the articulation of imperatives and publicizing of 
information.   
 While these are only tentative suggestions, they do argue for the practical value of 
employing rational trust as a critical resource for educational administration. As a 
shorthand assessment of the moral validity of educational initiatives, rational trust gives 
an account of the visible sincerity and reciprocity of a decision-making procedure. In 
specific instances, rational trust may be taken to indicate constituent confidence in the 
perspective taking of district administrators and their overall satisfaction with the 
availability of information. The basic suggestion, therefore, is that a conception of 
rational trust could be crafted for the needs of educational administration, a conception 
that provides assurance that the moral point of view is taken by administrators during 
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consideration of large-scale initiatives while recognising the contextual limitations 
school-district administration places on decision making.  
Conceptualized as a heuristic, rational trust could allow articulation and 
identification of disruptive factors in cases where trust in administrative decisions is 
eroding. In such cases, the failing confidence of constituents in the orientation of the 
decision-making process toward impartial conditions of deliberation may be traced to a 
lack of one or a number of the indispensable criteria of rational trust. Tangible 
considerations of perspective taking, for instance, may reveal that the gap between the 
idealizing presuppositions of inclusion and participation, and the actual features of 
deliberation, is not sufficiently bridged to assure rational trust. As such, the orientation 
towards inclusion and participation exhibited by the decision makers has failed to show 
reciprocity to the extent required for maintaining the rational trust of those affected. That 
is, the decision-making process is failing to function in a specific way – that impinges on 
the satisfaction of essential criteria of reciprocity – to allow rational trust to bridge the 
gap between constituent presuppositions about inclusivity and participation and the actual 
practices of decision makers. Conversely, a generally acceptable degree of rational trust 
would indicate confidence in the decision-makers’ perspective taking as a substitute for 
full inclusion and participation. In cases such as this, the rational trust of constituents 
would be their own assurance that a policy could be justified under conditions of practical 
discourse and that the decision maker’s capacity for perspective taking is functioning as it 
should.  
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 There is already support for conceiving trust as a measure of satisfaction with 
decisions made in educational administration. For example, “active trust” is identified by 
Hargreaves and Fink (2008) as an indicator that constituents are confident in the expertise 
of teachers and principals to make good decisions about schooling (p. 235). Bryk and 
Schneider (2003) view “relational trust” as an important resource for school 
improvement, noting that leaders of successful school reform demonstrate “respectful 
exchanges”, “openness to others”, and “personal integrity” in their day to day dealings 
with constituents (p. 42). Kouzes and Posner (2003) are adamant that all successful 
organizational leaders must earn the trust of those they work with: “Being seen as 
someone who can be trusted, who has high integrity, and who is honest and truthful is 
essential” (p. 24). Senge et al. (1994) raise the strong relationship between skillful 
discussion and “an atmosphere of trust”, insisting this is the only way this type of 
communication works (p. 394). Trust also plays an important role in the influential 
writings of O’Toole (1996), whose work is cited twice by the respondents in this study. 
In his conception of leadership, trust is generated by the “integrity” of leaders “to achieve 
the ends of the people” (p. 28).  
 Furthering the significance of trust as an indicator of constituent satisfaction are 
numerous unsolicited comments made by the respondents. For example, “Leaders of 
decision-making and change processes need to be able to portray the element of trust and 
honesty and integrity and openness in their work” and “If you coerce somebody or you 
violate the trust, then the others [inclusion, participation, and truthfulness] begin to go out 
the window.” Still, as with the conditions themselves, trust appears to have a strategic 
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value in administrative decision making: “We shouldn’t pat ourselves on the back for 
creating trust, it’s a necessity. We can’t live without it, not in the way that education is 
organized” and “Buy-in is substantially impacted by the concept and notion of 
trustworthiness.” If, however, Habermas’s reconstruction of the moral point of view has 
it right, then administrators should be able to build the rational trust of staff and 
constituents by demonstrating their commitment to reciprocity and sincerity. In this case, 
“creating trust” need not be seen as a solely strategic activity but as affirmation of a 
commitment to inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion as irreplaceable 
moral and communicative norms.  
 While more focused research of trust in the setting of educational administration 
is indicated by such examples, the conceptualization of “rational trust” offered here could 
form the basis for developing and testing a heuristic that represents a moral point of view 
for educational administration while acknowledging the practical limits of institutional 
decision making. The course of action being suggested, therefore, is: rather than 
attempting to further operationalize the conditions of practical discourse for a variety of 
educational settings, allow the conditions to define what trusting in the morality of 
educational initiatives means. This approach accepts the counterfactuality of the 
conditions while giving them a practical role in establishing the moral validity of policy 
in a manner consistent with contemporary educational administration thought on the 
importance of trust.    
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Chapter Eight 
Summary, Future Work, and Recommendations 
 
 This research establishes “inclusion”, “participation”, “truthfulness”, and “non-
coercion” as important concepts of interest in the communication practices of educational 
administrators. This claim is based on considerable recognition of the significance of 
these communicative ideals by senior school-district administrators in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. As such, a key finding of the current research is the present awareness of and 
positive attitude in principle toward the conditions of practical discourse in district-wide 
decision- and policy-making. In addition to existent support for the general application of 
conditions of communicative rationality, the interview data can be further divided into 
subthemes of specific relevance to situating a Discourse Theory of Morality in the field 
of educational administration. The scalar nature of satisfying the conditions in practice, 
for example, is evident and presents a subtheme consistent with their counterfactual 
designation in Habermas’s discourse theory.  
Subthemes of difference, however, are also present and distinguish the current 
administrative understanding of the conditions in this educational context from 
Habermas’s view of their necessity in relation to moral validity. For the respondents, 
support for the conditions is generally understood as basic to the strategic validity of 
district-wide initiatives and as vital to the effective and sustained implementation of 
policy. In the case of each individual condition, therefore, the conceptualization and 
characterization of its “necessity” by senior administrators permits differing degrees of 
acceptable fulfilment in actual cases of decision making. As strategically salient 
conditions, they are viewed as contingent on the ends of the school system and open to 
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purposeful limiting and adjusting in order to leverage their interrelated effects. Their 
application and acceptable fulfilment is, therefore, at the discretion of senior 
administrators and made to satisfy strategic standards deemed practical and appropriate 
for the successful development and implementation of policy initiatives.   
 These findings of difference, entailed in the preferential appreciation of the 
conditions as strategically salient, offer insight into the nature of barriers obscuring a 
moral point of view of the kind delineated by Habermas in school-district administration. 
When present, such barriers limit the conditions of practical discourse, reducing the 
validity of procedures aimed at impartial and universally acceptable decision making. If a 
discourse-theoretical moral epistemology is to bear strongly upon district-wide initiatives, 
then consciousness of the moral relevance of the epistemic conditions will need to be 
raised. This aim should include enhanced analysis of administration literature that 
promotes strategic forms of communication for educational organizations, greater 
questioning of accepted norms of communication at the level of school-district decision 
making, the challenging of preconceived understandings of educational leadership roles, 
and formal examination of educational imperatives that may be narrowly interpreted into 
policy by senior administrators.  
 Although the current research does not represent all who could conceivably be 
affected by district-level decisions, or all relevant opinions of decision-making practices 
in the district, taken together these interviews give meaningful insight into the internal 
dynamics of school-district administration and the attitudes and priorities of its senior 
leaders. These findings contribute to educational administration research by providing a 
 
 
 
 
151
more comprehensive description of administrative policy- and decision-making in a 
Canadian school district and by establishing a groundwork for using a Discourse Theory 
of Morality to guide and assess the moral validity of administrative practice in public 
education. Despite existing barriers to the practice of a Discourse Theory of Morality in 
this educational setting, the explicit awareness senior administrators have for the 
importance and general relevance of the conditions of moral validity is an encouraging 
finding. This finding should be understood, however, in relation to the pertinent 
subthemes of difference. These subthemes often demonstrate a clear preference for the 
strategic value of the conditions at the expense of taking a moral point of view in decision 
making. 
In addition to providing insight into the four idealizing conditions of discourse in 
the context of school-district administration, implications concerning the plausibility and 
practicality of Habermasian discourse theory for this particular setting were also raised by 
participants in the current research. On the issue of plausibility, the significance of the 
conditions as recognized in the attention they are given by senior administrators, is 
consistent with Habermas’s rational reconstruction of the universal presuppositions of 
argumentation. Senior leadership appears to intuitively know the value of each discourse-
theoretical idealization as an important condition of communication and their 
understanding of the “necessity” of the conditions for dialogical processes (and strategic 
purposes) is supported by influential systems theorists such as Senge. As a pragmatic 
analysis, Habermas’s (1990) reconstruction is fallible – it is not an “ultimate 
justification” of the absolute necessity of the specific conditions of practical discourse for 
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moral deliberation (p. 32). As such, the plausibility of the conditions may be challenged 
by various interpretations taken from other philosophical orientations and real-world 
experiences of discourse. The evidence presented here, however, does not refute 
Habermas’s analysis but may be counted as supplementary corroboration. While such 
empirical findings cannot in themselves settle the concerns raised by McCarthy, they do 
present evidence that further validates Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Morality as a 
universalizable moral epistemology. In this sense, the current study generates 
confirmation that is consistent with Habermas’s central philosophical claims and extends 
the relevance of practical discourse for guiding and assessing decisions made in public 
education.   
In terms of the practicality of this moral epistemology for an educational setting, a 
case is made for developing a rough gauge of constituent satisfaction with degrees of 
inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-coercion during administrative decision 
making. Rehg’s notion of “rational trust” is posited as a viable indicator or heuristic of 
constituent satisfaction. The moral validity of a decision could be gauged by the rational 
trust of constituents in their school-district leaders. Conceived in this way, rational trust 
would be a pragmatic bridging mechanism working to sufficiently ground the moral 
validity of concrete decisions. The importance of maintaining rational trust arises in 
recognition of the finite and fallible nature of real decision-making in a context 
constrained by time, resources, and jurisdictional authority – that is, in an educational 
setting where the conditions of practical discourse will always be present as 
counterfactual.  
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While much ground is covered by this enquiry concerning the specific conditions 
of practical discourse in an educational setting, there remains a good deal more to be 
explored. It is not difficult to envision an extensive research program centered on further 
studying the conditions in the theoretical and practical contexts of educational 
administration. Toward such work, the following sections offer a brief prospectus for 
continuing research from empirical and critical viewpoints. In addition to possibilities for 
future research, this final chapter also highlights an opportunity raised by the current 
research to reflect on new directions for educating educational administrators. These 
directions for the future study and enhancement of educational governance are consistent 
with the need to develop a viable moral epistemology for the field and with the aim of 
developing a Habermasian moral point of view in the administrative practice of public 
education.  
8.1 Empirical Work: Checking Veracity and Barriers in Specific Cases 
 As an initial foray into understanding the four conditions of moral validity in the 
context of school-district administration, the scope of participants was narrowly focused 
and the contexts provided by the participants were open and general. This approach to 
investigating moral validity in administrative decision-making could, however, be more 
finely focused on a particular case where the rightness of an initiative is in question. In 
such an instance, the range of interviews could be expanded or the interview data could 
be supplemented with a large-scale survey of constituents in order to test the veracity of 
the claims made by senior administrators. Additional questioning and measures could be 
used as checks of district-wide practices to assess levels of truthfulness and non-coercion, 
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for example. Another approach to issues of veracity or the reliability of respondents could 
involve ethnographic observations made of actual practices employed by the district 
during decision making. Such observations could be used for comparison to senior 
interviews and claims of inclusion and participation, for example.  
 A possible outcome of additional empirical research could be practical proposals 
to ease morally constraining factors in school-district administration from a discourse-
theoretical perspective. Through further communication and partnership with district 
administrators, educators, and constituents, this research may stimulate modification of 
present decision-making practices and the implementation of new procedures that better 
attend to the democratic needs of a multiculturally diverse population. Further extensions 
of this study could widen the foundation of critical perspectives on schooling by 
providing a tangible continuum of conditions for assessing the moral validity of 
educational initiatives. 
 Of course, it is also possible to anticipate the emergence of new questions 
prompting further empirical investigation of the point on the continuum of conditions at 
which rational trust is lost: How much inclusion, participation, truthfulness, and non-
coercion are needed in educational decision making in order to maintain constituents’ 
rational trust? When rational trust fails, what is (are) the specific condition(s) that has 
(have) precipitated its failure? Such questions are bound to arise given the counterfactual 
nature of the idealizing conditions and the recognition that, in concrete circumstances, 
how to apply the moral point of view is never crystal clear. As long as this conceptual 
constraint on the philosophical framework is acknowledged, however, future empirical 
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research would still have the advantage of starting with a well-identified and clearly 
verified set of relevant conditions. While much discussion around the requisite fulfillment 
of specific conditions is certain to take place in concrete cases, the discussion will be 
informed and supported by a vital and sound philosophical grounding: a moral 
epistemology that provides real possibilities for advancing understanding and assessment 
of morality in the field of educational administration.    
8.2 Critical Work: Checking Imperatives and Understandings in Specific Cases  
 Another avenue of investigation arising from the current study is an opportunity 
to test the core assumptions under which district initiatives proceed. Questioning, for 
instance, if there is wide agreement among all the constituents of a district that “student 
learning” should be the priority of public education, or if there are other priorities of 
equal or greater importance to the stakeholders, other claims on generalizable interests 
and values that may meet with acceptance under conditions of moral validity. 
Furthermore, if student learning is validated as the highest priority of public education 
then new questions emerge concerning what specifically this priority means in terms of 
curriculum and pedagogy, and how progress toward this goal will be assessed. This work 
would result in wider verification, clarification, and interpretation of assumed mandates 
that are the impetus of particular initiatives. Such research might also rely on more 
extensive interviewing, administering general surveys, and observing concrete instances 
of consensus building. The results of data collection could inform a critical assessment of 
the underlying assumptions supporting educational objectives and measures. Arguments 
grounded in the necessary conditions of moral validity could be advanced according to 
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whether the assumed imperatives that drive policy are, for instance, impartial in nature or 
in fact represent a hegemonic worldview favouring the dominant socio-economic class 
and legitimized by the formal structures and processes of the educational system. The 
relevance of such research is supported by the reflection of one senior administrator that 
“we’ve not had any kind of process in this country about what people really want in their 
public education system. People simply have accepted the dominant voice, so we’ve not 
had any legitimate discussion of education.”  
 In addition to providing means of challenging the impartiality and interpretation 
of specific educational initiatives, critical extension of this research may have additional 
implications for initiatives that appear warranted on the basis of self-evident moral 
norms. Such moral norms include the principle of equal respect, which is often cited as 
the moral warrant for dialogical and democratic initiatives aimed at establishing more 
inclusive decision making across school districts. Unless such norms are somehow 
understood as epistemic requirements or “argumentative rights”, however, they provide a 
substantively moral grounding of administrative practice – a ground that appeals to a 
residual moral intuition inherent in common conceptions of “justice” and “fairness”. 
When this is the case, the morality of initiatives rests on an explicitly moral assumption 
such as the self-evident right of equal respect. In turn, this valuing of equal respect may 
simply reflect the moral intuitions and attitudes of a particular ethos or worldview and 
cannot, therefore, satisfy the epistemic requirements of an impartial and universal moral 
point of view.   
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 O’Toole’s (1996) influential argument for values-based leadership provides an 
excellent example of how asserting the principle of equal respect can lead to a circular 
justification of inclusive organizational practices such as dialogical decision making. 
O’Toole’s work is commendable for attempting to place morality at the center of 
organizational life and leadership. To his further credit, O’Toole conceptualizes dialogue 
in a categorically different manner than does Senge by identifying equal respect as an 
indispensable moral principle of successful organizations. For Senge, dialogue is a 
strategic necessity, but for O’Toole, dialogue within the organization is a moral 
obligation based on the principle of equal respect. While an initial reading of O’Toole 
suggests this is a positive approach to organizational leadership from a critical 
perspective, it must be recognized that this shift fails to satisfy Habermas’s claim that 
moral validity can only be warranted through practical discourses. In this sense, 
O’Toole’s account of values-based leadership is the inverse of Habermas’s Discourse 
Theory of Morality in that a moral norm is supplied by O’Toole in justification of 
organizational dialogue. For Habermas, it is the moral validity of universal egalitarianism 
and any policy supervenient on this norm that is redeemed and reaffirmed through 
dialogical reasoning.  
 This inverse relation does not negate the importance of O’Toole and others who 
broach the topic of morality in organizational leadership. Starratt (2004), for instance, 
asserts that principals have a “moral responsibility” to ensure their decisions are not 
arbitrary, involve due deliberation, and show caring for all who will be affected (p. 47). It 
does, however, draw attention to a key implication of placing Habermas’s moral point of 
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view at the center of educational organizations. That implication is a reminder that the 
moral point of view is an intersubjective, epistemic viewpoint and not a substantively 
moral position. From this critical perspective, leaders should actively promote the 
conditions amenable to establishing the moral validity of initiatives through engagement 
in practical discourse, and remain cautious and reflexive when justifying policy under 
generalized conceptions of morality. Not to do so risks jeopardising the impartiality of 
educational policy and fails at opening space for constituent engagement in morally 
justified policymaking. While in such cases the values and intentions of decision makers 
might be good and in keeping with perceived moral norms, the initiatives they develop 
may well lack the epistemic backing of communicative rationality and a claim to moral 
validity.    
8.3 Recommendations: Cultivating the Moral Point of View of Administrators 
 This study has a final implication that concerns the teaching of graduate courses 
in educational administration and leadership. It suggests that course material and class 
discussion of the conditions of strategic validity, so prevalent in the administration 
curriculum, should be conducted in concert with teaching about the specific epistemic 
features of practical discourse. In this way, Habermas’s discourse theory would provide 
students with a resource for argumentation on the generalizability of organizational 
norms, constituent interests, and policy initiatives. This would constitute a morally 
progressive approach that expands the deliberative awareness of future educational 
administrators by introducing them equally to strategic and moral dimensions of 
educational decision-making. By consciously introducing moral epistemology into the 
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educational administration curriculum, emphasis can be placed on how the strategic and 
moral domains converge, diverge, and conflict. This approach to the education of future 
leaders would allow enhanced analysis of administration literature, greater questioning of 
accepted norms of communication, the challenging of preconceived understandings of 
educational leadership roles, and formal examination of educational imperatives from a 
moral point of view.  
 A full extension of this educative process would further concentrate on cultivating 
the dispositions necessary for actual engagement in practical discourses (Kelly, 2010, 
2013; Kelly & Okshevsky, 2012). This is a natural extension of the theoretical framing of 
the moral point of view (Rehg, 2003), moving from developing the moral competence of 
students of educational administration to fostering in them the dispositions of character 
that allow practical discourses to become the norm of decision making. There exists a 
precedent for the value of this approach to moral education in the abundant “teacher 
dispositions” literature (Borko, Liston, & Whitcomb, 2007; Burant, Chubbuck, & Whipp, 
2007; Kelly, 2013; Kelly & Okshevsky, 2012; Sanger, 2008) and in the work of at least 
one advocate for situating moral virtues in the arena of school leadership (Starratt, 2004). 
Taking a step in the direction of “administrator dispositions” is also consistent with 
conveying a moral point of view toward the center ring under the “big tent” (Donmoyer, 
1999) of educational administration. Developing such a dispositional approach to school-
district leadership could also employ something like rational trust. As a starting point, 
rational trust could be conceived as an indicator of administrators’ disposition to be 
sincere and to engage in reciprocal perspective taking in their reasoning and judgement. 
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Whether administrators show a sincere and reciprocal character could then be examined 
by paying close attention to the normative conditions under which they make decisions.   
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Appendix 1 
Letter of Informed Consent to be Interviewed for Research 
 Related to “Morally-Valid Decision Making in School-District Administration: 
Newfoundland and Labrador Case Studies”. 
 
 Please take a moment to read the following information about this research while 
considering your willingness to participate in giving an interview that will be audio taped 
and transcribed for analysis. The interview should take approximately one hour and may 
be conducted at a secure location at the Faculty of Education building or at any other 
location you deem acceptable. This research is being undertaken by Darron Kelly, a 
Doctoral student at Memorial University’s Faculty of Education and supervised by Dr. 
Jean Brown who is a Full Professor at the Faculty. The purpose of this research is to 
investigate the degree to which school-district policy- and decision-making uphold values 
of inclusion, participation, non-coercion, and truthfulness and to create new approaches 
to decision making that better instantiate these values.  
 
 While educational decision making has long been a subject of inquiry, very little 
attention has been paid to the place and extent of moral values in decision-making 
processes. Your participation in this research will help fill in this gap in the current 
understanding of educational decisions. If you participate, you will be agreeing to grant 
an approximately one-hour unscripted interview. During this interview you will be asked 
general questions about your conceptions of inclusion, participation, non-coercion, and 
truthfulness within the context of school-district administration. You will also be asked 
about your professional experiences with policy- and decision-making and if you have 
thoughts or ideas about how inclusion, participation, non-coercion, and truthfulness may 
be better represented in decision-making processes.  
 
 You should know that all information collected is confidential and the anonymity 
of all participants will be maintained to the fullest extent possible. You need not answer 
any question that makes you uncomfortable and any resulting publications or 
dissemination of findings will maintain the highest possible level of confidentiality and 
anonymity for all participants. You have the right to withdraw at any time and, if you so 
choose, all information you have provided will be destroyed. All interviews and 
transcripts will be held at a secure location at Memorial University for five years, after 
which time they will be destroyed.  
 
 Despite our sincere commitment to your privacy, the unlikely risk remains that 
someone other than the researchers may hear or read your interview and/or associate a 
particular interview with a particular participant. You need also know that due to the 
study’s focus on a single school-district over a specific time period, there is a risk that 
your statements or opinions may be identified by someone reading the research findings. 
This risk of identification may also be increased by the relatively small number of 
interviews we intend to conduct (approximately 10-15). We will take every precaution to 
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protect your privacy so that any information you provide will be kept confidential and 
will not be available to anyone except the researchers, and that future publication of the 
research findings will protect your anonymity.  Your participation is voluntary. 
The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary 
Committee on Ethics in Human Research and found to be in compliance with Memorial 
University ’s ethics policy. If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the 
way you have been treated or your rights as a participant), you may contact the 
Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by telephone at 737-8368. 
If you agree to participate, please date and sign this consent form.    
 
I hereby consent to be interviewed for “Morally-Valid Decision Making in School-
District Administration”. 
 
Name:  ________________________________  
 
Signature:    ____________________________  
 
Date:  _________________________________  
  
Researcher: 
Darron Kelly (Ph.D. Candidate) 
Memorial University, Faculty of Education. 
(403) 580-5804 
diklly@mta.ca 
 
Co-Supervisor: 
Dr. Jean Brown 
Memorial University, Faculty of Education. 
(709) 737-7561 
jbrown@mun.ca 
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Appendix 2 
Interview Guide 
ICEHR No. 2009/10-087-ED 
Anticipated length of interview: 60 - 90 minutes 
 
Thank you for agreeing to this interview. 
I’m interested in hearing your impressions of the decision-making processes that occur 
around initiatives in your school district. Is that alright? 
Can you tell me about a district-wide initiative in which you participated? 
Can you describe the process that brought about that initiative? 
Can you describe your role in the process? 
Do you remember some of the other key roles or contributions to the process? 
What were some of the outcomes of that initiative? 
Looking back… what would you say were the strengths of the decision-making process 
itself? 
What weaknesses do you see in the process? 
If the district had to make similar decisions today… what suggestions would you make 
for improving the process? 
Are you familiar with some of the educational decision-making literature? 
There are many factors that might be of interest in investigating decision making but, at 
this point, I’m particularly interested in hearing your thoughts on some aspects that are 
not often discussed in the literature. These include things like “inclusion”, 
“participation”, “truthfulness”, and “coercion”. Is it alright if I ask you some questions 
about these aspects of decision making? 
Again, in relation to the process you’ve just described… can you tell me your impression 
of the “inclusiveness” of the process? 
Do you think the process had an appropriate level of “inclusion”. 
(If “yes” or if “no”) How so? 
(If “no”) How do you think the process could have been more “inclusive”? 
Can you tell me your impression of the “participation” that took place within the process? 
Do you think the process had an appropriate level of “participation”? 
(If “yes” or if “no”) How so? 
(If “no”) How do you think the process could have encouraged greater “participation”? 
Can you tell me your impression of the “truthfulness” occurring within the process? 
Do you think the process had an appropriate level of “truthfulness”? 
(If “yes” or if “no”) How so? 
(If “no”) How do you think the process could have better supported “truthfulness”? 
Can you tell me your impression of the “coercion” that may have taken place within the 
process? 
Do you think the process had an acceptable level of “coercion”? 
(If “yes” or if “no”) How so? 
(If “no”) How do you think the process could have worked with less “coercion”? 
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In your opinion, who else should we speak with about decision-making processes that 
occur around initiatives in your school district?  
Thank you very much for this interview. Is there anything else you would like to add or 
discuss at this point? 
Do you have any questions or is there anything else you would like to know about this 
study? 
 
Thank you again.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Additional Relevant Interview Data (Coded by Subtheme)∗
 
On the condition of inclusion: 
 
“[If] we’re trying to enhance a certain culture that puts it in a stage of growth, then 
inclusion has to be there.” [SS] 
 
“If you tell people what to do, they generally won’t do it if you’re not looking. But if you 
include them and they’re a part of the decision-making process, they engage.” [SS] 
 
“A big part of the inclusion is to try to create coherence.” [SS] 
 
“People bring different things to the table and it’s the multiple voices that legitimize the 
dialogue and make it valuable.” [SS] 
 
“From the point of view of inclusiveness, it [the example initiative] would have included 
and given everybody a chance to participate but it [the decision-making process] didn’t 
necessarily try to arrive at some kind of consensus building. It was not about that at all.” 
[SS] 
 
“It [the example initiative] could possibly have been more inclusive from the perspective 
of involving principals. It’s not that we didn’t think about it. We made a decision that it 
would be most helpful to them to give them a buffer [from the parent community].” [SL] 
 
On the condition of participation: 
 
“When people are asked for views or asked to contribute and participate, they do come 
onboard.” [OC] 
 
“We’ve tried various ways to get the consultation, through private meetings or public 
meetings, to get a full range of input.” [OC] 
 
“Each participant has to be granted a clearly equal opportunity to make their 
contribution” [OC] 
 
“You can’t have your employees out in the community knocking down some kind of an 
initiative that the district has. They [teachers] are given their opportunity to bring forward 
their concerns [privately] and so we can try to address them.” [SL] 
 
                                                 
∗ Coding: Overlapping Condition [OC]; Counterfactual in Practice [CP]; Strategically Salient [SS]; 
Interrelated Nature [IN]; Strategic Limiting [SL]. 
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“Sometimes the participation rate in processes might be as simple as people giving a 
quick eyeballing of the change process or the decision that’s about to be made and 
drawing a conclusion, accurately or otherwise, that, ‘Oh well, this is nothing new so I 
don’t need to bother’.” [CP] 
 
“When you invite people to engage and they say, ‘I don’t want to engage. I’m not 
interested in engaging. I’m too busy to engage’, then decisions have to be made 
[unilaterally].” [CP] 
 
“There’s presentations by various groups with different points of view but there’s not lots 
of opportunity for some good to-and-fro discussion which brings you to a better decision 
point.” [CP] 
 
“To think that you would be able to have a process in place where every single person 
could have equal opportunity for substantial participation might be a little bit of a 
stretch.” [CP] 
 
On the condition of truthfulness: 
 
“I think people were true to what they believed in and they were trying to find whatever 
evidence they could find to back it up.” [OC] 
 
“Research gave me personally the surety of that truth which I instinctively felt anyway 
but which was confirmed for me in research.” [OC] 
 
“The truthfulness was in that focus [the expressed educational imperative]. We were true 
to that.” [OC] 
 
“All I can say about the truthfulness of this initiative is that it was to everyone’s 
advantage to put out there entirely what we [the District office] were about.” [OC] 
 
“There’s probably that level of truthfulness that if you’re one-hundred percent honest, 
you probably would shut down some of the meaningful dialogue.” [CP] 
 
“On the level of truthfulness that exists throughout the organization, I think it would be 
naïve to think that everybody in your organization is going to give you the truth.” [CP] 
 
“We’re very truthful in that domain. We share the cold, hard data, the enrolment data, 
infrastructure, the age of buildings, any reports that we have and so on. We share those.” 
[SS]  
 
“We’re not just picking this stuff out of thin air and just creating it. There is a solid 
research base to substantiate what we are talking about.” [SS] 
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“We did lots of research on it [the example initiative] and visited schools and [had] 
consultations with principals.” [SS] 
 
“We used the literature and we used other schools in the province [to make a case for the 
policy]”. [SS] 
 
“It’s really, I believe for education, a kind of golden age of the utility of research to our 
practical realities.” [SS] 
 
 “[If] people see that you’re genuinely working to include them, that you’re truthful and 
honest, then it does change the whole credibility piece and it changes [the level of 
engagement] on their end.” [SS] 
 
“If this [the value of the example initiative] had not been true and we had not been paying 
attention to what was happening and to the concerns parents were expressing, it 
[implementation] would have been a much more difficult process.” [SS] 
 
On the condition of non-coercion: 
 
“If you give people an opportunity to dialogue and you have defined periods for that and 
processes to engage in reaching consensus and the processes are well defined, people 
don’t feel coerced.” [OC] 
 
“If you don’t have equal players, players that are valued to the same extent, then it 
becomes a coercive environment.” [OC] 
  
“[If] people said, ‘You make the decision. You’re in the position to make it’ [and] I make 
a decision that affects their lives, that’s not coercion because they said to me, ‘You make 
it’.” [OC] 
 
“There’s a line there and what is viewed by somebody as being a persuasive article or 
persuasive arguments may be viewed by the person receiving it as coercion.” [CP] 
 
“There’s always an element of coercion whenever you set out and try to put forth your 
point.” [CP] 
 
“You’re going to have more success [implementing policy] with interactive and learning 
approaches than you would with dogmatic or authoritarian approaches. We [senior 
district administrators] believe there are better approaches, not only from a human 
perspective, but in terms of wanting to accomplish what we want to accomplish.” [SS] 
 
“Anything that you can achieve without coercion is going to be achieved more fully, 
normally, than it would be with coercion.” [SS] 
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“I think my director wanted me to do that [implement the example initiative] in a way 
that would cause the least problem. My School Board [of Trustees] would have wanted 
me to do it in a way that would cause the least problem. The government would have 
wanted me to do that. There was pressure only in that sense, ‘do it and do it right’.” [SL]  
 
“The whole point of communication and offering growth opportunities and trying to 
bring people onside with the important initiatives that you want to undertake [is that] you 
will try everything else before coercion.” [SS/SL] 
  
“They [parents] probably felt we were being coercive, but, in my view, it was an 
appropriate coercion. It was appropriate because you needed to shape it [the initiative] in 
a particular way that in the long run would be better.” [SS/SL] 
 
“When he [the head of the school district] convinced the district [administrators] that the 
best approach would be to go forward with a smaller number of options, it was the right 
use of coercion or the right use of power or influence.” [SS/SL] 
 
“Not having teachers in the community just saying all kinds of things about this 
[initiative], I suppose, would be viewed by some as coercion. I don’t see it that way 
[because] teachers had their opportunity [in private consultations] to bring forward 
concerns.” [SS/SL] 
 
“There’s certainly an element of the staff [teachers] that believe they are coerced into not 
speaking out [but] there are other staff members who would actually feel coerced [by the 
community] if they weren’t given an opportunity to speak out in private. I think you’re 
going to have feelings of coercion whichever way you move down that path [of policy 
consultation].” [IN/ SS/SL]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
